AIRPROX REPORT No 2026004

Date: 03 Jan 2026 Time: 1436Z Position: 5121N 00032W Location: Fairoaks ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152	PC12
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Comm
Airspace	Fairoaks ATZ	Fairoaks ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Fairoaks Radio	Fairoaks Radio
Altitude/FL	A010	A005
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White	Grey, black
Lighting	Nav, beacon, landing	Nav, beacon, strobes, landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1100ft	NK
Altimeter	QNH	QNH
Heading	150°	NK
Speed	90kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	TCAS II
Alert	Information	None
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	200ft V/0.5NM H	300ft V/2NM H
Recorded	500ft V/0.2NM H	



THE C152 INSTRUCTOR reports that the runway in use was RW24RH and they were in receipt of an AGCS from Fairoaks Radio. At approximately 1434, [the C152] was right-hand downwind to land. [The pilot of the C152] was unable to make a "*right downwind runway 24*" call as [the pilot of the] PC12 was making a late initial call as they were entering the ATZ from the south-east, saying that they were "*inbound*". [The pilot of the C152] then made a "*late downwind runway 24* (*turning base*)" call while aware of the PC12 audibly and via electronic conspicuity. The C152 was on right base as the PC12 pilot elected to join left base.

They maintained awareness of the PC12 but, just as the C152 student pilot commenced descent, the instructor took control at approximately 1435, as they could see the PC12 cutting in front of them. Vision for their student was obscured due to the PC12's tight base, very short final and lower level. They executed a missed approach procedure by climbing and positioning on the south side of the runway, keeping the PC12 in sight.

After the PC12 had landed, the C152 instructor asked the PC12 pilot if they had had the C152 in sight. [Reportedly,] the PC12 pilot confirmed that they did and the C152 pilot advised that, in future, they should plan an appropriate join, giving way to circuit traffic and not cutting in front of them.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE C152 STUDENT PILOT reports that, after completing a full overhead join for RW24, right-hand circuit (specified by Fairoaks Radio), they joined the circuit at 1100ft on the downwind as expected for that join. Once turned onto downwind, they were unable to make a downwind call as the PC12 pilot was establishing contact with Fairoaks Radio. [The Fairoaks AGO] gave the PC12 pilot all the relevant information for Fairoaks, including Traffic Information, which included that there was "*a C152 in the circuit not yet reported downwind*". For clarification, once the radio was clear, their instructor made a

late-downwind call immediately after the initial call with the PC12 pilot, giving them their position, showing that they were about to turn onto base. They turned the aircraft onto base, where they began setting the aircraft up for the final stages of landing.

Once set up on base, they were about to make their turn on to final when their instructor spotted the PC12 very close, slightly in front and below their aircraft, causing [the instructor] to take immediate control and begin a go-around, making an evasive, climbing left turn and then correcting right, keeping the traffic in sight at all times during the manoeuvre. Throughout the entire manoeuvre, [the student] was unable to see the PC12 due to the positioning of the PC12 being slightly in front, below and very slightly to the right of [the C152], meaning that, in the left seat of the aircraft, it was not possible to see the PC12. They were only able to see the PC12 when they were back into the circuit, at which point it was taxying to parking.

Visual sight of the PC12 had been temporarily lost while they were on base leg due to the bright sun in their eyes, but situational awareness was maintained via their electronic conspicuity [device]. They executed a missed approach when it was confirmed that the PC12 pilot was, in fact, not joining overhead.

THE PC12 PILOT reported that, during an approach to Fairoaks using RW24, the [pilot of the C152] reported downwind right-hand, while they, in the PC12, were established on left base. As they banked onto final, the C152 was observed for the first time at their 3 o'clock position, higher, and roughly two miles away. Given the significant speed difference (the PC12 was exceeding 120kt while the C152 had likely been around 60-70kt), there was no risk of collision and at no point was safety compromised.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE FAIROAKS AIR/GROUND RADIO OPERATOR reports that, essentially, the [pilot of the] PC12 cut in front of [the C152] in the circuit, which was on left base [UKAB Secretariat note: the C152 had been on right base]. The PC12 pilot joined left base, shorter than the Cessna, and proceeded to land.

The PC12 pilot was joining and was given Traffic Information. The circuit traffic was also given the Traffic Information. [The Fairoaks AGO opined that] they did not think the safety of anyone was compromised. All [pilots] were aware of the others, and the PC12 pilot reported visual with the Cessna.

Factual Background

The entry for Fairoaks in the UK AIP provides the following information:

EGTF AD 2.22 FLIGHT PROCEDURES

1 Circuits
- a. Circuits variable.
- b. All procedures are based on Fairoaks QNH.
- c. Circuit altitude is 1100 FT for aeroplanes and 800 FT for helicopters.
- d. Inbound aircraft and circuit traffic should squawk 7010 when operating in the Fairoaks circuit and ATZ/LFA unless otherwise instructed.
- e. Joining
  - i. Aeroplanes should normally enter the ATZ level at 1400 FT AMSL, and descend to 1100 FT AMSL when north of the runway prior to turning:
    1. downwind for Runway 06 left hand circuit;
    2. crosswind for Runway 24 left hand circuit;
    3. crosswind for Runway 06 right hand circuit;
    4. downwind for Runway 24 right hand circuit.
  - ii. 'Straight-in', 'downwind' and 'base' joins are strongly discouraged when the circuit is active.

The weather at Farnborough was recorded as follows:

```
METAR EGLF 031450Z 31009KT 270V330 CAVOK 03/M05 Q1011
```

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. Both aircraft were also observed by reference to ADS-B data sources. The diagram was constructed and the separation determined from the radar data.



Figure 1 – CPA at 1435:51

The C152 and PC12 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2] When two or more heavier-than-air aircraft are approaching an aerodrome or an operating site for the purpose of landing, aircraft at the higher level shall give way to aircraft at the lower level, but the latter shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is in the final stages of an approach to land.[3]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C152 and a PC12 flew into proximity in the Fairoaks ATZ at 1436Z on Saturday 3rd January 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of an ACGS from Fairoaks Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the Air/Ground Radio Operator involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the C152, and members agreed that the EC device fitted to their aircraft had provided an alert to the presence of the PC12 (**CF3**). It was noted that the pilot of the C152 had heard the PC12 pilot announce on frequency their intention to join the circuit, and had subsequently described in their narrative report that they had been "*on right base as the PC12 pilot elected to join left base*". Members therefore agreed that it had been reasonable to have anticipated a

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.
[3] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way 4(i)

potential conflict with the PC12. It was noted that the C152 pilot had "*maintained awareness of the PC12*" and had subsequently assumed control from their student when they "*could see the PC12 cutting in front of them*". Members felt that there had been an opportunity to have resolved the situation a little earlier, and agreed that the slight delay before they had taken action had, in essence, caused them to have been concerned by the proximity (**CF6**).

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the PC12 and the nature of their join to the circuit. The entry for Fairoaks Aerodrome in the UK AIP was reviewed, and it was noted that: 'Inbound aircraft and circuit traffic should use transponder code 7010' and that pilots 'should normally enter the ATZ level at 1400ft AMSL and descend to 1100ft AMSL when north of the runway prior to turning crosswind for RW24 left-hand circuit'. It was also clear to members that joins to the base leg are 'strongly discouraged when the circuit is active'. Members noted that, whilst the pilot had not been obliged to have adhered to those three conditions, they had been published as the preferred, and safest, way to approach the airfield. Members felt that it may have been somewhat imprudent to have deviated from the recommended procedures.

It was agreed that the TCAS fitted to the PC12 would have been expected to have detected the presence of the C152, but no alert was reported (**CF4**). Notwithstanding, it was noted that the pilot of the C152 had made their 'late downwind' call after the PC12 pilot had made initial contact with the Fairoaks AGO and, consequently, they had gained situational awareness of traffic established in the right-hand circuit. Members were surprised that the pilot of the PC12 had proceeded to join the left-hand circuit without having visually acquired the C152 beforehand. Members noted that the PC12 pilot reported that "*the C152 was observed for the first time at their 3 o'clock position",* and determined that that would have been as they had turned onto final (although that seemed to be at odds with their description that the C152 had been "*roughly two miles away*"). Members determined that the C152 had been sighted late (**CF5**). It was agreed that, despite situational awareness of the C152, the pilot of the PC12 had not integrated with the established pattern of traffic (**CF2**).

Turning to the actions of the Fairoaks AGO, members noted that they had passed Traffic information to each pilot on the other aircraft. Noting that they had not been permitted to have sequenced the traffic in the circuit, members agreed that there had been little else that they could have done to have helped the situation.

Concluding their discussion, members felt that the PC12 pilot had sighted the C152 late and, perhaps, had relied upon their greater airspeed to get ahead in the landing sequence. Members agreed that the PC12 pilot had not conformed with, or avoided, the existing pattern of traffic (**CF1**). Although safety standards had been reduced, members were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision.

The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026004			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Human Factors	• Incomplete Action	Events involving flight crew performing a task but then not fully completing that task or action that they were intending to carry out	Pilot did not sufficiently integrate with the other aircraft despite Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	

4	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
5	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
6	Human Factors	• Incorrect Action Selection	Events involving flight crew performing or choosing the wrong course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the PC12 had not conformed with, or avoided, the pattern of traffic in the circuit.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because, despite situational awareness of the presence of the C152, the pilot of the PC12 did not integrate into the circuit correctly.



[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.