


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2025171**

Date: 30 Jul 2025 Time: ~0938Z Position: 5129.5N 00046.4W Location: White Waltham ATZ

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Hoverbike II T150	Helicopter
Operator	Civ UAS	Unknown
Airspace	White Waltham ATZ	White Waltham ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	
Service	AGCS	NK
Provider	White Waltham	
Altitude/FL	NR	
Transponder	Not fitted	A
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	Orange	
Lighting	Strobes	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	5-10km	
Altitude/FL	82ft AGL	NK
Altimeter	NK	
Heading	Stationary	
Speed	Stationary	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	N/A	
<b>Separation at CPA</b>		
Reported	0ft V/50m H	NK
Recorded	NR	



**THE T150 PILOT** reports that they had been a UAS crew comprising 1 x Remote Pilot & 1 x Command Unit Operator and were established at White Waltham in a geofenced area, within [an] approved UAS flight and testing area - these are deconflicted from active areas with crewed aviation. While conducting a routine flight with a long-line payload, the command unit operator advised the Remote pilot of an approaching helicopter from a north-northwest direction estimated to be 1km away. The Remote pilot made visual contact with the rotary craft and subsequently moved the UAS away from RW11 to maintain safe separation from the approaching helicopter. The approaching helicopter did not slow and appeared to divert from established Rotary Wing airfield procedures, diverging from normal approach and departure lanes and instead vectoring directly for the Rotary Wing hangars [they opined]. The Remote pilot maintained a fixed position, at a point deconflicted from the RW11 approach lanes, and at 25m AGL to allow the helicopter to make visual contact and avoid, and to allow the Remote pilot to further assess the situation. When the helicopter continued on its conflicting path, the Remote pilot then decreased height to 19m AGL, unable to reduce height further due to a 17m long-line payload. The rotary craft continued towards the UAS until, at approximately 50m lateral separation, it initiated a late and aggressive right roll, and positively pitched up, manoeuvring to avoid the UAS. From the perspective of the Remote pilot, the distance at time of rotary craft evasive action was <50m lateral separation, and negligible vertical separation.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

Unfortunately, it has not been possible to trace the **PILOT OF THE OTHER AIRCRAFT**.

**THE WHITE WALTHAM AIR/GROUND OPERATOR** reports that they are sorry to say but they know nothing about this incident and have no record of any comments on the Air/Ground radio. No safety reports have been received by their safety management system and nothing had been raised to them by either of the parties so unfortunately, they are unable to make any comments on the situation.

**THE WHITE WALTHAM AIRFIELD MANAGER** reports that on 30<sup>th</sup> July 2025 an Airprox between a [...] UAS and an untraced aircraft helicopter was [reported] by one of the UAS pilots employed by [...]. White Waltham Airfield Ltd was not made aware of this event, so no SMS follow-up was actioned. Subsequent follow-up has revealed the following:

Untraced aircraft – Investigation - [The White Waltham safety team] looked at the identity of the untraced aircraft in detail. The resident rotary wing operators were not tasked at 0937 and there is no record of a visiting aircraft in the booking in/out system. As they cannot identify the second aircraft and its pilot, they have been unable to get any statement to help the investigation.

WLAC Operations - There were 2 ROCC on duty in the WLAC operations room. The [day of the reported event] was not exceptionally busy so there is no reason to suspect that the appropriate radio calls were not made. No Airprox was reported by the UAS operator to the ROCC so no action was taken.

Analysis - It has been custom and practice for the UAS to be landed on hearing an approaching or departing helicopter. Due to the long-line activity on this day, this didn't happen. [White Waltham] has no record of the subject untraced aircraft receiving PPR or booking in or out and they are unable to identify the aircraft or pilot. It is custom and practice for the ROCC to warn departing and arriving aircraft of the drone activity and location. There is no reason to suspect this didn't happen on the day.

Root Cause – [The White Waltham safety team] is unable to state the exact root cause for the reasons stated above.

#### Preventive Actions

- WLAC will strengthen its PPR, booking in-and-out procedures such that they have visibility of all movements. This will permit the briefing of arriving and departing visitors of [the activity of] drones and relevant local procedures.
- WLAC will continue to review their entry exit procedures for rotary wing aircraft.
- WLAC will continue to review their drone operations.

These actions have been followed up in meetings between the various operators on the airfield throughout the year. WLAC has a safety meeting planned in January when they will review the situation once more.

#### Factual Background

The weather at Heathrow Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR COR EGLL 300920Z AUTO 35004KT 300V030 9999 SCT016 BKN021 BKN027 19/14 Q1019 NOSIG=

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At 0938:20. The white cross is the reported Drone position. An inbound 'V' squawk aircraft was unidentified and carried Mode A only. The trail to the south of the white cross was an uninvolved aircraft.



Figure 2: T150 pilot-provided GPS image showing their operating area. The purple line and yellow area indicate the approximate flightpath and direction of the reported second aircraft.

The T150 did not appear on radar. A picture of its operating area was provided and was used to create the diagram at page 1. An unidentified (Mode A only) track was seen which coincided with the report offered by the T150 pilot and is overlaid on the diagram at page 1. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to trace the pilot of the second aircraft.

The T150 and unknown aircraft pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other

<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

aircraft in operation.<sup>2</sup> During the flight, the remote pilot shall keep the unmanned aircraft in VLOS and maintain a thorough visual scan of the airspace surrounding the unmanned aircraft in order to avoid any risk of collision with any manned aircraft. The remote pilot shall discontinue the flight if the operation poses a risk to other aircraft, people, animals, environment or property.<sup>3</sup>

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a T150 RPAS and an untraced aircraft flew into proximity at White Waltham airfield at around 0938Z on Wednesday 30<sup>th</sup> July 2025. The T150 RPAS pilot was operating under VLOS in VMC and had been communicating on the AGCS frequency. The pilot of the second aircraft could not be traced.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from the T150 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the air/ground operator involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board considered all evidence available. They noted that despite significant effort from the UKAB Secretariat it had been impossible to positively identify the second aircraft and therefore trace its pilot to request a report. The White Waltham Airfield Manager had provided an initial statement confirming that they had received no reports at the time regarding the incident and they had then followed that up with an investigation and mitigations to help prevent future incidents.

In examining the material available, a radar track of an aircraft wearing a Mode A squawk only had shown at the time and approximate flight path as described by the T150 pilot. That radar trace had then ceased to show shortly after passing CPA and it had been impossible to discover its path or destination beyond that point. Discussions with the helicopter operator at White Waltham confirmed a lack of activity from their aircraft around the time of the incident and the only other aircraft operating at the airfield at that time had been an uninvolved fixed-wing aircraft and therefore discounted.

The report and description provided by the T150 pilot was clear and Board members thanked them for its submission, offering their disappointment that it had not been possible to positively identify the second aircraft and its pilot. They noted that the untraced aircraft had apparently not carried any electronic conspicuity (EC) devices that were traceable by systems available to the UKAB Secretariat and, as the T150 had not been equipped with EC equipment, it had not registered any electronic emissions from that aircraft (**CF1**). The T150 pilot reported the untraced aircraft as having continued towards them until at approximately 50m lateral separation, it initiated a late and aggressive roll to the right and positively pitched up, manoeuvring hard which may have indicated that the pilot of that aircraft had seen them late and taken avoiding action. The actions taken as described by the T150 pilot on sighting the second aircraft and having been concerned by its proximity (**CF2**) had undoubtedly greatly reduced the risk of collision in this case and the Board felt that there had been no more that they could have done at that time.

Members felt that in this case there had been insufficient information available to determine the risk of collision involved and assigned a Risk Category D and the following contributory factors:

**CF1** – The T150 pilot had no situational awareness of the approaching second aircraft.

**CF2** – The T150 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the approaching second aircraft.

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<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

<sup>3</sup> Assimilated Regulation (EU) 2019/947- UAS.OPEN.060 Responsibilities of the remote pilot (2)(b)

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

Contributory Factors:

2025171				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>				
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
<b>• See and Avoid</b>				
2	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft


Degree of Risk: D.

Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Flight Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because the T150 pilot had no situational awareness of the approaching untraced aircraft until they sighted it.



<sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).