


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2026006**

Date: 19 Jan 2026 Time: ~1341Z Position: 5114N 00155E Location: Dover Straits

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	DA62	EC155
Operator	Coast Guard	Civ Helo
Airspace	TDA098E	London FIR
Class	Danger Area	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	London Information	London Information
Altitude/FL	NK	NK
Transponder	None <sup>1</sup>	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Red, White	Blue
Lighting	Strobes, Position, Taxy, Landing	Nav, Strobe, Landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2200ft	2500-2750ft
Altimeter	QNH (1014hPa)	QNH (1013hPa)
Heading	Orbiting	273°
Speed	115kt	155kt
ACAS/TAS	TAS	TAS
Alert	Alert	Information
<b>Separation at CPA</b>		
Reported	200-500ft above	400-500ft V/0ft H
Recorded	NK	



**THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO** reports that, at approximately 1333, Ostende called asking for information on danger areas active west of VABIK. They informed them that TDA098 was active up to 2500ft. The EC155 pilot then called on frequency at 1339 at 2500ft west of VABIK. The FISO advised them of the London QNH and told them to remain outside controlled airspace. At approximately 1343, the DA62 pilot, on frequency and believed to be working within the TDA098 complex, called to advise of an "Airprox with a helicopter inside the danger area" and asked for the registration. They replied that they were unable to confirm the callsign over the radio. This was because they were unable to positively identify traffic so could not be 100% certain. The EC155 pilot heard this exchange and responded with confirmation that they were visual with the DA62 traffic and were outside the danger area as they were at 2600ft. The DA62 pilot acknowledged this transmission and asked for the registration again, which was provided.

**THE DA62 PILOT** reports that they were on a coastguard patrol and were tasked to relieve [an aircraft] covering an event in the Dover Straits; it was a well-coordinated swap and the [other aircraft] departed at 1200hrs. They then monitored the event as it moved northwest from the FIR Boundary. Their 1NM orbit was within the Danger Area TDA098E, 1100ft above a Tekever AR5 drone monitoring the same target, whose operator they were coordinating with on the Danger Area frequency to maintain separation. No-one else was cleared into the Danger Area at the time. A possible Airprox occurred at 1342hrs: while orbiting the conclusion of the event (2200ft QNH 1014hPa), the TAS announced 'traffic, 3 o'clock'. On looking right, a dark coloured helicopter appeared from behind the wing (they were in a left-hand orbit so the starboard wing was high and had obscured it) passing a few hundred feet above their aircraft. They noted that workload was high, coordinating on box 2 with the drone operator on the Danger Area frequency, and monitoring the event on the surface with the Coastguard and Border force vessels and that there had been a degree of assumption that the Danger Area gave protection (only

<sup>1</sup> A,C,S reported as fitted, but the aircraft could not be seen on the NATS radar replay.

the drone and their aircraft were cleared into it at the time). The pilot mentioned a possible Airprox to London Information on the frequency and asked if they had the registration. A helicopter pilot came on frequency saying they were at 2600ft, so above the danger area. They [the DA62 pilot] were then re-tasked to Median FIR sweep on conclusion of the event and RTB. After landing they telephoned London Information to discuss the event.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

**THE EC155 PILOT** reports that they departed [...] to [...] VFR to route via VABIK. They asked [departure airfield] Approach controller if the Danger Area west of VABIK was active and were told that it was active with a drone. They climbed to 2500ft to route over the area at its upper limit. After contacting London Information just before VABIK, they set the regional QNH. They saw another aircraft in the 10 o'clock quite far away (around 3NM) which seemed to be below them. They were in constant visual contact with this traffic throughout. They received a TA on the converging traffic which gave the traffic as being 300ft below and they climbed to 2750ft to give 500ft separation. The traffic passed below. They heard the other pilot say on London Info that they [the EC155] were in the danger area and that the pilot was going to file an MOR. The result of [a subsequent] investigation was that the EC155 was outside the area at all times, but the EC155 pilot suggested that they would give such an area a wider berth next time.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

## Factual Background

The weather at Southend was recorded as follows:

METAR EGMC 191320Z 17009KT CAVOK 10/07 Q1014=

An extract from AIC Y 019/2026 covering EGD098E states:

23 **EGD098E** When operationally required a TDA is established within the area bounded by straight lines joining successively the following points:

a) 510756N 0012635E; b) 511454N 0013137E; c) 512251N 0013322E; d) 511740N 0015439E; e) 511447N 0020000E; f) 511153N 0015200E; g) 510607N 0014309E; h) 510336N 0013547E; i) 510756N 0012635E.

24 The TDA EGD098E is established between surface and 1500ft AMSL.

25 In order to accommodate additional RPAS operations, the Upper Limit of EGD098E may extend to 2500 FT AMSL and will be notified by the G field of the activation NOTAM.

## Analysis and Investigation

### NATS Investigation

The pilot of [DA62 C/S] was operating within TDA EGD098E and reported an Airprox on the London Information frequency in relation to a confliction with [EC155 C/S]. The pilot of [EC155] reported they were visual with the DA62 and were outside the vertical TDA limits.

Note: [3 aircraft] were all operating within the Dover Straits area prior to the reported confliction. [one aircraft] vacated the area and left the LFIS frequency at 1204:38, with [a second] returning to Southend at 1319:25, leaving only [the DA62] active in the area. The area to the east of Dover was known to have intermittent low-level radar and RT coverage.

[C/S] was a Diamond DA62 Coastguard aircraft operating within the Dover Straits, receiving a requested Basic Service from London Information from 1125:02 (all times UTC) onwards. The pilot was operating in accordance with AIC Y 162/2025 - AERIAL SURVEY: OFFSHORE DOVER

STRAITS and within Temporary Danger Area (TDA) EGD098E (AIC Y 148/2025) which was NOTAM'd active up to altitude 2500ft (see Figure 1, 2).



Figure 1 - AIC Y 148/2025 Chart



Figure 2 - NOTAM

TDA098 complex had been in operation since 31<sup>st</sup> August 2020 with the current AIC Y 148/2025 and AIC Y 019/2026 stating it would be in operation until the 30<sup>th</sup> September 2026. Usual practice for LFISOs was to provide aircraft tracking towards the LTMA with the London QNH to assist in onward infringement prevention. Aircraft tracking away from the LTMA were also issued the London QNH to ensure aircraft are vertically separated using the same reference datum. The TDA complex was positioned within the Chatham RPS area, although filets of EGD098F/G overlapped below the lateral boundaries of the LTMA.

As [the DA62] was operating within EGD098E (see Figure 1), it was unknown at the time if they were operating in relation to either the Chatham RPS (1008hPa) due to their position close to the FIR boundary at VABIK, or the London QNH (1014hPa)<sup>2</sup>, as previously provided by the LFISO at 1125:02 on initial contact with the LFIS frequency. At the time of the reported conflict, the pilot of [EC155 C/S] had been issued the now updated London QNH (1013hPa) by the LFISO.

UKAIP ENR 1.7-3.9 stated:

Airspace within all Control Zones (CTRs), and within and below all Terminal Control Areas (TMAs), Control Areas (CTAs) except Airways and the Worthing and Clacton Control Areas, during their notified hours of operation, does not form part of the ASR Regional Pressure Setting system.

3.10 When flying in Airspace below TMAs and CTAs detailed above, pilots should use the QNH of an adjacent aerodrome when flying at or below the Transition Altitude. It may be assumed that for aerodromes located beneath such Areas, the differences in the QNH values are insignificant. When flying beneath Airways whose base levels are expressed as Altitudes pilots are recommended to use the QNH of an adjacent aerodrome in order to avoid penetrating the base of Controlled Airspace.

UKAIP ENR 6-18 provided an ASR chart with a note stating:

The airspace below all airways and the Clacton, Cotswold, North Sea, Strangford and Worthing CTAs is part of the forecast QNH Altimeter Setting Region System (ASRs). Within all CTRs and within and below all TMAs and all other CTAs, during their notified hours of operation, the airspace does not form part of the forecast QNH ASRs.

These UKAIP entries suggested if operating below the Worthing CTA, aircraft were required to apply their altitude according to the Chatham ASR. However, the base of the Worthing CTA is applied according to Standard Pressure 1013hPa and stipulated as a FL (Figure 3).

<sup>2</sup> The pilot reported to UKAB that they were operating on the QNH 1014hPa.



Figure 3

Safety Investigations requested clarification from [Company], the Controlling Authority for the TDAs, who stated their BVLOS UAS operated on the Lydd Airfield (EGMD) QNH (1015hPa). AIC Y148/2025 and AIC Y019/2026 which provided detail on the TDA complex did not stipulate the QNH on which these TDA vertical boundaries were applicable. [The DA62] was operating approximately 40NM from Southend. The Airprox report from the pilot of [DA62 C/S] stated they were operating on QNH 1014hPa and were in communication with [Company] who were operating the drone beneath them.

Note: There is no requirement for pilots to receive an ATS in Class G airspace, therefore pilots may be unaware of the specific QNH requirement to vertically avoid TDA098 complex, with the UKAIP implying the Chatham RPS would be required. The London QNH is consistently within a maximum of 2hPa greater than the Lydd QNH.

#### Event

The pilot of [the DA62] had previously contacted the London Information (LFIS) frequency at 1125:02 and requested a Basic Service. The pilot reported their position as Ramsgate at altitude 2600ft. A Basic Service was provided with the London QNH of 1014hPa advised. No further reported positions, altitudes or ops normal checks were exchanged with the LFISO prior to the subsequent reported conflict at 1341.

CAP774 UK Flight Information Services Chapter 2.1 stated that:

Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight.

AIC Y 064/2023 UK Flight Information Services advised pilots, with regard to Traffic Information under a Basic Service:

It is essential to remember that the controller or FISO will, under a Basic Service, provide only generic traffic information on airspace activity that they are aware of, when it is practicable for them to do so. This is subject to their workload and they are not required to monitor the progress of flights in receipt of Basic Service. ... Consequently, it is important for pilots to maintain a good lookout and to listen to radio transmissions from other aircraft to develop a mental picture of where aircraft are and to ensure that they continue to operate their flight safely.

[EC155 C/S] was an EC155 helicopter routing from [redacted] to [redacted]. The Ostend Approach controller telephoned the LFISO at 1330:07, stating the pilot of [the EC155] had requested information on Danger Area activity status west of VABIK, with the aircraft routing towards DET. The LFISO advised that EGD098E was active up to altitude 2500ft. [The DA62] was not within radar coverage prior to the reported conflict and was therefore not displayed on the LFIS Flight Information Display (FID) to provide situational awareness to the LFISO at the time of this initial

estimate passed by Ostend (Figure 4). As detailed previously, position updates had not been provided by the pilot following the initial call on frequency.



Figure 4

The pilot of [the EC155] contacted the LFIS frequency at 1339:20 and reported 1NM west of VABIK at altitude 2500ft. Therefore, in line with SERA.6001, was assessed to be positioned outside EGD098E. A service type was not requested by the pilot, with a LFIS maximum Basic Service subsequently stated with advice to remain outside controlled airspace with the London QNH of 1013hPa advised (London QNH had reduced by 1hPa from passing to [the DA62]), all of which was read back correctly by the pilot.

At 1341:48, the pilot of [the DA62] advised the LFISO: *“I’ve had an Airprox with a helicopter, [they’re] in the Danger Area to the north, have you got a callsign for them?”* The CA4114 from the LFISO stated: ‘I replied that I am unable to confirm the callsign over the radio. This is because I am unable to positively identify traffic so cannot be 100%. The [EC155 pilot] heard this exchange and responded ...’ - *“[EC155 C/S] we were visual with the aircraft, and we were outside of the Danger Area, we were two thousand six hundred feet.”*

Neither aircraft was displayed on the FID at this time. NODE radar also displayed no primary or secondary contacts; therefore, a closest point of approach could not be ascertained (Figure 5).



Figure 5

Third party ADS-B data suggested [the DA62] was at altitude 2175ft at the time of the reported Airprox (Figure 6). ADS-B data displayed [EC155 C/S] was climbing through altitude 2500ft as it tracked west of the FIR boundary (Figure 7).




Figure 6



Figure 7

Based on [the DA62] maintaining altitude 2200ft (from the pilot Airprox report), this would have provided a potential 300ft vertical separation against any traffic crossing above EGD098E. The pilot Airprox report stated vertical separation was between 200-500ft. Pilot reported altitudes and QNHs set suggested the two aircraft had a minimum of 300ft vertical distance. [The EC155] first displayed on radar at 1342:07, 4.7NM west of VABIK at altitude 2700ft, correlating with the pilot report that stated they subsequently climbed to altitude 2700ft. A further request from the LFISO for a position report from the pilot of [the DA62] at 1348:22 was not responded to.

The pilot of [the DA62] suggested on the frequency that [the EC155] was within the vertical confines of the TDA. The pilot reported on initial contact with LFIS, at altitude 2500ft and was provided with the London QNH of 1013hPa. The differential between the London QNH (1013hPa) and the Lydd QNH (1015hPa) on which the TDA vertical limit was established (according to [company] Ops), suggested the pilot of [the EC155] had not infringed EGD098E with the aircraft positioned above the vertical limit.

Note: This information on use of Lydd QNH to establish the vertical limit of TDA EGD098 complex has since been promulgated to the London FIS operation.

## Conclusions

The pilot of [the EC155] had previously requested information on EGD098E activity and vertical limits via Ostend Approach in order remain outside the TDA. The Airprox occurred when the pilot of [DA62] reported an Airprox with a helicopter inside the TDA EGD098E Danger Area, shortly after the pilot of [the EC155] had reported 1NM west of the FIR boundary at 2500ft. [the EC155 pilot] was advised of the London QNH, as per standard practice, unbeknown that the TDA098 complex operated with regard to vertical limits on the Lydd Airfield QNH (1015hPa). [The DA62 pilot] reported operating on QNH of 1014hPa. The confliction occurred at approximately 1341:48, however, neither aircraft was visible on radar and therefore a closest point of approach could not be ascertained. Pilot reports of altitudes and QNH applied suggested vertical separation was a minimum of 300ft. The incident was resolved by the pilot of [the DA62] continuing their left-hand orbit. The pilot of [the EC155] reported they were climbing to altitude 2700ft and were visual with [the DA62] at all times until past.

## UKAB Secretariat

The NATS radar replay was assessed and neither aircraft could be seen at the time of the Airprox. The EC155 appeared on the radar replay just after the Airprox at 1342, heading west, indicating FL027. Both aircraft could be seen and identified using open-source data sources, with the DA62 indicating on ADS-B and the EC155 showing using MLAT data only. However, the length of time between updates on the EC155 meant that an accurate assessment of separation could not be

made, therefore the diagram at the top of the page has been compiled using pilot reports and approximate ADS-B and MLAT data.

The DA62 and EC155 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>3</sup>

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DA62 and an EC155 flew into proximity within the Dover Straits at around 1341Z on Monday 19<sup>th</sup> January 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data, a report from the FISO involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the actions of the DA62 pilot. Members noted that the pilot had been operating within the confines of TDA098E, which had been active up to 2500ft, although the DA62 had been operating at around 2300ft at the time of the Airprox. Members noted that the workload for the DA62 pilot would have been high, in both achieving their tasking with the drone also operating in the TDA and flying the aircraft. The pilot had been receiving a non-surveillance-based Basic Service from London Information (**CF2**) and therefore would have been unlikely to have received any Traffic Information but had been relying on the TDA to provide protection from other aircraft. The DA62 pilot had received information on the EC155 from their TAS (**CF3**) and, on searching for the other aircraft, had seen the EC155 and had, incorrectly, believed it to have been within the TDA and had therefore been concerned by its proximity (**CF4**).

Turning to the actions of the EC155 pilot, members noted that the pilot had planned ahead and had asked Ostende ATC to confirm the activity status of the TDA and had arranged their altitude to be above the TDA accordingly. On crossing the FIR boundary, the pilot had called London Information to receive a Basic Service and had been given the London QNH, with the FISO content that their altitude had been above the TDA. The EC155 pilot had reported that their TAS had alerted them to traffic (**CF3**), with which they had become visual at a range of around 3NM, and members were pleased to note that the pilot had decided to take early action on this information; because the TAS indicated a separation of around 300ft, the pilot had decided to climb to achieve 500ft separation.

The Board briefly looked at the actions of the London Information FISO and were reminded that the FISO can only offer a Basic Service (**CF2**) and, whilst they had radar for information purposes only, the radar coverage in the area of the Airprox was poor. Indeed, the NATS radar replay had not shown the event. Therefore, members were content that the London FISO, having received information that the EC155 had been above the TDA, and without any information on the exact location of the DA62 at the time, could not have foreseen the DA62's pilot's concern.

The Board then discussed the issue raised in the NATS investigation with regard to the pressure setting that the operators in the TDA were using to calculate the vertical limits of the TDA, and how pilots transiting in the area could find this pressure setting. Members discussed the merits of using an RPS versus a local airfield (it was believed that the operators had been using Lydd QNH) and agreed that it did not matter which pressure setting was used, as long as the correct information was made available to all other users. Members debated whether this had played a part in this particular Airprox, but agreed that, because the EC155 pilot had been a few hundred feet above the top of the TDA, the unknown pressure setting had not affected the safety barrier on this occasion. However, members agreed that

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<sup>3</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

this information should be made readily available (CF1) and therefore resolved to make a recommendation that:

*The nominated DA Authority for TDA098 to consider amending the AIC Y019/2026 to specify the pressure datum to be used to define its vertical extent.*

When determining the risk of the Airprox, members considered the reports from both pilots and that of the London Information FISO together with the limited ADS-B data available. They acknowledged that the DA62 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the EC155, but quickly agreed that, because the EC155 pilot had been visual with the DA62, and had been several hundred feet above it, there had been no risk of collision and that normal safety standards had pertained; Risk Category E.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

Contributory Factors:

2026006				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Ground Elements</b>				
<b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b>				
1	Organisational	• Aeronautical Information Services	An event involving the provision of Aeronautical Information	The Ground entity's regulations or procedures were inadequate
<b>• Situational Awareness and Action</b>				
2	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
<b>• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance</b>				
3	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
<b>• See and Avoid</b>				
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	<del>Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement</del>	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: E.

Recommendation: The nominated DA Authority for TDA098 to consider amending the AIC Y019/2026 to specify the pressure datum to be used to define its vertical extent.

Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Ground Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **not used** because the London FISO was not required to monitor aircraft receiving a Basic Service.

<sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

<b>Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026006</b>		Outside Controlled Airspace						
<b>Barrier</b>		<b>Provision</b>	<b>Application</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b>				
				<b>Barrier Weighting</b>				
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✔	✔					
	Manning & Equipment	✔	✔					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	⚠	○					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⊘	⊘					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✔	✔					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✔	✔					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✔	✔					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✔	✔					
	See & Avoid	✔	✔					
<b>Key:</b>		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Not Present/Not Assessable</u>	<u>Not Used</u>		
Provision	✔	⚠	✘	⊘				
Application	✔	⚠	✘	⊘		○		
Effectiveness								