AIRPROX REPORT No 2025243

Date: 21 Nov 2025 Time: 1514Z Position: 5124N 00121W Location: 2NM SW Newbury

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Explorer	C172
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Listening Out
Provider	N/A	Boscombe Down
Altitude/FL	1900ft	2100ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White, purple
Lighting	Strobe	Tail beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2000ft	2200ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH (1028hPa)
Heading	270°	180°
Speed	90kt	105kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	50ft V/0m H	100ft V/0m H
Recorded	200ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE EXPLORER INSTRUCTOR reports that this was a flight, after extensive ground school on the functions of the EFIS, to demonstrate the in-flight use of the EFIS fitted to the aircraft. They had climbed out from [their take-off airfield] and headed west using the EFIS GPS function, intending to identify Hungerford and also to demonstrate the display of the nearby glider site, Rivar Hall, on the GPS map. They had already levelled at 2000ft QNH. They were in the right-hand seat as the instructor, and their student, a full PPL, was flying the aircraft. The student spotted a brief glimpse of the other aircraft as it was just ahead of their wing and immediately pushed the nose down and alerted them verbally. They (the Instructor) spotted the aircraft just as it disappeared over their wing at the wingtip, and it was above them, just. It all happened in a matter of seconds and they had had no previous sighting of that aircraft beforehand. They continued their flight, having lost sight of the other aircraft. It had been faster than them and it was [subsequently] identified from [an ADS-B tracking website]. Even though the replay of the flight presented a 200ft separation, with the other aircraft passing behind, visually it was closer and it had passed directly overhead.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C172 PILOT reports that they had been tracking straight-and-level on a southerly heading for about 5min with a listening watch on 126.705MHz (Boscombe Down) and did not recall any aircraft in the vicinity. However, this was Class G airspace and they were aware that not all pilots would be transmitting in that area. Being below the horizon, and with a fixed relative bearing, it made the other aircraft less visible [reported as having been on their right, 3 o'clock, about 200m, 100ft below]. Also, it appeared that the other aircraft was tracking towards the low sun which may not have helped their forward visibility.

[The pilot of the C172 described their avoiding action as] 'none' due to a shortage of time and that the separation was adequate.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The entry for Boscombe Down in the UK AIP provides the following details:

ENR 4.1.5.2 Boscombe Down Service Limitations

4.1.5.2.1 Limited Traffic Service - At and below FL40. Subject to ATC workload, pilots will be informed of any limitations to Deconfliction Service and standard separation will be provided whenever possible.

4.1.6 ATS Units Participating in the Lower Airspace Radar

Boscombe Down
Service Radius: 30NM
Availability: Fri 0900-1600. Opening hours may vary subject to operational flying requirements.

The weather at RAF Odiham and Middle Wallop was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGVO 211520Z 29003KT 9999 FEW024 05/M01 Q1027 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU
METAR EGVP 211520Z AUTO 25003KT 9999 NCD 05/00 Q1027
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. The Explorer, but not the C172, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.



Figure 1 – CPA at 1513:30

The Explorer and C172 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Explorer pilot was required to give way to the C172.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an Explorer and a C172 flew into proximity 2NM south-west of Newbury at 1514Z on Friday 21st November 2025. The Explorer pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, not in receipt of a FIS. The C172 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, listening out on the Boscombe Down LARS frequency.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the Explorer, and it was acknowledged that the purpose of their flight had been to have demonstrated the use of the EFIS system fitted to the Explorer. Members appreciated that that may have necessitated brief periods where both pilots would have been 'heads-in'. Members agreed that it would therefore have been most prudent indeed to have taken steps which would have assisted them with their responsibility to avoid other traffic. However, it was noted that the pilot of the Explorer had not been in receipt of a FIS (**CF1**) and members agreed that, had they elected for a surveillance-based service, they may have received pertinent Traffic Information along their route. It was noted that their flight had been conducted in an area where a LARS could have been sought. It was also noted that the Explorer had not been fitted with an additional EC device. Members agreed that, had one been fitted, it may have provided a timely alert to the presence of the C172. Nevertheless, it was agreed that it had been the case that the pilot of the Explorer had not had situational awareness of the C172 until it had been visually acquired by their student (**CF2**). Members noted they had subsequently taken urgent avoiding action and agreed that the C172 had, therefore, been sighted late (**CF3**).

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the C172. It was noted that they had tuned their radio to the Boscombe Down LARS frequency but had not requested a service (**CF1**). Pointing out that the pilot of the C172 had been aware that '*not all pilots would be transmitting in that area*', members wondered why a service had not been requested. As per their previous thoughts, members suggested that valuable Traffic Information may have been gleaned had they been in receipt of a surveillance-based service. Members agreed that the C172 pilot had not had situational awareness of the Explorer (**CF2**). It was further agreed that the Explorer had been sighted late (**CF3**).

Concluding their discussion, members summarised their thoughts. It was noted that several safety barriers had either not been engaged, or had not been fully effective, in this encounter. Members wished to highlight that both pilots had not engaged the ground-element safety barriers that had been available to them and that neither aircraft had been fitted with additional electronic conspicuity devices which may have aided with the detection of proximate traffic. Consequently, it appeared to members that both pilots had placed a very large emphasis on the see-and-avoid barrier which, in this encounter, had not been entirely effective. Members agreed that there had been a risk of collision (**CF4**) and that it had been the somewhat urgent avoiding action taken by the student in the Explorer that had increased the separation between the aircraft at the last minute. The Board assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025243			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• See and Avoid			
3	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			

4	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because it may have been prudent for both pilots to have been in receipt of a surveillance-based Flight Information Service.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft until it had been visually acquired.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because both pilots had sighted the other aircraft late.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.