AIRPROX REPORT No 2025219

Date: 08 Oct 2025 Time: 1455Z Position: 5356N 00057W Location: IVO Elvington

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	TBM960	Hawk
Operator	Civ Comm	HQ Air (Ops)
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	Elvington Traffic	Low Level Common
Altitude/FL	500ft	700ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Silver, black, red	Red
Lighting	L'ding, strobe, nav	Strobes, landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	800ft	500ft
Altimeter	QNH (1023hPa)	NR
Heading	260°	360°
Speed	130kt	360kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	Not fitted
Alert	Information	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	0ft V/1NM H	NR V/1NM H
Recorded	200ft V/1NM H	



THE TBM960 PILOT reports that they had 'PPR'd' with Elvington to inform them that they would be arriving at 1500. They switched to the frequency published for Elvington on the CAA VFR chart of 119.63MHz and made a first blind-call at about 10NM out, informing Elvington Traffic that they would be positioning for a left-base for RW26, with no response. They could see some traffic on TCAS, north-west of the runway. There are a few airfields there, so they assumed it might have been a local school doing practice forced landings, but there was no-one on frequency. They made a blind-call when downwind, again with no response.

[An aircraft, first sighted at 1NM in their 10 o'clock position,] was to the south of the airfield (below them and heading north) as they turned base. They were now keeping a very good lookout outside. As they rolled onto final, a Hawk went across the final approach at a similar height. [The pilot of the TBM960] was doing a flapless approach, as it was such a good place to practice, and had given themselves a long final. They had been aware of traffic nearby so they were not concerned and took no avoiding action. However, they were surprised that there was no-one on the published frequency and that the location of the low-pass was perpendicular to their final approach.

On subsequently examining the aircraft logs, they found that the traffic that they had seen on TCAS was not actually the Hawk but was instead a Grob trainer [(the Prefect)]. The Hawk had gone between themselves and the Grob, parallel with the Grob, at a similar height. That was why they assessed that the risk of collision was low rather than none as they had initially thought.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE HAWK PILOT reports that, on a Continuation Training sortie, whilst at low level and approaching Elvington airfield, they became visual with a Prefect co-altitude with them on their left and a large civilian single-engine aircraft slightly above on their right that was carrying out an approach to Elvington (first sighted at a range of 4-5NM). They assessed that the separation distance between themselves and the

two other aircraft was more than sufficient so they did not manoeuvre until they were clear of both. At no point did they assess that there was a risk of collision between any element.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE PREFECT PILOT (as a witness) reports that they were the non-handling QFI conducting a low-level training exercise at 500ft AGL. With a road junction near York as the next turning point, the trainee was conducting pre-turn checks when they heard a Hawk transmitting on the Low Level Common VHF frequency that they were in a similar position. That served as a good opportunity to practice 'picture building' communications, and the trainee relayed their own position and status on Low Level Common.

TAS showed a concurrent contact approaching from their 5 o'clock and the trainee was able to establish visual contact from the right-hand seat confirming a single red Hawk overtaking on their right-hand side. Aware of Elvington airfield on the nose, but with no visual or electronic contacts other than the Hawk, they were content to allow the trainee to maintain heading, and they passed over the centre of Elvington at 500ft with the Hawk passing an estimated 0.5NM mile to their right. That seemed the best form of deconfliction with a sighted aircraft and the limited number of air movements known to operate from Elvington which is a minor aerodrome with no ATZ.

They were unaware of the GA aircraft which, from the report, would have been positioning on final approach to the east of the Hawk, and probably masked from either visual or electronic contact. With the city of York on their left and the Hawk on their right, had they been aware of the GA traffic then exiting low-level would have been their other option. They believe their lookout, and monitoring of Low Level Common frequency, plus TAS/[EC device] would have been sufficient barriers had they come any closer to the GA traffic.

Factual Background

The weather at Leeds Bradford Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNM 081450Z 26012KT 9999 FEW028 SCT038 13/07 Q1023
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Analysis and Investigation

RAF Waddington Investigation

During a routine Continuation Training sortie, the occurrence pilot was approaching a waypoint in the vicinity of the City of York. They were aware of the presence of a Prefect from CADS[1] and were able to visually acquire it to their left with no confliction on their current heading. In the same timeframe, they visually acquired an aircraft to their right and, again, assessed that, by maintaining their current heading, there would be no confliction and their vector would remain predictable. Having passed clear to the north of both aircraft, they resumed their pre-planned navigation route.

3FTS Investigation

[The pilot of the Prefect was] unaware of the event. The flight was recalled although no route chart was available. They were aware of a potential conflict with the Hawk which formed the focus of that leg. No LARS was available which could have offered sufficient coverage at low level in that area, therefore they were solely working the Low Level Common frequency. The weather details were not fully recalled but the QFI believed they were fit for low level and were not a factor. They believe they would have found it difficult to have identified the aircraft crossing 2NM ahead of them without being aware that it was in the vicinity. Although that was a relatively busy time, with the trainee conducting pre-turn workcycle, they were both looking out. They did not receive any warning on TAS, but that does not mean there was not any temporary or fleeting representation on it. TAS is not recorded therefore they are unable to verify that. Neither they, nor their trainee, recall anything. They were

[1] CADS (Centralised Aviation Data Service) is a web-based flight planning service where pilots flying in uncontrolled airspace can share information about hazards and flightpaths.

familiar with Elvington and thought it was, essentially, not active unless by rare prior agreement. They were not expecting traffic to be landing there. They believe the Hawk was on CADS pre-flight. Their original route took them along the flow arrow to the east of Elvington therefore there was no original plan to overfly it, however, to permit horizontal clearance with the Hawk, they elected to alter their route to go over the airfield up to the planned turning point.

Sequence of events: The crew was planning a sortie at 500ft MSD which was to pass along the flow arrow to the east of Elvington. A Hawk was notified on CADS as potentially being in the area. The crew made contact on the Low Level Common frequency and arranged suitable deconfliction. This meant they maintained a track slightly parallel west of the original track and were then routeing overhead Elvington. No traffic was expected to be operating at Elvington. It was not considered to listen to the Initial Contact Frequency (ICF) due to low activity levels thought to have been in place. The site has no ATZ and is 'see-and-avoid'. Although the [TBM960] can be seen through ADS-B data sources to have crossed ahead of the Prefect, and slightly above, it was not sighted by either crew despite their lookout. No recollection of TAS displaying the [TBM960] ahead, and no warning sounded to the crew was recalled.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the three aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. The aircraft were depicted on the radar replay at Flight Levels. A suitable correction was applied to determine their altitudes. The pilot of the TBM960 kindly supplied flight-monitoring data for their flight. The TBM960 and Prefect, but not the Hawk, were observed by reference to ADS-B data sources. The diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined by combining the data sources.

Figure 1 - 1455:20, 6sec before CPA (ADS-B and MLAT data)



Figure 2 - CPA at 1455:26 (radar data)



Figure 3 - 1455:50 (24sec after CPA)

The TBM960 and Hawk pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[3]

Comments

HQ Air Command

Although the Hawk pilot might have gained better situational awareness of the traffic in the Elvington pattern if they had listened out on the Elvington Traffic frequency, they were not required to do so as Elvington has no ATZ and is not a licensed aerodrome, so they were following current military guidance to monitor the Low Level Common frequency when operating at low level. Ultimately, a good lookout by the Hawk pilot meant that a collision was never likely to occur between the TBM960

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.
[3] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 17.

and the Hawk, but MAA RA 2307 requires military pilots to avoid an aerodrome unless they can confirm whether other aircraft are operating and can conform with the traffic pattern. Given that the pilot of the Hawk admits that they saw that the TBM960 pilot was "*carrying out an approach to Elvington*", then the Hawk pilot was required to either avoid Elvington or follow the traffic pattern. Instead, they chose to continue on their flightpath as they deemed that there was no risk of collision. This is not in compliance with MAA RA 2307.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a TBM960 and a Hawk flew into proximity in the vicinity of Elvington at 1455Z on Wednesday 8th October 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the TBM960 pilot listening out on the Elvington Traffic frequency and the Hawk pilot listening out on the Low Level Common frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from three pilots, GPS track data for the flight of the TBM960, radar photographs/video recordings and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the TBM960, and members noted that they had been aware of an aircraft to the north-west of their position during their approach to Elvington aerodrome RW26. It was also noted that they had subsequently sighted an aircraft to the south, the Prefect, as they turned onto base leg. Members agreed that the TCAS equipment fitted to the TBM960 had detected the Prefect, and would have been expected to have detected the Hawk, but no alert was reported (**CF5**). In the absence of a common frequency in use between the pilots, it was agreed that the pilot of the TBM960 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the Hawk until it had been subsequently sighted (**CF4**) when it had crossed ahead of them from left-to-right.

Turning to the actions of the pilot of the Hawk, members noted that they had tuned their radio to the Low Level VHF Common frequency. A member with experience of military fast-jet operations explained that the Hawk pilot's choice of radio frequency had been appropriate for that part of their sortie, although noted that tuning to the Elvington Traffic frequency may have provided them more timely awareness of the presence of the TBM960 along their route. It was agreed that the Hawk pilot had not had situational awareness of the TBM960 until it had been sighted (**CF4**) although members noted that it had been visually acquired at a significant range of 4-5NM. The subsequent actions of the Hawk pilot were pondered with regard to their statement that they had been aware that the pilot of the TBM960 had been "*carrying out an approach to Elvington*". It was appreciated that the pilot of the Hawk had been aware of the presence of the Prefect to their left and had assessed that their separation from it, and their separation from the TBM960 to their right, had been "*more than sufficient*" and that "*at no point did they assess that there was a risk of collision*". Nevertheless, members were in agreement that the pilot of the Hawk had not avoided, nor conformed with, the pattern of traffic in operation at Elvington aerodrome (**CF3**). It was further agreed that, upon their realisation that the pilot of the TBM960 had been on an approach to the runway at Elvington, they had not adapted their dynamic plan adequately (**CF2**) and, consequently, their proximity to the TBM960 had caused its pilot concern (**CF6**).

Members summarised their thoughts and the matter of the risk of collision was considered. It was agreed that the pilot of the TBM960 had been concerned by the proximity of the Hawk (**CF7**) but it was noted that they had assessed that no avoiding action had been necessary. It was also agreed that the pilot of the Hawk had not complied with the applicable regulation to have avoided, or conformed with, the pattern of traffic in operation at Elvington (**CF1**). Notwithstanding, members were in agreement that both pilots had sighted the other aircraft in ample time to have taken avoiding action if it had been required. Members agreed that safety standards had been reduced but were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025219			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Incorrect Action Selection	Events involving flight crew performing or choosing the wrong course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern
7	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the Hawk had not complied with the regulation to have conformed with, or avoided, the pattern of traffic in operation at Elvington aerodrome.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because, on their assessment that the pilot of the TBM960 had positioned their aircraft to approach the runway at Elvington aerodrome, the pilot of the Hawk had not adapted their dynamic plan sufficiently to have conformed with, or avoided, the pattern of traffic formed.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft until it had been visually acquired.

[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the TCAS equipment fitted to the TBM960 would have been expected to have detected the presence of the Hawk but no alert was reported.