AIRPROX REPORT No 2025241

Date: 20 Nov 2025 Time: 1146Z Position: 5046N 00150W Location: IVO Bournemouth Airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	A340	Falcon 20
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Comm
Airspace	Bournemouth CTR	Bournemouth CTR
Class	D	D
Rules	IFR	IFR
Service	ACS	ACS
Provider	Bournemouth Tower	Bournemouth Tower
Altitude/FL	~750ft	~1000ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White	Blue
Lighting	Nav, Strobe, Beacon	'Standard'
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	NK	'climbing after take-off'
Altimeter	QNH (1016hPa)	QNH
Heading	255°	255°-340°
Speed	150kt	~140kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	TCAS II
Alert	None	TA
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	100ft V/0.5NM H	'Unsure'
Recorded	~250ftV/ 0.5NM H	



THE A340 PILOT reports that, on initial contact with Bournemouth ATC, they were told that they were in a landing sequence with 2 smaller aircraft to depart before they landed. They immediately reduced speed to minimum approach speed to mitigate potential problems. When transferred to Tower they were told they had one aircraft to depart. The Falcon was given normal take-off clearance and they were told to expect late landing clearance. The Falcon took longer than expected to commence the take-off roll, but eventually did. As they approached 100ft to land, it was obvious that there was a conflict so, despite being given a very late landing clearance, they did not deem it safe to continue. They carried out a missed approach, mindful that the Falcon was climbing into their go-around path, they were ready to break left if needed but, in the end, with careful monitoring, they carried out a standard missed approach to an uneventful second approach and subsequent normal landing.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE FALCON 20 PILOT reports that, on taxiing from dispersal with ATC clearance to hold point N, they noted a Piper Cherokee holding at E. Following receipt of departure instructions, they were cleared to line up RW26 and were informed by ATC that the Cherokee would be receiving clearance to depart ahead of them from E. The Cherokee lined up and received a take-off clearance, with what they recall as an instruction to turn right after departure. Following their own line-up, they also noted an initial contact R/T call on the Tower frequency from an A340 at circa 10NM, cleared for an ILS approach. They recall the A340 being informed of the plan for departing traffic ahead. There was a delay of some seconds prior to the Cherokee commencing its take-off roll. Once airborne, the Cherokee drifted left of the extended centreline (the wind was northerly). The Cherokee continued its climb, drifting further left of the centreline, and they recall the Tower controller requesting the Cherokee expedite its turn to the right. Following the Cherokee's right turn across the extended centreline and to the north, they were

cleared for take-off and, with the Cherokee in sight, commenced their take-off roll well within the normal timeline and cadence for a Falcon take-off from a stationary position on the runway. Conscious of the A340 behind them, and slower traffic ahead, as they became airborne they recall hearing the A340 being given clearance to land and the A340 pilot responding that they were going around. Noting a potential conflict with the A340, but unable to establish visual contact, they attempted to gain SA through monitoring of TCAS. After take-off they received a non-standard instruction from the Tower controller to turn right heading 350° which, whilst likely to put them into potential conflict with the slower Cherokee climbing out ahead, they complied with immediately on the basis that this would increase separation against the A340 and they were maintaining visual contact with the Cherokee throughout. Whilst maintaining visual with the Cherokee, they received a single TCAS TA, judged to have been at a height above ground at which RA suppression is no longer a factor. Content that they were visual with, and laterally avoiding, the Cherokee, in addition to out-climbing it, and that they were then clear of the A340, they continued to head 350° and were passed to the Approach controller, from which point a normal departure was resumed. Whilst they were aware of the presence of the landing A340 through listening out, they were not aware of any instructions from ATC to expedite departure. Even if there had been a request to expedite, they could not have commenced the take-off roll more quickly than the already expeditious manner in which they did so, with awareness of the approaching A340 and the recently departed Cherokee, following a take-off clearance given when already holding on the runway.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE BOURNEMOUTH TOWER CONTROLLER reports that whilst [the A340 C/S] was about 16NM to run they lined [FA20 C/S] up to get the aircraft through the glidepath critical part before [the A340] established. Due to the long line up from holding point November, they decided to depart [the PA28] ahead of [the FA20] from holding point Echo, with an early right turn. Then they could get both aircraft away before the A340 landed, to save them the delay of the A340 backtrack and the runway edge inspection. [The A340 pilot] was told to expect a late landing clearance due to FA20 traffic departing ahead. Due to the time it took for [the PA28] and [FA20] to depart the A340 pilot didn't get landing clearance early enough and went around whilst [the FA20] was on the climb out. This ended with a 'Piggy Back go-around' with about a mile between. Traffic Information was given to [the FA20 pilot] on [the A340] going around behind. They co-ordinated with radar that the [A340] was going around and asked how would they like to move AMB1, 350° was given, so they told [the FA20 pilot] to turn right heading 350°. They then passed [A340 C/S] flying the standard missed approach to the radar frequency followed by [the FA20].

THE BOURNEMOUTH RADAR CONTROLLER reports that, at the time of this incident, they were acting as OJTI in Radar. Their trainee was vectoring an A340 inbound for an ILS approach. When the aircraft was approximately 12NM out, the trainee informed the Tower controller that the aircraft was inbound. The Tower controller requested release during the same conversation on a departing FA20. The trainee could not release the FA20 immediately as there was a light-aircraft in the climb-out which had just performed an approach and go-around for training. The training aircraft subsequently reported that they would not require another instrument approach as planned and elected to depart the CTR to the south, VFR.

The trainee APS controller, under guidance, then released the FA20, informing the Tower controller that the preceeding aircraft [not the Cherokee] was now VFR and asking that they pass Traffic Information. The Tower controller acknowledged this and also notified the pending departure of a PA28 going to the northwest. At the time the release was given, the inbound A340 had been transferred to the Tower frequency and was on about an 8NM final. They were happy that there was a gap large enough to get the FA20 away ahead of the A340. Shortly afterwards, a return appeared on the display for a departing aircraft but it was not the anticipated FA20, it was the PA28. They had not expected this aircraft to depart ahead of the FA20. The FA20 did not get airborne until the A340 was inside a 1NM final, at which point the A340 [pilot] executed a missed approach, they saw this through the window in the radar room, and the Tower controller also stated that the A340 had gone around, on a Standard Missed Approach. They would estimate that the FA20 was about 0.5NM ahead of the A340 at this point, and both at about 100ft or lower. The Tower controller was told to instruct the FA20 to turn right onto a heading of 350°, as originally the FA20 was a westbound departure and the SMA procedure would have

meant the A340 was also heading west. The heading took the FA20 very close behind and inside the track of the PA28 as it routed northwest bound. They understood from the Tower controller that both aircraft had been given Traffic Information prior to departure on one another, weather conditions were also CAVOK. They believe there was probably no more than 0.5NM between the A340 and the FA20 when the Airprox occurred.

Factual Background

The weather at Bournemouth was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGHH 201120Z 32008KT 280V340 CAVOK 04/M01 Q1016=
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Analysis and Investigation

Bournemouth Occurrence Investigation

Executive summary

On the 20 November 2025, an Airprox occurred involving an inbound A340, a departing FA20, and a departing PA28, during a period of high departure demand ahead of the A340's arrival.

With the A340 approximately 16NM from touchdown, departures were being managed from two holding points. To expedite traffic, the PA28 departed first from holding point Echo, followed by the FA20; the PA28 [pilot] was issued an early right turn to clear the climbout path. The A340 [pilot] had been advised to expect late landing clearance due to the departures ahead.

The combined time required for both departures resulted in the A340 [pilot] not receiving landing clearance in sufficient time and subsequently initiating a go-around. As the A340 [pilot] carried out the published missed approach, the FA20 [pilot] was instructed onto a heading of 350° to remain clear of the missed approach track and prevent further reduction of separation. The A340 [pilot] continued the standard missed approach procedure. The FA20's assigned heading placed it in close proximity to the departing PA28, which was tracking northwest.

A departure release had previously been issued for the FA20 IFR departure when the A340 was approximately 8NM from touchdown, including Traffic Information relating to a separate aircraft departing to the south. However, the next observed departure was the PA28 rather than the FA20. By the time the FA20 became airborne, the A340 was already on very short final and [its pilot] commenced the missed approach shortly thereafter, inside 1NM.

Findings

During the period leading up to the occurrence, visitors were present in the control tower. The Tower controller's decision processes continued as normal, however, the established traffic sequence was maintained with limited reassessment of alternative options as the situation developed.

The FA20 was issued an IFR departure release. A VFR departure by the PA28 had been pre-noted by Tower to Radar, however, the Radar controller expected the FA20 to depart ahead of the PA28. Based on this expectation, no intervention was made by the Radar controller as the situation developed. It was found that FA20 crews had previously complained regarding departure delays; while no request was made for a timed departure, this prior feedback could have contributed to a perceived operational pressure to expedite the FA20 departure and not alter the plan as things progressed.

At the time the departure sequence was planned, the taxi distance and expected transit time from holding point November to the runway for the FA20 were assessed as sufficient by the Tower controller to allow the PA28 to depart ahead, without adversely affecting the overall sequence. This assessment supported the expectation that both departures could be achieved prior to the inbound aircraft reaching a critical stage of approach.

While overall situational awareness was maintained by the Radar controller, the actual departure order differed from the expected sequence. This reduced the opportunity for reassessment and intervention at critical stages. Strong crosswind conditions affected the initial climbout of the PA28, resulting in drifting left prior to the commencement of the right turn. This reduced the rate at which the aircraft cleared the climbout area, and increased complexity and reduced the time significantly for the FA20 to get airborne before the A340 arrival.

Radar data indicates that, during the initial phase of the missed approach, the FA20 was in close proximity ahead of the A340, with lateral separation to be approximately 0.5NM and vertical separation minimal while the FA20 was still below 100ft.

Both aircraft were operating in CAVOK conditions. Following the initiation of the missed approach, the FA20 crew was issued a heading intended to remain clear of the missed approach track. This heading resulted in the FA20 operating in close proximity to the departing PA28. The FA20 flight crew reported afterwards that they were visual with the aircraft and they were able to accept the assigned heading.

The A340 captain reported that they were issued a very late landing clearance while the Falcon 20 was cleared for take-off ahead and experienced a prolonged take off roll, resulting in reduced separation on short final. At approximately 100ft AGL, the captain assessed the safe separation could not be assured and initiated a go-around in accordance with standard procedures. The Falcon crew reported that engine spool-up on their aircraft typically takes approximately 30sec, which may contribute to a delayed acceleration during the initial take off roll.

Conclusion

The occurrence resulted from a departure plan that provided limited margin when managing multiple departures ahead of an inbound aircraft approaching touchdown. The planned sequence for the PA28 to depart ahead of the FA20 was assessed as achievable, however, as the situation developed, the plan offered limited flexibility to timing, aircraft performance and weather conditions.

Continuation of the original plan during a period of increased workload and time compression reduced the opportunity for reassessment once margins reduced. The [A340 pilot] initiated a missed approach when a landing clearance could not be issued in sufficient time. Reduced separation subsequently occurred during the departure and missed approach phases, with all aircraft operating in CAVOK conditions.

CAA ATSI

The Bournemouth investigation report was written from the perspective of the Radar controller, whereas all aircraft involved were under the control of the Tower controller. ATSI was unable to ascertain the historic upper wind data for this area in relation to the comment in the investigation report of there being “strong crosswinds”, but noted that the surface wind given to the PA28 pilot for their departure was 310°, 5kt. Both the PA28 and the FA20 would be turning to the right after departure, with the PA28 routeing to the north westerly VRP, and the FA20 departing due west. If strong crosswinds (from the north-west) were present, this should have perhaps been taken into account by the Tower controller as it would have always impacted on the time taken for the PA28 to sufficiently clear the climbout lane to allow for the subsequent departure of the FA20.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken. Although the A340 could be seen approaching the airfield, it disappeared from radar at around 1NM final from Bournemouth, appearing again when 2.5NM west of Bournemouth, climbing out. The FA20 did not appear on radar until 2.5NM northwest of Bournemouth, after the Airprox had occurred (Figure 1).



Figure 1 – 1146:39

Further analysis of other data sources showed the A340 in MLAT only, and again this had a break between 1NM final and 1NM to the west, however, the FA20 could be seen on ADS-B getting airborne and climbing out to the west. Comparing the two data sources could only provide an approximation of the separation, indicating around 250ft vertical and 0.5NM lateral separation. The diagram at the top of the report has been compiled using this data.

The A340 and Falcon 20 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an A340 and a Falcon 20 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Bournemouth airport at 1146Z on Thursday 20th November 2025. Both pilots were operating under IFR in VMC and in receipt of an ACS from Bournemouth Tower.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the actions of the A340 pilot. They had been making an approach to Bournemouth and had been told by the Tower controller to expect a late landing clearance. The pilot could see the situation unfolding in front of them, they had known the FA20 needed to get airborne before they could land and so had continued the approach, expecting to receive the clearance, however, they reported that the FA20 had taken longer than expected to take off. Members noted that the pilot would have had a point in their mind at which they would have needed to initiate a go-around, and when they had eventually been given a clearance by the controller, it had been too late, and the decision to go around had been taken. Once on the go-around, the A340 pilot had been faced with the threat of catching up the FA20 on climbout. Fortunately, the FA20 pilot had been able to take a right turn suggested by ATC, and the A340 pilot had been able to conduct the normal missed approach procedure (MAP), but members noted that this would have been an uncomfortable scenario and the A340 pilot had been rightly concerned by the proximity of the FA20 (**CF5**). The A340 pilot had not reported a TCAS alert, although members thought that one would have been expected (**CF4**).

Turning to the actions of the FA20 pilot, they had been lined up on the runway, awaiting clearance whilst a PA28 got airborne ahead of them. They reported that it had taken some time for the engine to spool

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

up, and members familiar with the FA20 noted that this was a normal occurrence. Once airborne, the FA20 pilot had been cognisant that the A340 pilot had gone around behind them, but had also been aware of the PA28 ahead. Fortunately, they had been visual with the PA28 and had managed to take the turn given by ATC to take them between the PA28 and out of the way of the A340 behind. The FA20 pilot reported having receivedf a TCAS TA, but members were uncertain whether this had related to the PA28 or the A340 (**CF3)**.

The Board then briefly discussed the role of the PA28 pilot. The PA28 had been lined-up at point E, on the runway ahead of the FA20, and the pilot had been given a clearance to take-off first. Clearly, it had been in the Tower controller's mind that they could have allowed the PA28 to get airborne ahead of the FA20 and still have given a clearance to the A340 pilot to land. However, it appeared that, for some reason, possibly strong winds, the PA28 pilot had taken a while to clear the climbout lane, despite having been asked by the Tower controller to take an early right turn. The Board did not have a report from this pilot and so were not in possession of the reasons behind the delay in turning, and some members considered this to have been a contributory factor in the Airprox. However, following further discussion, it was agreed that it had been for the Tower controller to sequence the aircraft and part of that was to continually re-assess the situation, so members agreed that, whilst the actions of the PA28 pilot had made the controller's situation more difficult, they should not be considered as a contributory factor.

The Board then looked at the role of Bournemouth ATC. Members wished to echo the comments of CAA ATSI, that the Bournemouth investigation appeared to focus on the actions of the Radar controller and not the Tower controller. Members agreed that the Radar controller had had very little control over the events, instead having to react to the situation presented by the actions of the Tower controller, but noted that the Radar controller had offered a heading of 350° for the FA20 pilot to turn onto, which had provided enough separation for the A340 pilot to execute the MAP behind them. Members wondered why the Tower controller had cleared the PA28 for take-off ahead of the FA20, as this had been the catalyst for the Airprox (**CF1**).They noted that the FA20 operated from Bournemouth, and so thought that the controller should have been familiar with the length of time it would have taken for the FA20 pilot to spool up the engine prior to getting airborne. The controller should have been aware that delaying the take-off of the FA20 by allowing the PA28 pilot to get airborne first would have had ramifications for the inbound A340 (**CF2**). Whilst controlling members acknowledged that the Tower controller had been trying to allow everyone to achieve their aims and that, had they been able to issue the clearance 10sec earlier, they probably would have achieved that aim, still they reiterated that the primary role of a controller was to ensure safety was not compromised. As it happened, members thought that the situation had been allowed to run on for too long in the hope that it would have somehow all worked out, and they thought that the Tower controller could have made an early decision to resolve it. Controlling members noted that the controller had been trying to avoid a 'piggy-back' go-around, where the aircraft going around catches up the aircraft taking off, and that was perhaps why they had not sent the A340 around earlier. Nevertheless, they thought that there had been other options available to the controller even after they had cleared the PA28 pilot for take-off, including taking the FA20 off the runway in order to allow the A340 to land. Overall, members thought that the situation had been very messy and the Tower controller's initial sequencing plan had left very little margin for error.

When determining the risk, members considered the reports from both pilots and ATC, together with the radar replay and GPS data sources. They noted that the height of the aircraft and subsequent incomplete data meant that the separation of 0.5NM was likely to be approximate. However, the A340 pilot had been visual with the FA20 throughout, and the FA20 pilot had also been aware that the A340 pilot had executed the MAP behind them and so had taken a turn as soon as practicable. Therefore, members agreed that, whilst the situation had been uncomfortable for those involved and safety had been degraded, there had been no risk of collision; Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025241			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Human Factors	• Expectation/ Assumption	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team acting on the basis of expectation or assumptions of a situation that is different from the reality	
2	Human Factors	• Inappropriate Clearance	An event involving the provision of an inappropriate clearance that led to an unsafe situation	
	Flight Elements			
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS TA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning triggered	
4	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
5	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[2]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the clearances and runway occupancy decisions made by the Bournemouth Tower controller led to the A340 pilot executing the missed approach procedure and flying into proximity with the FA20.



[2] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.