


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025224

Date: 18 Oct 2025 Time: 1251Z Position: 5046N 00102W Location: Hayling Island

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Pipistrel	PA28
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	None
Provider	Sandown	N/A
Altitude/FL	~1970ft	1920ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White, blue
Lighting	Nav	Strobes, bcn
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	5-10km
Altitude/FL	1800ft	1900ft
Altimeter	QNH (1022hPa)	QNH (1023hPa)
Heading	'East'	210°
Speed	95kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	PilotAware	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	0ft V/100m H	NR
Recorded	~50ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE PIPISTREL PILOT reports that they had been returning from [...] and had been flying eastbound at 1900ft on 1022hPa QNH. They had been monitoring the Sandown frequency (119.280MHz) but not receiving any service from them. Conditions were clear, smooth air, very good visibility. They had been the flight instructor with a student in the left-hand seat and themselves in the right-hand seat. They saw the aircraft on their left in their approximate 10 o'clock position, near RUDMO (just off the south coast, south of Hayling Island) as it emerged from their blind spot of the cockpit pillar. After the startle factor, they had seen the Piper turn to its left, putting its path straight ahead of their own. [They believe that] the Piper pilot had made the correct decision to turn left rather than right and hit them. The Pipistrel pilot pulled up sharply to avoid the Piper, then levelled out about 200ft higher. They saw the Piper turn right then head south, clear of their path. The risk of collision was very high.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that they had been tracking to [...] on a course of approximately 210° at an altitude of 1900ft. They were just leaving the coast near the mouth of Langstone harbour when their passenger called their attention to another aircraft nearby on the starboard side. The PA28 pilot remembers leaning across the passenger and looking slightly down and slightly behind. They did not see the aircraft during their normal scan. They [recall that] they did not have time to assess the exact distance or bearing of the aircraft but realised that it posed a credible threat of collision and immediately took avoidance action. This took the form of a steep turn of approximately 90° to port, followed by a rapid descent to 1400ft, turning back to starboard to resume tracking to [...]. The PA28 pilot remembers telling their passenger to keep a good lookout above. Regarding the status of the radio service, they had been receiving a Basic Service from Farnborough Radar (125.250MHz) after transit of the Farnborough zone. They were not sure of the exact sequence of events, but Farnborough told them that they had been leaving their area and suggested to free-call Sandown. The pilot responded that

they would call Bembridge Radio on 123.255MHz. They [believe that] this was before the incident and that they had not yet called Bembridge, but cannot be sure.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

Factual Background

The weather at Southampton Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGH 181250Z 15007KT 110V190 9999 BKN038 14/07 Q1021=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: CPA – 1sec (1250:30)




Figure 2: The next radar sweep at CPA + 3sec (1250:34)

Both aircraft were tracked via radar and identified through Mode S data. As the 2 aircraft approached CPA, the Pipistrel had been in a gentle climb, showing on radar to be passing through 1920ft (co-altitude) as the pilot had seen the PA28 (which had been tracking at a steady altitude of 1920ft) and at the point they had then initiated their avoidance manoeuvre, which had included increasing their climb rate.

The Pipistrel and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the Pipistrel.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Pipistrel and a PA28 flew into proximity at Hayling Island at 1251Z on Saturday 18th October 2025. Both pilots had been operating under VFR in VMC, neither had been in receipt of a Flight Information Service.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members firstly discussed the actions of the Pipistrel pilot, noting that they had been engaged in a training flight as the instructor in the right-hand seat and the student in the left-hand seat. They had been listening out on the Sandown frequency and had therefore not been in receipt of a Flight Information Service. They had been equipped with a transponder and had carried an electronic conspicuity (EC) unit capable of receiving electronic emissions from the PA28 but, in this event, had registered none (**CF2**). The Board agreed that the lack of a FIS and no EC inputs had led the Pipistrel pilot to have not had any situational awareness of the proximity of the PA28 (**CF1**). The pilot reports that the PA28 had appeared quite close from behind their blind-spot (**CF3**) and was seen to take a turn to the left, which they had determined to have been an avoidance manoeuvre.

In reviewing the actions of the PA28 pilot, members noted that they had been in the process of switching from Farnborough Radar, as they had reached the limit of that coverage, to the Sandown frequency but had not, at CPA, been in receipt of a Flight Information Service and, as they had not carried EC equipment, had not gained any situational awareness of the proximity of the Pipistrel (**CF1**). The pilot reports that the passenger in the right-hand seat had visually acquired the Pipistrel, and the PA28 pilot, having manoeuvred themselves to confirm, had deemed it to be too close (**CF3**) and had performed an immediate avoidance turn to the left.

Members discussed the issue of the availability of air traffic services in this area, noting that Bembridge and Sandown had no radar, Bournemouth and Farnborough were at the limits of their capability for this event and that, at times, Southampton was not able to provide a service to pilots operating outside its controlled airspace. Members wished to remind all operators that the Low Level VHF Common Frequency (130.490MHz), which exists with the aim of helping to mitigate against mid-air collision in the UK Low Flying System (UKFLS), can be utilised to share positional reports amongst users in the same area, and is not restricted to simply those areas where military low-flying traffic can be expected to be encountered.

Concluding their discussion, members turned their attention to the determination of the risk of collision. They noted that the neither pilot had any situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft and that, having visually acquired the Pipistrel at a late stage, the PA28 pilot had initiated avoiding action, thereby reducing the risk of collision. Members consequently agreed that safety margins had been reduced much below the norm and were in agreement that there had been a risk of collision (**CF4**), assigning a Risk Category B to this event.

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**Contributory Factors:**

	2025224			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Flight Elements				
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
2	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
• See and Avoid				
3	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
• Outcome Events				
4	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because, although the Pipistrel was equipped with an electronic conspicuity system, it had not received any electronic emissions from the PA28.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because both pilots had achieved only a late sighting of the other aircraft.

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025224		Outside Controlled Airspace						
		Provision	Application	Effectiveness				
Barrier				Barrier Weighting				
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	○	○					
	Manning & Equipment	○	○					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	○	○					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	●					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	●	●					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	⊗	●					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⚠	⊗					
	See & Avoid	⚠	⚠					
Key:		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Not Present/Not Assessable</u>	<u>Not Used</u>		
Provision	●	⚠	⊗	○				
Application	●	⚠	⊗	○				
Effectiveness	■	■	■	■	□			