


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2025225**

Date: 18 Oct 2025 Time: 1121Z Position: 5141N 00030W Location: ivo Sarratt Bottom

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	EV97	R44
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Helo
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Listening Out <sup>1</sup>
Provider	([destination] Traffic)	(Denham Radio)
Altitude/FL	1950ft	2000ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	Silver	Silver/purple
Lighting	Landing	Position, landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1500ft	1400-2200ft
Altimeter	QFE (1015hPa)	QNH (NK hPa)
Heading	054°	NK
Speed	~70kt	80-90kt
ACAS/TAS	PilotAware	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	<b>Separation at CPA</b>	
Reported	0ft V/30ft H	0ft V/0.5NM H
Recorded	~50ft V/<<0.1NM H	



**THE EV97 PILOT** reports flying in trail with another aircraft, approaching [destination], when they observed a helicopter on SkyDemon about 2 miles north. It was on a converging course from the left. As it neared them, it turned right and passed behind, as they were expecting. A couple of minutes later the helicopter overtook them on the right and immediately pulled in front, before overtaking the other aircraft. It then turned south and descended.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

**THE R44 INSTRUCTOR** reports instructing a student in the Denham local flying area. They were undertaking some refresher training after the student had been away. The exercises consisted of practice forced landings from 2000ft towards a suitable field with a go-around at the end, left- and right-hand steep turns at around 1800ft up to 45° AoB, vortex-ring entry and recovery and simulated emergencies. On one climb-out, they observed a small fixed-wing aircraft above and to the left about half a mile away on a steady course, heading maybe 060-090°. They climbed in the same direction at the same distance for a while until they had passed it at the same level. They then turned right, away from the aircraft, and continued their flight.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’.

<sup>1</sup> Reported as an AGCS with Denham but the Denham A/G Operator did not believe they were in 2-way communication with the pilot at the time of the Airprox.

## Factual Background

The weather at RAF Northolt was recorded as follows:

METAR EGWU 181120Z 14012KT 9999 FEW030 BKN046 15/08 Q1023 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU=

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The EV97 and R44 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>2</sup>. If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the EV97 pilot had right of way and the R44 instructor was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right<sup>3</sup>. An aircraft that is obliged [by rules of the air concerning avoidance of collision] to keep out of the way of another shall avoid passing over, under or in front of the other, unless it passes well clear and takes into account the effect of aircraft wake turbulence.<sup>4</sup>



Figure 1: Airspace Analyser CPA 1120:50

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>3</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

<sup>4</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c).




Figure 2: Aircraft tracks after CPA to 1121:42

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when an EV97 and an R44 flew into proximity near Sarratt Bottom at 1121Z on Saturday 18<sup>th</sup> October 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither in receipt of a FIS.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and Mode S/C derived altitudes. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Board members first discussed the pilots' reports, and noted from the radar replay that the R44 instructor had only turned away after passing the second, leading, aircraft. Correlation of the R44 instructor's narrative of events with the radar replay indicated that they had only described their encounter with the leading aircraft, the aircraft with which the EV97 pilot had been flying in trail. Members wondered whether the R44 instructor might not have seen the EV97; that the R44 instructor's track before they had passed the other, leading, aircraft could have been purely coincidentally aligned with the EV97 track and that the R44 instructor had, in fact, not seen the EV97 at all. After further discussion, the Board discounted this speculation on the basis that the R44 instructor had also turned right as the EV97 pilot had made a small turn to the right and had then closed on the EV97 and climbed to about the same level, before CPA, after which the R44 instructor had abruptly turned left, in close proximity to and in front of the EV97, and had taken up a track which paralleled the other, leading, aircraft's track. The Board noted that, on passing the leading aircraft, the R44 instructor had descended and turned right, as had been described in their narrative. Members accepted that there had been a possibility that the R44 instructor had not seen the EV97 but felt that this was unlikely, given the aircrafts' relative tracks and altitudes.

Board members then discussed the manner in which the R44 instructor had overtaken the EV97. They had plainly not overtaken the EV97 in accordance with the regulations regarding overtaking (**CF1**), specifically by passing without remaining 'well clear' and by not avoiding passing in front. Given that they had most likely been aware of the EV97's proximity, their overtake manoeuvre had been ineffective in that they had passed in very close proximity to the EV97 (**CF2**). The R44 instructor had had no situational awareness of the EV97 (**CF3**), that is awareness of the other aircraft's proximity before sighting it, and members wondered whether a FIS from Farnborough North or fitment of a TAS in the R44 might have helped. The Board agreed that the EV97 pilot had obtained situational awareness on

the R44 from their TAS but, unfortunately, it had not alerted when it could reasonably have been expected to alert (**CF4**). However, the EV97 pilot had been aware of its proximity for some time before CPA. The Board members further discussed the R44 instructor's actions and agreed that they were at a loss to understand as to why they had inexplicably flown into conflict with the EV97 (**CF5**).

Turning to risk, Board members were equally divided between those who felt that, because the pilots had each been visual with the other aircraft, collision had been avoided (Risk C) and those who felt that the separation at CPA had been so small that risk of collision had remained (Risk B). Ultimately, Director UKAB cast a deciding vote, that the separation at CPA had been so small that this Airprox merited a Risk B, safety had been much reduced. Members agreed unanimously that the significant risk had been entirely avoidable.

Finally, the Board restated the often given advice that pilots should avoid other aircraft not by their margin, but by the margin of the other pilot.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### Contributory Factors:

2025225				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
<b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b>				
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
<b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>				
2	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>				
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
<b>• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance</b>				
4	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
<b>• See and Avoid</b>				
5	Contextual	• Loss of Separation	An event involving a loss of separation between aircraft	Pilot flew into conflict
<b>• Outcome Events</b>				
6	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>5</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

#### **Flight Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because, in the Board's opinion, the R44 instructor had not overtaken the EV97 in accordance with the regulations regarding overtaking.

<sup>5</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **ineffective** because the R44 instructor had seen the EV97 but had not overtaken with sufficient separation.

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because the R44 instructor had had no situational awareness on the EV97 until sighting it.

**Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because the EV97 TAS had not alerted when expected.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **ineffective** because, although the R44 instructor had seen the EV97, they had passed in close proximity whilst overtaking.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025225		Outside Controlled Airspace						
Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness					
			Barrier Weighting					
			0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	○	○					
	Manning & Equipment	○	○					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	○	○					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	⊗					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	●	⊗					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	⊗	●					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⊗	⊗					
	See & Avoid	●	⊗					
<b>Key:</b>								
	Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used			
Provision	●	●	⊗	○				
Application	●	●	⊗	○	○			
Effectiveness	■	■	■	■	□			