


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2025202**

Date: 14 Sep 2025 Time: 1139Z Position: 5350N 00258W Location: 1NM SE of Poulton VRP

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C172	R200
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	Blackpool App	Blackpool App
Altitude	1600ft	1600ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Beacon	Nav, ldg, strbs
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5-10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1500ft	~2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1005hPa)	QNH
Heading	360°	340-020°
Speed	90kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
<b>Separation at CPA</b>		
Reported	0ft V/100ft H	0ft V/200ft H
Recorded	0ft V/<0.1NM H	



**THE C172 PILOT** reports that they departed Blackpool Airport on RW13 for their third flight experience lesson of the day. They were in the right-hand seat as PIC and their student was in the left seat. A second student was in the rear. Following take-off, they made a left-hand turn to the north and continued to climb to the north. At 1500ft they levelled out and they were demonstrating to their student how to reduce power to cruise and trim the aircraft. Before they had completed the process, the student in the rear called out that an aircraft had just pulled in beside them (right side) from the rear. As they looked across, they could clearly see two people in the aircraft. The pilot in the far (right-hand seat) was giving them an exuberant wave. Their cabins could not have been more than 100ft apart. No sooner had they looked across and seen them wave, [the pilot of the R200] banked sharply right and flew away to the east, increasing in altitude as they did so. They did not see them ahead or to the sides during the climb to the north. They believed that this pilot's actions were very dangerous for two reasons: (1) as they approached from their rear and 100ft to the right (east), a sudden gust on top of the 170° wind could have pushed their aircraft into a collision with theirs. Their wingtips were very close. (2) As [the R200] was approaching [the C172] from the rear, if [the C172 pilot] had made a turn to the right during the climb at 1000ft to look for on-coming traffic, they would have turned into [the R200's] path.

They further noted that they were focused on explaining to their student how to trim the aircraft. They were not aware of the other aircraft until it moved alongside the right-hand side of their aircraft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE R200 PILOT** reports that, during the recovery from the stalling exercise they were teaching, their student asked about how to overtake another aeroplane. They treated this as a learning opportunity, taking advantage of the excess speed, they were carrying, and demonstrated by passing on the right. Their flightpath was divergent and there was zero risk of collision.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

**THE BLACKPOOL CONTROLLER** reports that the pilot of [the C172] contacted the Tower post flight, to inform them that, at 1138Z shortly after departure from Blackpool, they had an Airprox in the vicinity of Poulton with another aircraft. They identified this aircraft as an R200, also from Blackpool. Both aircraft were operating to the north of Blackpool on a Basic Service. No mention of an Airprox was made, by either pilot, whilst airborne.

## Factual Background

The weather at Blackpool Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNH 141120Z 16011KT 9999 FEW015 13/11 Q1005

## Analysis and Investigation

### Blackpool Airport

The pilot of [the C172] contacted ATC post flight to advise that they had an Airprox with [an R200] in the vicinity of Poulton (outside the ATZ).

At 1120 [the pilot of the R200 was] given a Basic Service after departure, leaving the ATZ.

At 1135 [the C172] departed and [the pilot was] given a Basic Service, leaving the ATZ at 1136.

The Airprox was reported to be at approximately 1138.

At 1144 [the pilot of the C172] reported ready for re-join.

At 1145 [the R200 pilot also] reported ready for re-join, aware of [the joining C172].

Both [pilots] were operating under a Basic Service outside the ATZ to the north of Blackpool and there was a 15min period between their departure times, meaning that the ATCO would not have been aware of their relevant positions. There is no report of the Airprox on R/T. Appropriate Traffic Information was passed by the ATCO when the pilots called for re-join. The pilot of [the C172] called the Tower post flight to report the Airprox.

### CAA ATSI

[After reviewing] the reports from the pilots and ATC, ATSI has no additional comment for the Board.

### UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were identified using the Blackpool conspicuity squawk code. The C172 was also identified using Mode S data.




Figure 1 – Time 1138:31 CPA

Within 1min prior to CPA, the R200 was seen to descend behind and to the left of the C172, then to climb and cross from left to right behind the C172. CPA was assessed to have been at 1138:31 with 0ft vertical and less than 0.1NM lateral separation (Figure 1).

The R200 appeared, as a primary track, to stay alongside the C172 for the next radar sweep, after which the R200 track was not detected until 1139:03 where it was seen to have remained behind and to the right of the C172 (Figure 2).




Figure 2 – Time 1139:03

Further analysis of third-party tracking software confirmed that neither aircraft was detected using ADS-B data, however, the C172 could be detected using MLAT sources.

The C172 and R200 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the C172 pilot had right of way and the R200 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right, and no subsequent change in the relative positions of the two aircraft shall absolve the overtaking aircraft from this obligation until it is entirely past and clear.<sup>2</sup>

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C172 and an R200 flew into proximity 1NM southeast of Poulton VRP at 1139Z on Sunday 14<sup>th</sup> September 2025. Both the C172 and R200 pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of a Basic Service from Blackpool Approach.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the Blackpool Approach controller and noted that both aircraft had been in receipt of a Basic Service and had departed the ATZ 16min apart. The Board discussed the lack of surveillance facilities available to the controller at Blackpool Airport when considering whether the controller may have been able to pass Traffic Information to the pilots. Members agreed

<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

that it had not been feasible for the Blackpool Approach controller to have passed Traffic Information and that they had not been required to monitor either aircraft under the terms of a Basic Service in any case (CF1).

The Board then considered the actions of the R200 pilot and noted that the pilot had elected to use their excess airspeed to demonstrate an overtaking manoeuvre to the student. The Board observed, however, that this manoeuvre had not been conducted in accordance with the requirements of SERA.3210, as outlined in the UK Secretariat's report (above), and members agreed, therefore, that the R200 pilot had not complied with the prescribed overtaking procedure (CF2). The Board wondered why the R200 student had been distracted by another aircraft on their recovery from their stalling exercise and discussed the importance of completing the pre-aerobatic HASELL checks, with an emphasis on the lookout for proximate traffic. Nevertheless, members agreed that, given the subsequent decision by the instructor to demonstrate an overtaking manoeuvre on the nearby traffic, and in view of the fact that no effective 'overtake' had taken place, the execution of the manoeuvre had been ineffective (CF3). The Board further noted that the radar returns of the two aircraft had merged for 23sec before the R200 had re-emerged behind, and to the right of, the C172, and members agreed that the R200 pilot had flown into conflict with the C172 prior to, and within, that timeframe (CF5).

Moving their attention to the actions of the C172 pilot, the Board noted that the pilot had been unable to obtain a surveillance-based radar service to assist their situational awareness of proximate traffic. Members agreed, therefore, that the C172 pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence or position of the R200 (CF4). The Board considered whether the pilot might have detected the R200 sooner had their lookout incorporated a wider visual scan, however, members agreed that the C172 pilot's view had been obscured by the rear fuselage, given that the R200 had been approaching from behind (CF7). The Board commended the student in the back seat for alerting the instructor to the presence of the other aircraft, and they felt that this had allowed the instructor to have seen the R200 only at, or just after, CPA. Members concluded that this had constituted an effective non-sighting of the R200 by the C172 pilot (CF6).

Drawing their conversation to a conclusion, the Board noted that the C172 pilot had had no situational awareness of the actions of the R200 pilot approaching from behind them, and on having seen the R200 at or after CPA, had been concerned by the proximity of the R200. In light of the fact that the R200 pilot had been visual with the C172 throughout their manoeuvre, members concluded that the R200 pilot had flown into conflict with the C172 and that safety margins had been much reduced below the norm (CF8). As such the Board assigned Risk Category B to this event.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### Contributory Factors:

	2025202			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Ground Elements</b>				
<b>• Situational Awareness and Action</b>				
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
<b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b>				
2	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
<b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>				
3	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>				
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
<b>• See and Avoid</b>				

5	Contextual	• Loss of Separation	An event involving a loss of separation between aircraft	Pilot flew into conflict
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
7	Contextual	• Visual Impairment	Events involving impairment due to an inability to see properly	One or both aircraft were obscured from the other
• Outcome Events				
8	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

#### **Ground Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **not used** because the Blackpool Approach controller was not required to monitor either the C172 or the R200 under the terms of a Basic Service.

#### **Flight Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **partially effective** because the R200 pilot had not completed their overtake manoeuvre in accordance with (UK) SERA.3210.

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **ineffective** because the R200 pilot's intended overtake manoeuvre did not occur as planned.

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because the C172 pilot had no situational awareness of the position of the R200 aircraft.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **partially effective** because the C172 pilot's view of the R200 was obscured as it approached from behind, and the R200 pilot did not allow sufficient separation from the C172 during the overtake manoeuvre.

<sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

<b>Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025202</b>		Outside Controlled Airspace					
Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness				
			Barrier Weighting				
			0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓				
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓				
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✗	○				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●				
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	⚠				
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✗				
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●				
	See & Avoid	✓	⚠				
<b>Key:</b>							
	Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used		
Provision	✓	⚠	✗	●	○		
Application	✓	⚠	✗	●	○		
Effectiveness							