AIRPROX REPORT No 2025207

Date: 23 Sep 2025 Time: 0920Z Position: 5150N 00217W Location: 3NM SW Gloucester

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	BE90	DA42
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	IFR	IFR
Service	Basic	Procedural
Provider	London Information	Gloster Approach
Altitude/FL	FL080	FL080
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, black	White, black
Lighting	Strobe, beacon, nav	Position, strobe, landing, taxy
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	FL080	FL080
Altimeter	SPS (1013hPa)	SPS (1013hPa)
Heading	NK	059°
Speed	NK	123kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	Other
Alert	TA	NR
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	0ft V/100m H	0ft V/0.5NM H
Recorded	0ft V/0.5NM H	



THE BE90 PILOT reports that, after a short survey over Gloucester, they took a heading toward their next task over Bristol Airport. As they had to wait for a clearance to enter controlled airspace, they elected to perform left-hand orbits at their position, about 7NM south-west of Gloucester, and they notified London Information. They were only provided with a Basic Service at that time.

During the turn, they noticed traffic on TCAS which appeared to get closer at the same level. All three crew members tried to locate the aircraft but, as the trajectory of the aircraft on TCAS was indicating that it was closing in from the left, their turn was stopped to maintain separation. They finally spotted the aircraft (in their 9 o'clock) and overtook it with a lateral margin of 100-200m. They believe it was a DA42 or 62. Once they had assessed that they had enough margin, they resumed their turn to the south while maintaining visual contact. The other aircraft did not change heading or altitude. During the manoeuvre, the TCAS issued a TA 'warning'. No resolution was issued by TCAS.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE DA42 PILOT reports that they were flying towards the GST NDB from the south-west for instrument training at FL080 under a Procedural Service from Gloster Approach. They were approaching GST with approximately 5NM to run when they noticed an aircraft to their right-hand side routeing to the south-east. The aircraft then banked to the left, passed in front of them from their right-to-left and then routed to the north-west at the same level as them. There was no avoidance action required.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE GLOSTER APPROACH CONTROLLER reports that they were the APP ATCO at the time, on a split frequency 128.555MHz. They had coordinated with either Bristol Radar or Cardiff Radar, an

inbound DA42 to maintain FL80, direct to GST, to allow a jet departure beneath at FL70. The Airprox report received showed that it had conflicted with a non-notified BE90 (not on frequency) that had been operating at the same level in the vicinity of GST. [The pilot of the DA42] did not report, or query, any conflicting aircraft at their level.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that [the pilot of the BE90] was in receipt of a Basic Service from them, squawking 1177. The other aircraft was approximately 5NM south-west of Gloucestershire Airport, squawking 4530. It is reported that [the BE90] flew 0.6NM ahead of [the DA42]. An Airprox was not reported to them at the time or subsequently. They were not in contact with [the pilot of the DA42].

Factual Background

The weather at Gloucestershire Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGBJ 230920Z VRB02KT CAVOK 09/06 Q1030
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Analysis and Investigation

Gloucestershire Airport Unit Investigation

The Approach position was staffed at Gloucestershire. Prior to 0920, Cardiff Radar contacted Gloster Approach and requested a level for [the DA42] which had been inbound to GST. Gloster Approach issued FL080 (as there was a pending IFR departure from Gloster that had been given FL070).

At time 0919, [the pilot of the DA42] contacted Gloster Approach and reported at FL080 on track to GST. [The pilot of the DA42] was given a Procedural Service, a route direct to GST and a descent to FL050. At no point did [the pilot] mention another aircraft in proximity to them and the APP ATCO was unaware that an Airprox had occurred.

Gloster ATCU was not aware of the flight of [the BE90] at FL080. Gloster Approach has no surveillance equipment available for situational awareness. No radar service was available at Gloucestershire Airport as per AIP Supplement 112/2024:

AIP SUP 112/2024

Effective 12 DEC 2024

1. Radar services not available. SRA not available for Runways 09 and 27.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 1). The BE90, but not the DA42, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.



Figure 1 – 0918:55 (1min before CPA)



Figure 2 – CPA at 0919:55

The BE90 and DA42 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the DA42 pilot had right of way and the BE90 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a BE90 and a DA42 flew into proximity 3NM south-west of Gloucester at 0920Z on Tuesday 23rd September 2025. The BE90 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information. The DA42 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Procedural Service from Gloster Approach.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the controller and FISO involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the BE90, and it was noted that they had been in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information. In consideration of the location of their tasking, members suggested that it may have been far more prudent to have requested a service from the Gloster Approach controller, which may have provided a far better picture of the traffic situation. Indeed, members recalled the wording on CAA VFR navigational charts that '*Pilots are strongly recommended to contact the aerodrome ATSU before flying within 10NM of any aerodrome marked with instrument approach feathers*'. Nevertheless, members noted that the pilot of the BE90 had received a Traffic Alert to the presence of the DA42 from their TCAS equipment and that it had been subsequently sighted in the 9 o'clock position. Members agreed that the pilot of the BE90 had provided a description of the encounter that indicated that no urgent avoiding action had been necessary and that they had had ample time to have assessed the situation and to have initiated an overtake manoeuvre within safe margins.

Turning their attention to the actions of the pilot of the DA42, members agreed that the EC equipment fitted to their aircraft would have been expected to have detected the presence of the BE90 but no alert was reported. Consequently, it was agreed that the pilot of the DA42 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the BE90 until it had been visually acquired. Members noted that the DA42 pilot had assessed that no avoiding action had been necessary and that the BE90 had passed in front of them without it having caused them any concern.

In consideration of the actions of the Gloster Approach controller, members agreed that, with the absence of surveillance equipment and without the pilot of the BE90 having contacted them on frequency, they had not had situational awareness of the presence of the BE90. Members agreed that there had been little that the controller could have done to have assisted the pilot of the DA42 further. Similarly, members agreed that the London Information FISO had not had situational awareness of the DA42 and that no Traffic Information could have been passed to the pilot of the BE90 to have assisted with their awareness of the DA42.

Concluding their discussion, members appreciated that the pilot of the BE90 had been concerned by the Traffic Alert that they had received pertaining to the proximity of the DA42. Notwithstanding, members agreed that both pilots had had sufficient time to have visually acquired the other aircraft and to have considered the safest course of action. Members were satisfied that the separation between the aircraft had been adequate and that there had been no risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category E to this event and members agreed on the following contributory factors:

CF1. The Gloster Approach controller had not had situational awareness of the BE90. The London Information FISO had not had situational awareness of the DA42.

CF2. It had been strongly recommended for the pilot of the BE90 to have made contact with the Gloster Approach controller when flying within 10NM of the instrument approach 'feathers' at Gloucestershire Airport.

CF3. The pilot of the DA42 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the BE90 until it had been visually acquired.

CF4. The pilot of the BE90 had been concerned by the proximity of the DA42 upon receipt of a Traffic Alert from their TCAS equipment.

CF5. The TCAS equipment fitted to the BE90 had provided a Traffic Alert to the presence of the DA42.

CF6. The EC device fitted to the DA42 would have been expected to have alerted to the presence of the BE90 but no alert was reported.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025207			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
4	Human Factors	• Unnecessary Action	~~Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS TA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning triggered	
6	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	~~An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system~~	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Gloster Approach controller had not had situational awareness of the BE90. The London Information FISO had not had situational awareness of the DA42.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because it had been strongly recommended for the pilot of the BE90 to have made contact with the Gloster Approach controller when flying within 10NM of an aerodrome with instrument approach 'feathers'.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the DA42 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the BE90 until it had been visually acquired.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025207
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness