


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025223

Date: 07 Oct 2025 Time: 1504Z Position: 5358N 00038W Location: 3NM SW Wetwang

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

| Recorded | Aircraft 1 | Aircraft 2 |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| Aircraft | DA42 | C208 |
| Operator | Civ FW | Civ FW |
| Airspace | London FIR | London FIR |
| Class | G | G |
| Rules | VFR | IFR |
| Service | Listening Out | None |
| Provider | Humberside Tower | N/A |
| Altitude/FL | F055 | F075 |
| Transponder | A, C, S | A, C, S |
| Reported | | |
| Colours | White | White, blue |
| Lighting | Landing, taxi, strobe, nav | Strobes |
| Conditions | VMC | VMC |
| Visibility | >10km | >10km |
| Altitude/FL | 7000ft | "descent from FL80" |
| Altimeter | QNH (1020hPa) | SPS (1013hPa) |
| Heading | 250° | NK |
| Speed | 110kt | 160kt |
| ACAS/TAS | TAS | TAS |
| Alert | None | TA |
| Separation at CPA | | |
| Reported | 200ft V/0.5NM H | 1000ft V/NR H |
| Recorded | 2000ft V/<0.1NM H | |



THE DA42 PILOT reports that their flight had been an MEP training sortie. Following completion of the lesson, and planning their flight to [their destination airfield], the autopilot was engaged. The Instructor observed an aircraft approximately 0.5NM behind the left wing, converging at the same altitude. The autopilot was immediately disconnected and a steep dive was initiated to 4500ft which was accompanied by a turn away from the conflicting aircraft’s track. The other aircraft was subsequently re-sighted, and the conflict was resolved without further incident.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

THE C208 PILOT reports that they were in a descent from FL80. They would normally have been under a Traffic Service from Humberside Radar in that area, but they were closed. Their next call would have been to Leeming when closer to Bagby. [The C208 pilot opined that] it is a bit of a ‘black hole’ in terms of service in that particular area when Humberside is closed, unfortunately.

They were alerted to the traffic by their traffic system, below and to the north. They therefore stopped their descent until the traffic had passed. It crossed underneath and ahead of them, heading towards the south. They then continued their descent.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’.

Factual Background

A NOTAM for the revised hours of operation of Humberside Aerodrome and activation of the Humberside ATZ:

C6078/25

Q) EGTT/QAZCA/IV/NBO/AE/000/022/5334N00021W003

A) EGNJ B) FROM: 25/10/06 06:30 TO: 25/10/12 20:40

E) REVISED HUMBERSIDE ATZ ACTIVATION AND AD HR AS FOLLOWS:

:
TUE 0500-0530(PPR), 0630-0730, 0800-1430, 1515-1700, 1930-2040(PPR)

:
ATS AVBL DURING ABOVE AD OPR HOURS ONLY. NO ARR OR DEP LATER THAN CLOSING TIMES MINUS 15 MINS. INBOUND ACFT ARE REQUIRED TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME TO RECEIVE AN ATS AFTER AD REOPENING. SAR OPS OCCUR H24, THEREFORE PILOTS TRANSITING THROUGH OR WI THE VICINITY OF THE ATZ OUTSIDE OF THE AD OPR HOURS ARE RECOMMENDED TO MAKE BLIND CALLS ON THE HUMBERSIDE TOWER CHANNEL 124.905MHZ. USE OF THE AD DURING PPR PERIODS IS BY PRIOR ARRANGEMENT THROUGH A HANDLING AGENT OR WITH TERMINAL SUPERVISOR ON 07718 524072.

The weather at Humberside Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNJ 071450Z 25010KT 9999 FEW023 SCT031 17/12 Q1021

METAR EGNJ 071520Z 23010KT 9999 FEW023 SCT031 16/12 Q1021

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 1). Neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 1 – CPA at 1503:30 (radar data)




Figure 2 – Aircraft positions at 1503:29 (MLAT data)

The diagram was constructed and the separation determined from the radar data.

The DA42 and C208 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C208 pilot was required to give way to the DA42.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DA42 and a C208 flew into proximity 3NM south-west of Wetwang at 1504Z on Tuesday 7th October 2025. The DA42 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, listening out on the Humberside Radar frequency. The C208 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC, not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the DA42, and it was noted that they had been listening out on the Humberside Tower frequency. Members noted the wording of NOTAM C6078/25 and agreed that, given that they had been flying beyond the operational range of the LARS offered by RAF Leeming and RAF Waddington, tuning their radio to the Humberside Tower frequency may have provided the best picture of the traffic situation available at their location at that time. Members agreed that the TAS fitted to the DA42 had not provided information pertaining to the presence of the C208 when an alert to its proximity would have been expected. Nevertheless, members noted that the pilot of the DA42 had sighted the C208 at a range of 0.5NM and had considered that positive avoiding action had been necessary. Members noted that, consequently, considerable vertical separation from the C208 had been generated by their descent.

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Turning their attention to the actions of the pilot of the C208, members agreed that the TAS equipment fitted to their aircraft had provided a Traffic Alert pertaining to the proximity of the DA42. It was noted that, again, on visual acquisition of the other aircraft, positive action had been taken (this time in arresting their descent) to prevent the separation from having reduced further.

Concluding their discussion, members appreciated that the pilot of the DA42 had been concerned by the proximity of the C208. Notwithstanding, members agreed that both pilots had had sufficient time to have visually acquired the other aircraft and to have considered the safest course of action. Members were satisfied that the actions taken by each pilot had ensured that the separation between the aircraft had been adequate and that there had been no risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category E to this event and members agreed on the following contributory factors:

CF1. The pilot of the DA42 had not had situational awareness of the C208 until it had been visually acquired.

CF2. The TAS equipment fitted to the C208 had provided a Traffic Alert to the presence of the DA42.

CF3. The TAS equipment fitted to the DA42 would have been expected to have detected the presence of the C208 but no alert was reported.

CF4. The pilot of the DA42 had been concerned by the proximity of the C208.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

| 2025223 | | | | |
|---|---------------|--|--|--|
| CF | Factor | Description | ECCAIRS Amplification | UKAB Amplification |
| Flight Elements | | | | |
| • Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action | | | | |
| 1 | Contextual | • Situational Awareness and Sensory Events | Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations | Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness |
| • Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance | | | | |
| 2 | Contextual | • Other warning system operation | An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS. | |
| 3 | Human Factors | • Response to Warning System | An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system | CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported |
| • See and Avoid | | | | |
| 4 | Human Factors | • Perception of Visual Information | Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement | Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft |

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the DA42 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the C208 until it had been visually acquired.

| Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025223 | | Outside Controlled Airspace | | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------|-----|-----|--|
| Barrier | Provision | Application | Effectiveness | | | | | |
| | | | Barrier Weighting | | | | | |
| | | | 0% | 5% | 10% | 15% | 20% | |
| Ground Element | Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | Manning & Equipment | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | Situational Awareness of the Conflication & Action | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance | ● | ● | | | | | |
| Flight Element | Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | Tactical Planning and Execution | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | See & Avoid | ● | ● | | | | | |
| Key: | | | | | | | | |
| | Full | Partial | None | Not Present/Not Assessable | Not Used | | | |
| Provision | ● | ● | ● | ● | | | | |
| Application | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | | | |
| Effectiveness | ■ | ■ | ■ | ■ | □ | | | |