


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025214

Date: 27 Sep 2025 Time: 0933Z Position: 5140N 00055W Location: ivo of Stokenchurch

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152(A)	C152(B)
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	Farnborough Rdr	Farnborough Rdr
Altitude	1900ft	1800ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Beacon, Landing	Beacon, Landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5-10km	>10km
Altitude	1680ft	1700ft
Altimeter	QNH (1020hPa)	QNH
Heading	225°	270°
Speed	85kt	85kt
ACAS/TAS	PilotAware	Not fitted
Alert	Unknown	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	120ft V/100m H	NK
Recorded	100ft V/0.1NM H	



THE C152(A) PILOT reports that, 1-2min after turning from a northwest to a south-southwest heading, an aircraft passed 100ft-120ft beneath them. The Farnborough [North LARS controller] indicated the incident and the pilot acknowledged it. As the weather began to worsen enroute to [their intended destination], they returned to [base]. The weather was not a factor at the time of the incident as visibility was good.

The pilot indicated that [the electronic conspicuity (EC) display] was not very clear due to the light conditions. They had not seen any alert on [the screen], and had not seen [the other aircraft] until it had flashed underneath them.

[The pilot stated that] they will look to the rear before 90° turns using all aids in future, and that it was unclear to them if the Farnborough [LARS controller had] indicated this traffic beforehand. However, they did not believe that they were the root cause, [citing the] “on the right, in the right” rule.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

THE C152(B) PILOT reports that the other aircraft was always in sight to them, but [the other pilot] had not been responding to Farnborough Radar on 132.800MHz. To their recollection, they were warned by the Farnborough [LARS controller] afterwards and replied “Aircraft sighted” or “Visual” with the other aircraft. The other aircraft passed below them [they recall] from right-to-left with safe separation.¹ They did not take any immediate action but maintained heading and altitude, keeping the other aircraft in sight until it passed from right-to-left heading south. To their recollection this was not an Airprox. [The

¹ The C152(B) pilot reported C152(A) passed below them. However, the NATS safety investigation established that , when the pilot called visual with C152(A), they stipulated that the aircraft was above them.

pilot of the] other aircraft eventually responded to Farnborough and was told that the separation was only 100ft, which may be a false reading in their opinion.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE FARNBOROUGH CONTROLLER reports that they had no recollection of the event.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Benson was recorded as follows:

METAR EGUB 270920Z AUTO 13008KT 9999 FEW039/// BKN048/// 13/10 Q1019

Analysis and Investigation

Farnborough Airport

[C152(A) and C152(B)] were operating outside controlled airspace with both pilots in receipt of a Basic Service from the Farnborough LARS North controller. The controller passed reciprocal Traffic Information to both pilots and the aircraft subsequently came into proximity. Safety Investigations was subsequently notified by the UK Airprox Board and the pilot of [C152(A)] reported the event as an Airprox.

Description

C152(B) was operating VFR, squawking 5020 with the pilot established on the LARS North frequency and in receipt of a Basic Service. The pilot of C152(A) was operating VFR and reported onto the Farnborough LARS North frequency at 0924:58 (all times UTC) and requested a Basic Service. The LARS North and East controller issued the pilot with squawk 5023, QNH1020 and a Basic Service. At 0932:29 (Figure 1) the controller issued the pilot of [C152(B)] with Traffic Information regarding [C152(A)] *"traffic 2 o'clock, range of a mile, right-to-left, slightly above"*, the pilot replied, *"visual with traffic, [C152(B) C/S], they are above us, we're descending a bit"*.



Figure 1

The controller passed reciprocal Traffic Information to the pilot of [C152(A)] at 0932:43 *"traffic left 10 o'clock half a mile left-to-right has you in sight shortly going to under fly you left-to-right"*, the pilot did not respond. The controller called the pilot a second time, no response. The Closest Point of Approach between [C152(A)] (Mode-A 5023) and [C152(B)] (Mode-A 5020) occurred at 0932:59 and was recorded on the NODE Multi-Track radar as 0.1NM and 100ft (Figure 2).



Figure 2

The controller called the pilot of [C152(A)] a third time at 0933:04 and the pilot acknowledged the call. The controller advised the pilot *“I just tried calling traffic to you twice, please listen out, it’s just under flown you by about a hundred feet”*, the pilot replied, *“err visual”*.

Neither pilot reported the proximity as an Airprox on the frequency to Farnborough at the time of the event.

Investigation

Information available to the investigation included:

- CA4114 from the Farnborough LARS controller
- NATS4118 Initial Watch Management Investigation Report
- UKAB Airprox report [redacted] from the pilot of [C152(A)]

The Farnborough LARS North and East function was being operated in a band-boxed configuration. Safety Investigations contacted Farnborough to notify the unit of the report, however, the LARS controller stated they had no recollection of the event.

The NATS4118 described that *‘just before the event, both aircraft are tracking west towards Stokenchurch, when at 0932z, [C152(A)] commences a left turn to the south towards the track of [C152(B)]’* (Figure 3).




Figure 3

CAP774 UK Flight Information Services Chapter 2.1 stated that a

'Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight'.

Both pilots were operating in receipt of a Basic Service, however, the LARS controller had observed the turn by [C152(A)] and passed Traffic Information to the pilot of [C152(B)] at 0932:29, followed by reciprocal Traffic Information to the pilot of [C152(A)] at 0932:43 prior to the Closest Point of Approach. Review of NODE radar indicated no evidence of either aircraft enacting any avoidance manoeuvre (Figure 4). This correlated with the pilot report from [C152(A)] above.




Figure 4

Conclusion

UK Airprox Board notified NATS Safety Investigations that the pilot of [C152(A)] had submitted an Airprox report regarding a conflict with [C152(B)] whilst both pilots were receiving a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS North at the time. An Airprox was not reported on the frequency.

There were no Safety Investigation recommendations as a result of this investigation.

CAA ATSI

ATSI reviewed the Farnborough Investigation report and noted the following:

The controller noticed the aircraft turning [into] conflict quickly, passed Traffic Information to the [C152(B)] pilot, and received confirmation that the pilot had [C152(A)] in sight. The pilot of [C152(A)] did not acknowledge the reciprocal Traffic Information that was passed twice before the controller's third attempt elicited a response but only after the conflict had passed.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were identified using Mode S data. CPA was assessed to have occurred at 0933:02 with 0.1NM lateral and 100ft vertical separation (Figure 5). Neither aircraft was observed with reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 5 – CPA Time 0933:02

The C152(A) and C152(B) pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C152(B) pilot was required to give way to C152(A).³

Summary

An Airprox was reported when two C152s flew into proximity in the vicinity of Stokenchurch at 0933Z on Saturday 27th September 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS North.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of C152(A), and noted that the pilot had been in receipt of a Basic Service under which the avoidance of traffic remains the pilot's responsibility. The Board noted that the pilot had, however, been in receipt of Traffic Information from the LARS controller informing them of the presence of C152(B) in their 10 o'clock position shortly to under fly them, but that the pilot had not acknowledged two such calls and members agreed that the pilot of C152(A) had not been effectively monitoring their RT communications (**CF1**). The Board further noted that C152(A) had not been fitted with additional electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment and that the pilot indicated that the display had been difficult to interpret due to the prevailing light conditions. Members discussed the advantages of more recent versions of EC devices that allow Bluetooth audio connections direct to a compatible headset, as a means of improving alerting in such conditions, and further noted that the EC device had not provided the pilot with a warning of the conflicting C152(B). Members agreed, therefore, that C152(A)'s EC device had not alerted as expected (**CF3**). The Board considered that the combined effect of the pilot neither having received an EC alert nor having heard the controller's Traffic Information had resulted in them having been unaware of proximate traffic, and members agreed that the pilot of C152(A) had had no situational awareness of the presence of C152(B) (**CF2**). The Board noted that, under the circumstances, the pilot had been left relying on the 'See and Avoid' barrier to mitigate the risk of collision, and members emphasised the importance of maintaining a visual scan before initiating a turn. For general reference, the Board wished to direct pilots to the CAA's CAP 1535: The Skyway Code 'Safer Flying' section on 'Avoiding Collisions'.⁴ The Board noted that the pilot stated that they had not visually acquired C152(B) until it had passed underneath them, and members agreed that the pilot of C152(A) had not seen C152(B) until at or after CPA, effectively a non-sighting (**CF5**).

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

⁴ [\(UK CAA\) CAP 1535: The Skyway Code](#) 'Safer Flying' section on 'Avoiding Collisions', 'The Visual Scan' (P131-132).

The Board then turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of C152(B), and noted that they had also been in receipt of a Basic Service, but had been provided with Traffic Information on the relative position of C152(A) from the LARS controller. The Board was satisfied that this information had given the pilot sufficient situational awareness to have visually acquired C152(A) in time to have monitored its flightpath and initiate a descent to provide greater separation. The Board noted, however, that the pilot of C152(B) had considered the recorded 100ft vertical separation to have been inaccurate, notwithstanding that radar altitudes are rounded to the nearest 100ft, and members questioned whether the pilot had adequately adapted their plan to pass comfortably beneath C152(A). The Board considered that the pilot of C152(A) had been startled on sighting C152(B) at or after CPA, and members agreed that the pilot of C152(B) had flown close enough to C152(A) to have caused concern (CF4).

The Board then looked at the actions of the Farnborough LARS controller, and noted that they had been providing both pilots with a Basic Service, under which the controller had not been required to monitor either aircraft under the terms of that service. However, having observed the potential conflict between the two aircraft as the pilot of C152(A) had turned towards the track of C152(B), the controller had acted promptly and appropriately by issuing Traffic Information to both pilots. Members agreed that the controller had demonstrated commendable situational awareness and tenacity in their handling of the situation.

The Board concluded that the pilot of C152(A) had had no situational awareness of C152(B) until having seen it pass beneath them, which had likely startled them. The Board also noted that the pilot of C152(A) had assimilated the Traffic Information passed to them and had been monitoring C152(B) while descending to pass below it. Members agreed that the separation achieved had been adequate for the circumstances and that, although there had been no risk of collision, safety had nonetheless been degraded. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2025214				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Flight Elements				
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
1	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Communications	Events involving flight crew that did not appropriately monitor communications	
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
3	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
• See and Avoid				
4	Human Factors	• Lack of Individual Risk Perception	Events involving flight crew not fully appreciating the risk of a particular course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk:

C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of C152(A) had not effectively monitored the R/T and had no situational awareness of the presence of C152(B).

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity equipment fitted in C152(A) had not alerted as expected.

		Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025214		Outside Controlled Airspace					
				Effectiveness					
				Barrier Weighting					
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
		Barrier	Provision	Application					
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓						
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓						
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting & Action	✓	✓						
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○						
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓						
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✓						
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓						
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⚠	✗						
	See & Avoid	✓	✓						
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used			
Provision	✓	⚠	✗	○					
Application	✓	⚠	✗	○	○				
Effectiveness	■	■	■	■	■				

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).