

AIRPROX REPORT No 2025240

Date: 20 Nov 2025 Time: 1416Z Position: 5306N 00240W Location: Beeston Castle VRP

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28(A)	PA28(B)
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	Liverpool Radar	Hawarden Radar
Altitude/FL	2310ft	2310ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, red, orange	White, blue, red
Lighting	Nav, anti-col	Strobes, bcn
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2200ft	2300ft
Altimeter	QNH (1017hPa)	QNH
Heading	120°	065°
Speed	95kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	PowerFLARM
Alert	None	Information
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	0ft V/0.5NM H	0ft V/0.5NM H
Recorded	0ft V/0.3NM H	



THE PA28(A) PILOT reports that, when flying a heading of 120° very near Beeston Castle VRP on track for Madeley village, they noticed an aircraft in the right 3 o'clock at a range of ½NM on a converging course at the same altitude. The PA28(A) pilot took avoiding action to the left. They estimated the distance between the 2 aircraft to have been 0.5NM. They reported the event to Liverpool Radar when safe to do so. The pilot of the other aircraft sounded confused and unfamiliar with the area [they opined].

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28(B) PILOT reports that the flight was a VFR navigation exercise to turn at Calveley disused airfield before turning south and returning to [...]. As they had approached Calveley, they had noticed a Mode C return [they believed] on their [branded EC equipment] at about 4NM (the range set on the [EC equipment]). The PA28(B) pilot visually acquired the other aircraft on a constant bearing at about the same time that Hawarden ATC advised that, even though they were not radar identified, they believed they had traffic in their 10 o'clock at a similar level. The PA28(B) pilot replied that they had the aircraft in sight. As they [the PA28(B) pilot opined] had the right of way they maintained course, speed and level, but prepared to take avoiding action, by rapid descent if necessary, a left turn would have placed the aircraft very close and a right turn would have left them unsighted as the wing came up. However, the [pilot of the] other aircraft must have then seen them and carried out a steep LEFT turn away. Estimated range was between 1/2 to 1NM. There was no alert from the [EC equipment]. The PA28(A) pilot then turned left and continued the flight. There had been no risk of collision as the aircraft was in sight for a considerable time.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE LIVERPOOL APPROACH CONTROLLER reports that whilst controlling as APS, at approximately 1417, a PA28(A) pilot, who was on a Basic Service outside controlled airspace, reported an Airprox

with a light-aircraft over Beeston Castle [VRP] but that they were [by then] clear of the subject traffic. The controller acknowledged their call. The PA28(A) pilot subsequently continued their flight and [...] the controller advised the pilot that if they called after landing [...] they would then take further details and submit an Airprox notification. The controller advised a Supervisor immediately of the incident. The PA28(A) pilot called at 1620 to advise that they were at 2.2A, 0.5NM south of Beeston Castle, routing to [...].

THE HAWARDEN APPROACH CONTROLLER reports that they had been the OJTI operating in the APS position at Hawarden ATC. The weather was clear and the first day for a while that weather had been favourable for flying so there were lots of VFR aircraft in the local area. The PA28(B) pilot was operating on a Basic Service. On a couple of occasions they came within 2NM of VFR traffic. Their trainee on both occasions called the traffic as *'not identified but believed to be'* and the pilot reported visual both times and did not seem concerned by the proximity.

Factual Background

The weather at Liverpool Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGP 201420Z 33009KT 300V360 9999 FEW026TCU 05/M04 Q1017=
METAR EGGP 201350Z NIL=
METAR COR EGGP 201320Z 34010KT 310V010 9999 FEW026TCU 06/M04 Q1017=

Analysis and Investigation

Liverpool Safety Investigation

Timeline Breakdown of Incident

[1413:41 – 1414:54] Multiple RT calls from Liverpool Radar and an intercom exchange between Liverpool Radar and Tower and Scottish Control for uninvolved aircraft].

1414:54 PA28(A) was transiting SE indicating A24- with conflicting traffic SSW, approximately 2NM, transiting NE, indicating A23-.

[Liverpool Radar on Frequency at 1414:58–1415:35 with uninvolved aircraft].

From 1415:37–1415:46 there were no transmissions and the PA28(A) was observed indicating A24, transiting SE. Conflicting 0430 squawk [the PA28(B)] was indicating A22- to the SW of PA28(A), approximately 1NM transiting NE.

[1415:46 – Liverpool Radar exchange with uninvolved aircraft].

1415:53 The PA28(A) was observed entering a left-hand turn to avoid conflicting with the 0430 squawk (the PA28(B)), with 100ft indicated separation and less than 1NM.

[CPA at 1416:02]

[1416:05 – 1417:19 uninvolved aircraft RT and intercom between Liverpool Radar and Tower].

1417:22 - PA28(A) *c/s: and PA28(A), just had, we've had a very close Airprox, er, overhead the Beeston Castle area, we're clear of conflict now.*

During the above (at 1417:23) transmission the phonenumber to Prestwick Centre could be heard ringing.

1417:25 – Scottish Control (on landline): *Prestwick Planner.*

1417:27 – Liverpool Radar (on landline): *Aaahh.*

1417:29 – Liverpool Radar (on frequency): *Er, PA28(A), roger.*

[1417:32 – 1421:42 Liverpool Radar on open landline, on frequency and on intercom with uninvolved aircraft].

1421:42 - PA28(A) c/s: *Liverpool Radar, PA28(A) just to let you know, we're south of Crewe now, we'll be changing onto Shawbury zone, do you need any more information about the Airprox?*

1421:50 – Liverpool Radar: *I will later, I'll have to file it but, er, just a little too busy at the moment and, er, if you could give us a call once you get back to the field and, er, we'll see if we can get all the information, thanks for that.*

1422:01 - PA28(A): *Absolutely no problem at all, give you a call later on, er, and we'll change on Shawbury zone 133.155MHz.*

[1422:06 – 1422:32 – on frequency with uninvolved aircraft].

1422:33 – Liverpool Radar: *PA28(A), that's understood, squawk conspicuity and on route, bye bye.*

14:22:36 – PA28(A) c/s: *Squawk conspicuity, free call on route, PA28(A).*

No more communication on frequency between Liverpool Radar and the PA28(A) pilot.

Subsequent telephone call between Liverpool ATC and the PA28(A) pilot at 1620.

ATC: *Hello Air Traffic.*

PA28(A) pilot: *Oh Hi, it's the pilot of [PA28(A) c/s].*

ATC: *Hiya.*

PA28(A) c/s: *Hi.*

ATC: *Yeah, all it was, just want to get your version of events from earlier on.*

PA28(A) c/s: *Yeah sure, so I mean, we, we just noticed, I think we were, the altitude we were at at the time was 2200ft roughly and it was literally just around about the Beeston Castle area, we were routeing down towards, just south of Crewe. I noticed on the right-hand side, I must be honest, I didn't actually think it was actually converging and it might have just been the angle of the sun at the time. And then the aircraft, I think it was coming on our course and then it turned left towards us, so we just turned left straight away and just went into an orbit and I saw it around, I think from what I could hear over the radio, I think it was [...], something like that, I think it sounded like the pilot was a bit confused with the local area. From our point of view we were clear of the conflict within a short space of time but I just, with it being that close. I thought it might be best to Airprox it.*

ATC (repeating back to pilot and taking notes): *OK, Pilot appeared confused and short period of time. You were at 2200ft yeah?*

PA28(A) c/s: *Yeah, let me just double check the SkyDemon track, it will give you a slightly more precise one but yeah, we were just around the Beeston Castle area, bear with me at the moment, let's see. Yeah, according to this about 2250ft or so and it was just, it was probably, the way, when we noticed it we were probably about half a mile south of Beeston Castle. I would say it was probably no more than about half a mile to our right at about 3 o'clock and then converging.*

ATC (repeating back to pilot and taking notes): *To right and converging.*

ATC: *Roger OK, if we need to get back in touch with you, can I just get your name and number.*

PA28(A) c/s: *Sure, my name is [...] and the number is [...] and I'm an instructor at [...].*

ATC: *No worries, I think that's all we need for the time being, we may be in touch just to get some further details, obviously we will have to raise some paperwork ourselves.*

PA28(A) c/s: *Yeah, no, that's absolutely fine. Well, can you just, whoever the controller was at the time, can you thank them because I think, from what I could gather on the frequency, it was quite a busy time and I think they had quite a number of aircraft.*

ATC: *They did, yeah.*

PA28(A) c/s: *I think it was quite, it sounded like quite a challenge, they were absolutely brilliant, so, that's all from me.*

ATC: *Alright, no worries, excellent, thank you very much, bye cheers.*

PA28(A) c/s: *Cheers mate, bye.*

Investigation Findings

The PA28(A) left controlled airspace at 1411 via Vicars Cross and was put under a Basic Service.

The PA28(A) routed southeasterly climbing to altitude 2400ft. At the same time there was a 0430 squawk at altitude 2300ft south of the field by 15 miles routeing easterly.

The PA28(A) and the 0430 squawk appeared to be on converging tracks.

Simultaneously, there was a request by ADC for an IFR BARTON 1T release and there were two VFR transits requesting crossing clearance of the zone, all of whom were tightly controlled and given early Traffic Information.

The PA28(A) and the 0430 squawk continued on their converging track until they were almost merging, at which point the PA28(A) took a sharp turn left away from the 0430 squawk.

The PA28(A) pilot called on radar frequency to state they had just had a "*very close Airprox over Beeston Castle, clear of conflict now*". This was acknowledged by the ATCO.

The PA28(A) appeared to have done a large left-hand orbit away from the 0430 squawk and continued southbound.

At time 1621 the PIC of PA28(A) [telephone] called ATC with a follow up call;

The PA28(A) pilot stated that the Airprox was around Beeston Castle and they noticed the other aircraft but initially did not think they were on a converging track, this may have been as a result of the angle of the sun. They believe they were about 0.5NM apart before realising they were converging and turning away to the left and doing a large orbit.

The pilot passed on their thanks to the ATCO in position at the time.

At the time of the incident, the ATCO's attention was drawn towards the two VFR transit aircraft and the IFR Barton 1T departure and making sure all traffic was separated and Traffic Information was passed. However the ATCO did appear to have developed tunnel vision with aircraft purely in the CTZ [sic] and had stopped their wider scan of aircraft under their frequency outside controlled airspace.

CAP 774 states that for aircraft receiving a Basic Service; 'The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility' however ATCOs do have a duty of care for all aircraft under their frequency and on this occasion a better scan of aircraft outside controlled airspace may have avoided the

Airprox. Therefore the ATCO and the unit as a whole may benefit from a reminder of the importance of keeping a wider scan going and the duty of care of ATCOs.

Hawarden Safety Investigation

[PA28(B) c/s] departed Hawarden RW04 at 1348 (squawking 0430) to conduct general handling to the east of the aerodrome under a Basic Service.

1414:53 U/T APS [PA28(B) c/s] *you're not identified but traffic believed to be you has traffic left 10 o' clock, mile and half appears to be converging left-to-right indicating similar level.*

1415:03 [PA28(B) c/s] [PA28(B) c/s] *thanks, not sighted looking, in fact got visual with the traffic.*

1415:08 U/T APS *Roger.*

1415:30 U/T APS [PA28(B) c/s] *new QNH 1018.*

1415:32 [PA28(B) c/s] *1018 thanks [PA28(B) c/s/].*

At 1415:35 Both aircraft continued their previous tracks with radar replays showing [PA28(B) c/s] descending to altitude 2200ft when approximately 1NM from the conflicting traffic [PA28(A) c/s].

1416:02 Radar replays show the aircraft at that point were separated by approximately 0.25NM horizontally and 100ft vertically. At that point the aircraft squawking 5050 [PA28(A) c/s] executed a left-hand orbit.

[CPA at 1416:02]

1416:51 U/T APS [PA28(B) c/s] *again not identified but again traffic believed to be you has further traffic due east of you 1 mile appears to be converging right-to-left indicating altitude 2000ft.*

1417:00 [PA28(B) c/s] *Visual with that one as well thanks.*

1417:01 U/T APS *Thank you.*

Hawarden Aerodrome is situated in Class G airspace, however, two regional aerodromes in Liverpool and Manchester Airports, both within close proximity to Hawarden, increase the complexity of the airspace with both Class A and Class D sectors with varying levels surrounding the aerodrome. The Airprox occurred in the vicinity of Beeston VRP which, although in Class G airspace, has Manchester CTA2 with a base level of 2500ft AMSL above (Class D). Therefore, both pilots were observed to be operating below 2500ft AMSL to remain outside controlled airspace. Recent changes to the MSA for Hawarden have resulted in the MSA being raised from 2400ft to 2600ft AMSL within the vicinity of the Beeston VRP, this may have contributed to the altitudes selected by both pilots to remain clear of terrain.

This segment of airspace is particularly busy with VFR traffic. Multiple flying schools and light GA [aircraft] operate in the area from aerodromes such as Liverpool, Hawarden and Sleaf airfield. Beeston is particularly close to the southern edge of the NorthWest Transit Corridor (NWTC), where traffic position to transit the corridor northbound or vacate the corridor southbound. In addition, aircraft routeing to/from Liverpool airport, accompanied with the restrictions of CAS and high terrain, make this area very popular for GA pilots, increasing the risk of aircraft flying in close proximity to other aircraft.

The PA28(B) pilot was receiving a Basic Service from Hawarden Radar and was conducting general handling to the south of the Beeston VRP.

Definition of a Basic Service

CAP 774 UK Flight Information Service Chapter 2.1 states the definition of a Basic Service: -

A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. This may include weather information, changes of serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, general airspace activity information, and any other information likely to affect safety. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility. Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight.

As clearly stated, it is the pilot's responsibility for the avoidance of traffic and there is no requirement for ATC to monitor this flight. However, when an ATCO deems there may be a high risk of collision, Traffic Information may be passed as stated below in CAP 774, Chapter 1.3, duty of care.

Duty of Care

CAP 774, Chapter 1.3, duty of care.

Nothing in this CAP prevents controllers from using their own discretion, initiative and professional judgement in response to unusual circumstances, which may not be covered by the procedures herein. In dealing with any such situations, controllers/FISO shall take account of the duty of care requirements at Appendix A. The nature of the ATS task in providing the UK Flight Information Services means that it is not possible to be totally prescriptive about all actions to be taken, particularly with regard to unknown traffic and the passing of advice and warnings on high risk conflictions to pilots who have requested a Basic Service or a Traffic Service. Consequently, there is a need for controllers/FISOs to remain free to use their professional judgement to determine the best course of action for them to take for any specific situation.

CAP 774 Chapter 2.8 also states: -

If a controller/ FISO considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning shall be issued to the pilot ((UK) SERA.9005(b)(2) and GM1 (UK) SERA.9005(b)(2)).

Hawarden APS ATCO's actions [in this event]

The U/T Hawarden APS ATCO deemed there had been an increased risk of collision and correctly passed Traffic Information to the PA28(B) pilot, allowing the pilot to become visual with the conflicting traffic squawking 5050 in their left 10 o'clock at a range of 1.5NM. The aircraft squawking 5050 was later found to be a PA28(A) which had just departed the Liverpool Control Zone southeast bound.

The PA28(B) then continued to fly straight-and-level as having the right of way as stated in bold in SERA.3210 Right of way: -

- (a) The aircraft that has the right-of-way shall maintain its heading and speed.
- (b) An aircraft that is aware that the manoeuvrability of another aircraft is impaired shall give way to that aircraft.
- (c) An aircraft that is obliged by the following rules to keep out of the way of another shall avoid passing over, under or in front of the other, unless it passes well clear and takes into account the effect of aircraft wake turbulence.
 - (1) Approaching head-on. When two aircraft are approaching head-on or approximately so and there is danger of collision, each shall alter its heading to the right.
 - (2) Converging. When two aircraft are converging at approximately the same level, the aircraft that has the other on its right shall give way, except as follows:

- (i) power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to airships, sailplanes and balloons;
- (ii) airships shall give way to sailplanes and balloons;
- (iii) sailplanes shall give way to balloons;
- (iv) power-driven aircraft shall give way to aircraft which are seen to be towing other aircraft or objects.

Evidence from radar replays

The radar replays clearly show that the pilot of PA28(A) did not give way to the PA28(B), whose pilot had remained visual with PA28(A) after having received Traffic Information from Hawarden Radar. The pilot of PA28(A) belatedly executed a left-hand orbit to avoid, suggesting the pilot was not visual with the PA28(B) until the last moment. It is unknown as to whether the PA28(A) pilot had received Traffic Information from Liverpool Radar.

Operating VFR under a Basic Service

When operating VFR under a Basic Service, pilots shall use the 'see and avoid principle'.

"See and Avoid" is aviation's fundamental principle for collision avoidance, requiring pilots to continuously scan for other aircraft and manoeuvre to stay clear, especially under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in good weather, relying on pilot vigilance and effective visual scanning tactics to compensate for human vision limitations, though its reliance on eyes alone faces challenges in modern busy airspace, prompting new technology.

[Possible] Measures to prevent the Airprox from occurring

The PA28(A) pilot had elected to remain with Liverpool Radar under a Basic Service after leaving the Liverpool Zone southeast bound. An upgrade to a Traffic Service could have been requested at any time (subject to controller workload), if the pilot felt the need to receive Traffic Information on conflicting traffic. A second option was to request to change frequency to Hawarden Radar on leaving the Liverpool Zone. This would not guarantee that the pilot would receive information on conflicting traffic, however the fact that the PA28(B) pilot had received Traffic Information on the PA28(A), suggests that in all probability the [same] ATCO would have passed the appropriate Traffic Information to the pilot of the PA28(A), potentially avoiding the incident.

As the pilot of the PA28(A) had been under a Basic Service with Liverpool Radar, there was no requirement for Traffic Information to be passed. However, as deemed by the Hawarden APS ATCO, the aircraft were converging at a similar level and Traffic Information was passed to the pilot of the PA28(B) providing duty of care. It is undetermined as to whether the pilot of PA28(A) received Traffic Information on PA28(B) from Liverpool Radar or whether the aircraft was equipped with any onboard collision avoidance or traffic alerting systems, but either of these could have allowed the PA28(A) pilot to have become visual with PA28(B) and a subsequent deviation in route by PA28(B) would [likely] have averted the Airprox.

Conclusion

The Hawarden APS ATCO passed pertinent Traffic Information to the pilot of PA28(B) to allow them to become visual with the PA28(A) and therefore reducing the risk of a mid-air collision. Regardless of whether Liverpool Radar did indeed pass Traffic Information to the pilot of the PA28(A), under a Basic Service, it is the pilot's sole responsibility for the avoidance of traffic. The see-and-avoid principles rely on a pilot keeping a continuous scan for conflicting traffic [...].

CAA ATSI

ATSI has reviewed the inputs from all parties including the investigation reports from both Liverpool and Hawarden and has nothing to add.

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At CPA (1416:02) 0ft V/0.3NM H

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified via Mode S data.

The PA28(A) and PA28(B) pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28(A) pilot was required to give way to the PA28(B).²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when PA28(A) and PA28(B) flew into proximity at Beeston Castle VRP at 1416Z on Thursday 20th November 2025. The PA28(A) pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Liverpool Radar, and the PA28(B) pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Hawarden Radar.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly considered the actions of the pilot of PA28(A), noting that they had carried electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment able to emit and receive ADS-B signals and had been in receipt of a Basic

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Service from Liverpool Radar. Members wished to remind all users that, when able to utilise air traffic services, the selection of the highest possible option should be considered to improve the flow of Traffic Information. In this case, the Basic Service had not delivered any Traffic Information (**CF3**) and that, combined with a lack of incoming ADS-B signal from PA28(B), had left the pilot with no situational awareness of the presence of that aircraft (**CF4**). The Board noted that the pilot of PA28(A) had, however, achieved a late sighting of PA28(B) (**CF6**) and had initiated avoidance action.

Moving onto the role of the pilot of PA28(B), members recognised that, as with PA28(A), they had been in receipt of a Basic Service, this time from Hawarden. That controller had been able to offer Traffic Information to the pilot on a number of occasions, which had allowed them to achieve early visual contact with PA28(A) and had enabled them to consider avoidance action options should they have deemed it to have been necessary. The PA28(B) had also carried EC equipment, in this case capable of registering emissions from PA28(A) and had, in fact, received an information notification. Members felt that the respective flightpaths of the co-altitude aircraft should have delivered a proximity alert in addition to the Information signal, but none had been reported as having been received (**CF5**).

In considering the actions of the Liverpool controller, members noted that the provision of a Basic Service does rely on the providing controller being able to monitor all receiving aircraft at all times, and they accepted that this is not uncommon where the controller is focussed elsewhere. In this event, where the controller is not required to monitor the aircraft under a Basic Service (**CF1**), they had not offered Traffic Information to the pilot of PA28(A) regarding PA28(B).

Members lastly considered the contribution from the Hawarden controller, noting that they had been under training and had provided the pilot of PA28(B) with a Basic Service and had been able to offer Traffic Information regarding PA28(A). This had enabled the pilot to visually acquire PA28(A) and ensure no risk of collision had existed. Board members wished to praise the controller for their attention in this event.

The Board noted that in this case, the Short Term Conflict Alert system in place was not utilised (**CF2**) due to the nature of the traffic and the squawks utilised.

In considering risk, members noted that, although the PA28(A) pilot had no situational awareness of the proximity of PA28(B), the pilot of PA28(B) pilot had good situational awareness of PA28(A) which had enabled them to achieve an early sighting of it and they had monitored its progress and prepared for avoidance action to increase separation between the two aircraft should it be required. Board members consequently judged there to have been no risk of collision but agreed that safety had been degraded; Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025240			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Situational Awareness and Action				
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
2	Technical	• Conflict Alert System Failure	Conflict Alert System did not function as expected	The Conflict Alert system did not function or was not utilised in this situation
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
3	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider

• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
• See and Avoid				
6	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:


Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **not used** because this event took place outside the Select Frame of the STCA.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28(A) pilot could have requested a Traffic Service from Liverpool Radar.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of PA28(A) had no situational awareness of the presence of PA28(B).

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic equipment carried by PA28(A) had not been able to register any electronic emissions from the PA28(B), and that carried by PA28(B) had offered an Information signal but no 'Traffic Alert' indication.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).