# AIRPROX REPORT No 2025228

Date: 30 Oct 2025 Time: 1118Z Position: 5222N 00130W Location: Coventry ATZ

## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

| Recorded | Aircraft 1 | Aircraft 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Aircraft | C152 | PA28 |
| Operator | Civ FW | Civ FW |
| Airspace | Coventry ATZ | Coventry ATZ |
| Class | G | G |
| Rules | VFR | VFR |
| Service | AFIS | AFIS |
| Provider | Coventry Information | Coventry Information |
| Altitude/FL | 800ft | 900ft |
| Transponder | A, C, S | A, C, S |
| **Reported** | | |
| Colours | White, blue | White, blue |
| Lighting | Beacon, strobes, nav, landing | Strobe |
| Conditions | VMC | VMC |
| Visibility | >10km | >10km |
| Altitude/FL | 800ft | 900ft |
| Altimeter | QNH (1007hPa) | QNH |
| Heading | 230° | 025° |
| Speed | 67kt | 95kt |
| ACAS/TAS | Not fitted | Not fitted |
| | **Separation at CPA** | |
| Reported | 0ft V/200m H | 0ft V/800m H |
| Recorded | 100ft V/0.3NM H | |




**THE C152 PILOT** reports that, at approximately 1119, during a dual training flight, they were in the circuit at Coventry aerodrome. On the climbout from RW23LH at approximately 700ft QNH, their student noticed an approaching aircraft on their left-hand side (in their 10 o'clock at an estimated range of 500m). The student began turning to the right and called "*aircraft sighted*". They estimate a minimum lateral separation of 200m while it was slightly above them and climbing away. It passed on their left-hand side, in the opposite direction, apparently joining on an extremely tight downwind leg (but not the published one).

The pilot of the C152 regained a normal circuit pattern and made a normal landing. Their student was slightly shaken as they were not expecting to see an aircraft so close to the airport and well inside the standard circuit pattern.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE PA28 PILOT** reports that they were ferrying the PA28 to Coventry for repair. They were in contact with Coventry Information and had requested a downwind join for RW23. As they approached the ATZ, they were aware (from the radio) of an aircraft taking off and departing to the south-west. As they approached the airfield, they were in visual contact with [another] aircraft which was passing in front of them from right-to-left at some distance away as they made their turn to join downwind. They continued into the circuit pattern and landed safely. They were not aware of any other arriving or departing traffic contacting Coventry Information.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

**THE COVENTRY AFISO** reports that, at approximately 1115, [the pilot of the C152] was flying non-standard circuits, well inside the published circuit pattern practising glide approaches. [The pilot of an uninvolved PA28] had recently departed from RW23 to the south-east. [The pilot of the Airprox PA28]

reported inbound at 10NM from the west and requested a downwind join. Whilst booking PPR, the pilot had discussed joining via Draycote Water as per the published procedure in the UK AIP. [The pilot of the C152] then called final for a touch-and-go.

Approximately two minutes later, [the pilot of the Airprox PA28] called joining downwind much earlier than expected. Looking up, they saw a PA28 at the start of the downwind leg where traffic would have been expected to be joining. They later realised that that was [the uninvolved PA28 leaving the airfield to the south-east], and they replied, "*report final, one ahead on short final*". The Coventry AFISO then reiterated the squawk of 0420 as the squawk was not correctly read back after the initial call.

Observing [the C152] on the climbout, they noticed [the Airprox PA28] in the opposite direction, just south of the upwind leg. No further Traffic Information was passed due to the aircraft already passing each other by the time they had noticed [the Airprox PA28's] position. No incident was reported by either pilot during this period. [The pilot of the Airprox PA28] then flew a very tight downwind leg, just outside the airfield boundary. They then made a tight turn on base leg and landed on RW23 safely at 1120. [The pilot of the C152] then continued in the circuit with no further confliction.

The AFISO perceived the severity of the incident as 'Low'.

## Factual Background

The entry for Coventry Airport in the UK AIP provides the following procedures:

EGBE AD 2.22 Flight Procedures

1 Arrivals
   a. Due to the proximity of Birmingham's controlled airspace (CTA2) over the airport, overhead joins are not possible at Coventry.
   b. To join for Runway 23, route to Draycote Water VRP and join on left base giving way to circuit traffic as appropriate.

The weather at Birmingham Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGBB 301120Z 15006KT 9999 FEW030 10/07 Q1006
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## Analysis and Investigation

### Coventry Unit Investigation

After reviewing the tape recordings, [the pilot of the PA28] was routeing for a downwind join for RW23 and gave their range as 10NM from the airfield at 1118. Two minutes later (1120), after the pilot's initial call, the aircraft was observed very close-in over [the industrial area to the south of the airfield] and reported "*downwind entering the ATZ*". As a result of that, and to the surprise of the C152 pilot on the climbout, the [C152 pilot] made a turn to the right to give the joining aircraft extra room as this was a non-standard join downwind. Appropriate Traffic Information was provided in the build-up to the Airprox. Without the addition of a FID (Flight Information Display), the exact distance of the aircraft from the airfield could not be determined.

Normal operations were being conducted at the time of the incident. The Duty AFISO was signed on to the watch and provided a Flight Information Service. An assistant was also present in the VCR at the time of the incident. [There was] nothing different or unusual about the working conditions. Traffic levels were steady and the Tower was fully manned. All available equipment was in full working order.

Pilots are responsible for maintaining their own separation in Class G airspace. Although the chances of an Airprox occurring at Coventry are minimal, it is not impossible. Staff are highly trained and regularly assessed on their competency throughout the year. ATS staff are well aware of the risks an Airprox possesses and provide Traffic Information appropriately in order to minimize any

risk of an occurrence. AFISOs are reliant on pilots giving them accurate information in order to assist other pilots in the safe conduct of flight.

**CAA ATSI**

[The pilot of the PA28] was seen to have been approaching the airfield from the WSW and on a track that was taking them towards the RW23 climbout. It was not until the aircraft was very close to the airfield that its pilot turned to the right to position downwind left-hand, effectively a non-standard join, particularly as the AIP references the use of Draycote Water VRP (only) for joins due to the proximity of Birmingham's controlled airspace.

The AFISO was not expecting the aircraft from that direction, and not as soon as it had appeared due to the pilot's previous position report, and they did not spot the confliction until after both aircraft had passed.

Coventry ATC has a serviceable VDF but no reference to its use was made in their initial and follow-up reports. Use of the VDF in this circumstance might have enhanced the AFISO's situational awareness with an indication to them that the PA28 was inbound from a non-standard direction. Unit management was contacted by CAA ATSI who confirmed that it is, perhaps, being underutilised. CAA ATSI has passed an informal recommendation to the unit that they reconsider, with a view to increasing its use as a matter of routine.

**UKAB Secretariat**

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. The aircraft were displayed on the radar replay at Flight Levels. A suitable correction was applied to determine their altitudes.

An uninvolved C172 had departed from RW23 at approximately 1112 to the south-west and had subsequently passed abeam the Airprox PA28, left-wing to left-wing, at approximately 1115:40. An uninvolved PA28 had departed to the south-east, and first appeared on the radar replay at 1115:10, when the Airprox PA28 had been at a distance of 6.3NM from Coventry Airport (Figure 1).

The squawk of the Airprox PA28 was observed to change from 0240 to 0420 at 1117:34. The C152 reappeared on the radar replay at 1118:06 after a touch-and-go.




Figure 1 - Aircraft positions at 1115:10




Figure 2 - Aircraft positions at 1117:34




Figure 3 – CPA at 1118:18

The pilot of the C152 kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight. It was by combining the data sources that the diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined.

The C152 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C152 and a PA28 flew into proximity in the Coventry ATZ at 1118Z on Thursday 30th October 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an AFIS from Coventry Information.

## PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data for the flight of the C152 and a report from the AFISO involved. Relevant contributory factors

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the C152, and members noted that they had been engaged in a dual training flight and had flown several tight circuits from RW23. It was agreed that the pilot of the C152 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the PA28 (**CF6**) until their student had sighted it during a climbout from the runway. Members noted that its proximity had caused them concern (**CF8**), but also noted that they had had sufficient time to have considered the safest course of action and had increased the separation by turning to the right.

Turning their attention to the actions of the pilot of the PA28, members reviewed the entry for Coventry Airport in the UK AIP. The correct join for RW23 had been to 'route to Draycote Water VRP and join on left base giving way to circuit traffic as appropriate'. It was noted that the Coventry AFISO had recalled that "*Whilst booking PPR"*, the PA28 pilot had *"discussed joining via Draycote Water*", although they had subsequently requested a downwind join and had tracked towards the airfield overhead. Members acknowledged that the Coventry AFISO had not been permitted to have instructed the PA28 pilot to have joined via Draycote Water, and agreed that the PA28 pilot had not complied with the published joining procedure (**CF3**).

Members next noted that the PA28 pilot had recalled that they had been aware of an aircraft that had departed to the south-west (which members surmised had been the uninvolved C172), and another which had passed "*in front of them from right-to-left at some distance away as they made their turn to join downwind*". Although it could not be confirmed, members were in agreement that that sighting had very likely not been the C152 (given that the C152 had been on a near-reciprocal heading), but may have referred to the uninvolved PA28 or another aircraft in the circuit pattern at that time.

Members noted that the AFISO had recalled that the pilot of the C152 had called 'final for a touch-and-go', and it was also noted that the pilot of the PA28 stated that they "*were not aware of any other arriving or departing traffic contacting Coventry Information*". Therefore, members agreed that the pilot of the PA28 had not gleaned situational awareness of the C152 (**CF6**) and had not sighted it during their join to the circuit (**CF7**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the Coventry AFISO, members noted that they had acknowledged that the pilot of the PA28 had requested a non-standard, downwind join. They would, therefore, have expected that the PA28 would have arrived from the south or south-west of the airfield, rather than from the south-east (via Draycote Water). However, it was not clear to members whether additional position reports had been requested by the AFISO which may have assisted with their situational awareness.

Members next reviewed the timings of the encounter. It was noted that the AFISO had recalled that the pilot of an uninvolved PA28 "*had recently departed from RW23 to the south-east*". Figure 1 (above), with a timestamp of 1115:10, shows that the pilot of the uninvolved PA28 had just taken off when the Airprox PA28 had been 6.3NM from the airfield. It had been subsequent to that, that the AFISO recalled that the pilot of the Airprox PA28 had reported that they had been 10NM from the airfield. Whilst the timings displayed in the NATS radar replay appeared to have differed slightly to those provided in the Coventry Unit investigation, it was clear to members that the pilot of the PA28 had provided an inaccurate position report. Members agreed that that information had led the Coventry AFISO to have constructed an inaccurate mental model (**CF2**) and had then inadvertently misidentified the outbound PA28 as the inbound Airprox PA28. That is, the outbound PA28 may have appeared to have been at the start of the downwind leg where the inbound Airprox PA28 might have reached in the elapsed time given its pilot's reported position. However, the Airprox PA28 had actually been several miles further west and north, much nearer to the RW23 extended centreline. Members noted that the AFISO had subsequently realised the error, although that had not been in time to have passed actionable Traffic Information to either pilot. Consequently, members agreed that, essentially, the conflict had not been detected (**CF1**).

Members concluded their discussion and summarised their thoughts. It was noted that neither aircraft had been fitted with an additional EC device, and the Board wished to emphasise that, had compatible

devices been fitted, both pilots may have received a timely alert to the proximity of the other aircraft and the encounter may have unfolded in a more benign manner. It was agreed that the pilot of the PA28 had not conformed with, nor had they avoided, the pattern of traffic in operation (**CF5**) and, as such, that their join to the circuit had been incorrect (**CF4**). Safety margins had been eroded but members agreed that it had been the early avoiding action taken by the student in the C152 that had increased separation and had ensured that no risk of collision had existed. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

| | 2025228 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CF | **Factor** | **Description** | **ECCAIRS Amplification** | **UKAB Amplification** |
| | **Ground Elements** | | | |
| | **• Situational Awareness and Action** | | | |
| 1 | Human Factors | • Conflict Detection - Not Detected | An event involving Air Navigation Services conflict not being detected. | |
| 2 | Contextual | • Traffic Management Information Action | An event involving traffic management information actions | The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness |
| | **Flight Elements** | | | |
| | **• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** | | | |
| 3 | Human Factors | • Use of policy/Procedures | Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew | Regulations and/or procedures not complied with |
| | **• Tactical Planning and Execution** | | | |
| 4 | Human Factors | • Action Performed Incorrectly | Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly | Incorrect or ineffective execution |
| 5 | Human Factors | • Monitoring of Environment | Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment | Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed |
| | **• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** | | | |
| 6 | Contextual | • Situational Awareness and Sensory Events | Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations | Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness |
| | **• See and Avoid** | | | |
| 7 | Human Factors | • Monitoring of Other Aircraft | Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft | Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots |
| 8 | Human Factors | • Perception of Visual Information | ~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~ | Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft |

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Ground Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because the Coventry AFISO had inaccurate situational awareness of the position of the PA28.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

## Flight Elements:

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the PA28 had not complied with the published joining procedure.

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the PA28 had not executed their join to the circuit pattern correctly.

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.