


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026009

Date: 28 Jan 2026 Time: 1616Z Position: 5143N 00007E Location: 1NM west of North Weald

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152	Sling 4
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	North Weald	North Weald
Altitude/FL	1100ft	1000ft
Transponder	A, C	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, blue, red	Red, silver
Lighting	Beacon, nav, ldg	Bcn, ldg, strobe
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1200ft	1100ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH
Heading	~350°	200°
Speed	90kt	75kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	TAS, PilotAware
Alert	N/A	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/~0.25NM H	500ft V/0.5NM H ¹
Recorded	100ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE C152 PILOT reports that they had been on a PPL instructional flight on circuit detail. They had established on downwind leg and made their position call. The other aircraft, [the Sling 4], was joining from the east on the standard crosswind join. Despite multiple calls from the Air/Ground Operator and [the C152 pilot], and [the C152] being directly in front of them, the Sling 4 pilot did not see them [they opine] and were not prepared to give way. When that pilot spotted them, the aircraft deviated course behind [the C152] then flew a wide circuit. After landing, the C152 pilot had taxied for a simulated RTO and, whilst waiting at the A2 hold, witnessed the same aircraft landing on an occupied runway. [...].

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

THE SLING 4 PILOT reports that, as they came in from the east to join North Weald, they descended to circuit height of 1200ft over Chipping Ongar; this is usual at North Weald to allow for departing aircraft to climb away higher. They [made] a crosswind join at 1200ft and were aware from the radio that there were a couple of others in the circuit so [the pilot] was looking out for them. They were having electronic conspicuity [alerts] on SkyDemon through their iPad and there was an aircraft highlighted on the downwind ahead of them; this turned out to be [an uninvolved aircraft]. As they had joined the circuit they had been surprised to see a second aircraft on the downwind;² as far as they can recall that one was not showing up on the iPad, but they did have visual contact. In response, they extended the crosswind and then the downwind legs to increase the clearance and remember asking their passenger to help track where it was. The pilot thought it landed on the runway as they had been on base but can't recall for certain as they also remember [the uninvolved aircraft] making a touch-and-go right in front of them.[...].

¹ Sling 4 pilot reports relative to a different (uninvolved) aircraft and a different position in the circuit.

² The reporting aircraft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE NORTH WEALD AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that they can confirm that they had been in the Tower at the time of the incident. RW20 had been the runway in use. From what [the A/G operator] remembers, the weather was pretty good. Visibility was at least 10km. Wind was light and variable. The C152 was conducting training circuits with 2 POB. The Sling 4 was inbound to the field from the east with 1 POB. At 1614, before [the Sling 4] arrived in the circuit, the A/G operator had informed the pilot of the current traffic (the C152 was, at the time, on the climbout). When the C152 pilot had called downwind, the A/G operator advised the pilot of the joining Sling 4. The C152 pilot stated that they were "visual". The A/G operator then asked the Sling 4 pilot if they had been visual with the (by then) downwind traffic, as they had deemed there to be a reasonable risk of conflict. At first, [the Sling 4 pilot] had said "negative", but shortly after stated that they were "visual". The C152 pilot then asked the Sling 4 pilot "if they intended to give way?". The Sling 4 pilot replied "I will give way, affirm". The two aircraft then continued round the circuit with the C152 ahead of the Sling 4. It is difficult to say, from the tower perspective, how close the aircraft got to one another.

Factual Background

The weather at Stansted Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGSS 281550Z AUTO 15004KT 100V200 9999 NCD 07/04 Q0995=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and the Sling 4 was identified via Mode S data. CPA is assessed to have occurred mid-way between consecutive radar sweeps as the C152 had passed through the 12 o'clock of the Sling 4 with the aircraft vertically separated by 100ft and the lateral separation at the 2 sweeps bracketing CPA both noted as 0.1NM.




Figure 1 – at CPA minus 2sec (1615:47)

The C152 and Sling 4 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.³ An aircraft operated on or in the

³ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.⁴

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C152 and a Sling 4 flew into proximity 1NM west of North Weald at 1616Z on Wednesday 28th January 2026. Both pilots had been operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of an Air/Ground Communications Service from North Weald Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data and a report from the Air/Ground Operator involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly considered the actions of the C152 pilot, noting that they had been established in the circuit on an instructional flight and had been made aware of the incoming Sling 4 through radio calls between the AGO and that pilot. Members agreed that, as the C152 had not carried any electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment, the pilot had gained only generic situational awareness of the position of the Sling 4 (**CF3**) before having sighted that aircraft to their right-hand side. Board members then discussed the question of relative priority in the circuit according to SERA and opined that, in such situations, all pilots are encouraged to act sufficiently early to avoid close encounters regardless of their status with respect to the Rules of the Air. Acknowledging that the C152 pilot had been established in the circuit and that it had been for the Sling 4 pilot to have integrated appropriately, they felt that it is wise to assume that the other pilot may not be equally experienced or have achieved visual contact and be prepared to alter their own flightpath to maintain separation. In this case, the CPA was measured at 100ft and less than 0.1NM, with Board members feeling that the C152 pilot, having sighted the Sling 4 on crosswind, had perhaps then allowed the 2 aircraft to come into a closer proximity than might otherwise have been the case (**CF6**).

Members moved on to consider the role played by the Sling 4 pilot, accepting that they had established contact with the North Weald AGO before entering the circuit pattern and had been informed of the other traffic at that time. The Board noted that the Sling 4 had been equipped with an EC unit capable of registering emissions from the C152, but that it had not done so (**CF4**) and the Sling 4 pilot had been left with only generic situational awareness of the position of the C152 (**CF3**). Although the Sling 4 pilot had gained only generic situational awareness and then a late-sighting of the C152 (**CF5**), members felt that the pilot had not effectively integrated with that other traffic (**CF2**) nor conformed with the pattern of traffic as established by the C152, possibly because they had considered that the C152 had also been joining traffic (**CF1**).

Board members wished to stress the need for constant 'Threat and Error Management' attention by all pilots at all stages of their flights, regardless of airspace status or classification. The carriage and use of EC alongside the utilisation of Air Traffic Services where available helped in that area and was actively encouraged. They noted that CAP2583⁵ had helped in the understanding of the limitations of 'See and Avoid' and recommended it to all GA pilots as a timely reminder.

In reviewing the actions of the North Weald Air/Ground Operator, members felt that they had been proactive in their communication and traffic awareness and had made all pilots aware of other aircraft operating in the circuit and that, in this case, had done all possible to assist the pilots involved in this event.

The Board, in assessing a Risk category for this event, noted that the AGO had enabled clear communication between the 2 pilots involved and that the C152 pilot had gained visual contact with the Sling 4 as it had closed towards the downwind leg. Noting the requirements of SERA, they nonetheless

⁴ (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

⁵ [CAP2583](#)

felt that both pilots could have more proactively generated greater separation at CPA. The Board agreed that safety had not been assured (CF7) and, as such, assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2026009				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
1	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
2	Human Factors	• Incomplete Action	Events involving flight crew performing a task but then not fully completing that task or action that they were intending to carry out	Pilot did not sufficiently integrate with the other aircraft despite Situational Awareness
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
4	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
• See and Avoid				
5	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
6	Contextual	• Loss of Separation	An event involving a loss of separation between aircraft	Pilot flew into conflict
• Outcome Events				
7	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁶

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the Sling 4 pilot did not conform with the pattern of traffic as formed by the C152.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because, although both pilots had generic situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft, the Sling 4 pilot had not sufficiently integrated with the C152.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the Sling 4 had not registered any electronic emissions from the C152.

⁶ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

See and Avoid was assessed as **partially effective** because the C152 pilot, having visually acquired the Sling 4, allowed the 2 aircraft to become proximate.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026009		Outside Controlled Airspace						
Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness					
			Barrier Weighting					
			0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	[Green bar: 0% to 5%]				
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓	[Green bar: 0% to 2.5%]				
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicition & Action	✓	✓	[Green bar: 0% to 15%]				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○	[Grey bar: 0% to 2.5%]				
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	[Green bar: 0% to 10%]				
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	⚠	[Yellow bar: 0% to 10%]				
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	⚠	✗	[Red bar: 0% to 20%]				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⚠	✗	[Red bar: 0% to 15%]				
	See & Avoid	✓	⚠	[Yellow bar: 0% to 20%]				
Key:			Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used	
Provision	✓	⚠	✗	○				
Application	✓	⚠	✗	○		○		
Effectiveness	[Green]	[Yellow]	[Red]	[Grey]		[Red Box]		