

AIRPROX REPORT No 2025168

Date: 02 Aug 2025 Time: 0954Z Position: 5058N 00042E Location: 1.5NM NW Rye

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152	RV6
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	NR
Service	Basic	Unknown
Provider	Lydd Approach	NR
Altitude/FL	1900ft	1900ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	NR
Lighting	Nav	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	NR	
Altitude/FL	1900ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1018hPa)	
Heading	030°	
Speed	93kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Other
Alert	N/A	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/200m H	100ft V/400ft H
Recorded	0ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE C152 PILOT reports that they were tracking from Hastings to Canterbury when they sighted another aircraft to their right-hand side, slightly above their level and heading towards them. They immediately pushed the nose down to get further below the aircraft because, at that moment, they did not have time to turn right to go behind it. The aircraft passed above and behind them. They do not think the other pilot had seen them because the aircraft did not seem to alter course. It was travelling significantly faster than they had been.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE RV6 PILOT declined to submit a full report, however, provided the following information: Saturday morning was particularly busy and they had manoeuvred to avoid multiple aircraft on that flight. They vaguely recall an aircraft passing relatively close below them but did not think any chance of collision was evident.

Reviewing their flightlog, they could see that [the C152] came within 400ft laterally and, according to their Mode C data, 100ft vertically. The RV6 aircraft is equipped with ADS-B-input which displays on an EFIS for both visual and audible warnings. [They believe that] it also has SIL1 ADS-B-out and displays bearingless Mode C/S targets. No such targets were detected by their equipment. They do not believe that the separation posed any concern.

THE LYDD CONTROLLER reports that, at 0953, [the pilot of the C152] made contact with Lydd Approach, requested a Basic Service and reported west of Rye routing to Canterbury. A Basic Service was provided in Class G airspace.

At 1000, Lydd Approach closed watch for a promulgated ATCO fatigue break. [The pilot of the C152] free-called [an en-route frequency].

[The pilot of the RV6] did not communicate with Lydd Approach before the closure of watch at 1000. Lydd ATSU has no access to surveillance equipment and this aircraft was unknown. Data on other, known traffic in communication at that time did not indicate a collision hazard to [the pilot of the C152]. Consequently, Lydd Approach was unaware of the Airprox.

Factual Background

The weather at Lydd was recorded as follows:

METAR EGMD 020950Z 34008KT 300V030 9999 FEW030 19/12 Q1018

Analysis and Investigation

Lydd Unit Investigation

The ATCO was with an assistant at the time and did not report workload as being a factor. Flight Progress Strip management was not a contributing factor, nor was equipment. An ECCAIRS report was filed after being made aware of the Airprox. [The pilot of the C152] left the frequency shortly before a period of closure of the service and went to [an en-route ATSU]. No comments were passed about being close to another aircraft. The second aircraft was not known to Lydd.

The incident took place within Class G airspace and, potentially, off frequency.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. The RV6, but not the C152, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 1 - Aircraft tracks (MLAT data for the C152 and ADS-B data for the RV6)




Figure 2 - CPA at 0953:58 (radar data)

The diagram was constructed and the separation determined from the radar data.

The C152 and RV6 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C152 pilot was required to give way to the RV6.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C152 and an RV6 flew into proximity 1.5NM north-west of Rye at 0954Z on Saturday 2nd August 2025. The C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Lydd Approach. The flight rules, meteorological conditions and ATS under which the RV6 pilot was operating could not be determined.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the air traffic controller involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the C152, and members noted that they had been in receipt of a Basic Service from the Lydd controller. It was therefore agreed that they had had the responsibility to avoid other traffic unaided by the controller and would not have expected to have received any Traffic Information along their route. It was also noted that the C152 had not been fitted with an additional EC device which, on this occasion, may have provided a timely alert to the presence of the RV6. Members agreed that the pilot of the C152 had not had situational awareness of the RV6 until it had been visually acquired converging from their right (**CF3**). Members noted that the C152 pilot had described that they had not had time to have turned behind the RV6 but had instead lowered the nose of the C152 to descend beneath it. Members agreed that the RV6 had been sighted late (**CF5**) and noted that, once sighted, they had reacted quickly to take avoiding action.

Focussing on the actions of the Lydd controller, members agreed that they had not been required to have monitored the flight of the C152 under the terms of a Basic Service (**CF1**). Additionally, without the use of surveillance equipment, they had not been able to have detected the RV6. Members agreed that there had been little else that the Lydd controller could have done to have assisted matters.

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the RV6, and were disappointed that they had chosen to not fully engage with the Airprox process. However, it was appreciated that they had provided a brief description of their flight on the day in question. The Board was keen to emphasise that the Airprox process is entirely non-punitive and that, even if they had believed that safety margins had not been eroded from their perspective, their report may have enabled a more detailed analysis of the event for the benefit of flight safety in general, from which many other pilots may have found value. Members proceeded with the information which was available and noted that the pilot of the RV6 had not been in receipt of a service from the Lydd controller. Members noted that the encounter had occurred approximately 8.5NM due west of Lydd and recalled the wording printed on CAA VFR navigational charts that: *'Pilots are strongly recommended to contact the aerodrome ATSU before flying within 10NM of any aerodrome marked with instrument approach feathers.'* It was therefore agreed that, for the benefit of the situational awareness of both pilots, the Lydd controller and for any other pilots on frequency, it may have been prudent for the RV6 pilot to have made contact to request a service (**CF2**) or, at least, to have relayed their intentions as they transited the area.

Members next noted that the pilot of the RV6 had a vague recollection of an aircraft that had passed 'relatively close below' but had believed that a risk of collision had not been evident. It was noted that the EC equipment fitted to the RV6 had not provided an alert to the presence of the C152, although it

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

was agreed by members that an alert would have been expected (**CF4**). Members pondered the description of the event by the C152 pilot, their assessment that a 'medium' risk of collision had existed and the somewhat urgent avoiding action that they had taken. Some members wondered whether the pilot of the RV6 had sighted the Airprox C152 at all or, if they had, had not appreciated its proximity. In the absence of a common frequency in use between the pilots and, having accepted that the RV6 pilot had indeed sighted the Airprox C152, members agreed that the RV6 pilot had not had situational awareness of the C152 until that moment (**CF3**). Members could not determine from the radar replay of the encounter whether the RV6 pilot had taken any action that had affected the geometry of the encounter but noted that they had maintained a gentle turn to the right.

Turning to the matter of the risk of collision, members noted that several safety barriers had either not been engaged or had not been fully effective during this encounter. Members agreed that safety margins had been reduced much below the norm and that there had been a risk of collision (**CF6**). It was agreed that it had been the avoiding action taken by the pilot of the C152 that had increased separation between the aircraft at the last minute. The Board assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025168			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
4	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
5	Human Factors	• Identification/Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			
6	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Lydd controller had not been required to have monitored the flight of the C152 under the terms of a Basic Service.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because it may have been prudent for the pilot of the RV6 to have contacted the Lydd controller.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft until visually acquired.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC equipment fitted to the RV6 would have been expected to have detected the presence of the C152 but no alert was reported.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the C152 had visually acquired the RV6 at a late stage.

