


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2025164**

Date: 28 Jul 2025 Time: 1416Z Position: 5341N 00136W Location: Ossett, Wakefield

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	EC145	TB20
Operator	HEMS	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	Leeds Bradford	Leeds Bradford
Altitude/FL	FL023	FL020
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C
Reported		
Colours	Yellow	White, Blue
Lighting	Anti-col, Nav, Landing	Beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2200-2500ft	2200ft
Altimeter	QNH (1020hPa)	QNH
Heading	280°	215°
Speed	125kt	105kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	Not fitted
Alert	TA	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	200ft V/<0.5NM H	50-100ft V/0.25-0.5NM H
Recorded	300ft V/<0.1NM H	



**THE EC145 PILOT** reports that they were tasked to an area just north of Todmorden. They climbed the aircraft initially to 2200ft QNH for the cruise, towards high ground to the west. In the cruise, the aircraft's ACAS indicated an aircraft north of them, approximately 200ft below. This aircraft was visually identified by the crew. The aircraft continued on a track that they believed would intersect their own eventually. As the unknown aircraft continued closer, Leeds informed them of the traffic, to which they replied "Visual". Leeds then informed [the TB20 pilot] (the approaching aircraft) of the EC145, to which they also indicated they had seen [the EC145]. As the aircraft approached closer, they climbed to 2400ft, then subsequently to 2500ft AMSL. The other aircraft then climbed, flew under their own, then turned moving into their 10 o'clock low position. This aircraft was close enough that they could read the registration of the aircraft. The TB20 then proceeded to fly under them again and into their 3 o'clock position, slowing falling behind into the 6 o'clock position, varying between 300ft to 500ft below within 1NM of them. This started in an area west of Wakefield and continued until they were approaching the HEMS landing site (approximately 7min). They did not believe there was adequate separation between the two aircraft at times, but they felt the safest thing to do was to continue at a constant altitude and speed as they were unsure as to what the other pilot's intentions were and what they were going to do next. During this time, another aircraft was identified on ACAS with a track that would intersect their own at the same height. However, with [the TB20] following so close behind, it made any potential avoiding action difficult because if they turned, descended or slowed down, they risked colliding with the other aircraft. However, if they climbed further, they believed that the wake turbulence would've been a potential issue to the other oncoming aircraft. They continued straight-and-level and the oncoming aircraft passed behind them. As they would need to descend to land, they were still concerned that if they did any manoeuvring, they might collide with the TB20. They asked Leeds Radar if they could speak to [the TB20 pilot] directly. Permission was given and they advised the other pilot that they would need to descend to be able to land shortly. [The TB20 pilot] advised they would stay

clear. They descended below the other aircraft's altitude to conduct the HEMS landing. [The TB20] moved further away but remained close by. Overall, this created a very uncomfortable situation for everyone on board their aircraft. Whilst they acknowledged that it was uncontrolled airspace, trying to maintain an awareness of what [the TB20] was doing also took away some capacity from monitoring other flight parameters and trying to conduct a HEMS mission in a safe manner.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE TB20 PILOT** reports that they did not believe that any incident had occurred. They departed Leeds East to return to [redacted], where the aircraft is based. At the M1/A1(M) junction VRP, they changed frequency to Leeds Approach and requested a Basic Service. They flew a heading of 215° to travel between Garforth and their next turning point, which was Dewsbury. As they passed to the south of Leeds, they heard ATC advise an aircraft that they had [the TB20] passing them right-to-left at their 1 or 2 o'clock. They had identified the helicopter from that description, so that when ATC subsequently advised them of a helimed helicopter to their south, they responded that they had them in sight. At the time, the helicopter was perhaps ½NM distant and appeared to be slightly higher than their aircraft. Perhaps 100ft. Given their relative paths, they saw no need to change their path or altitude. As they were beneath a CTA 2500ft-FL85 airspace, they were flying at 2200ft on the current QNH. They wouldn't be able to climb without permission. As for lateral separation, their current paths would result in the helicopter passing above and to their rear, which is, in fact, what happened. When they reached their turning point (Dewsbury VRP), they turned [onto a heading of] approximately 280° to head towards their next turning point of Burnley. As they made the turn, it was clear that the helicopter was travelling in the same direction. By this time, their aircraft was more than 1NM to the rear and slightly left of the helicopter. They reduced speed by 10kt and continued to monitor the helicopter ahead. They believed that the distance would continue to increase, which it appeared to do. Visibility was excellent and they didn't experience any prop wash. Shortly after their turn (1-2 min), they heard the helicopter's pilot ask the Leeds ATC if they could speak to them [the TB20 pilot] directly. The pilot explained that they would shortly be landing and asked that they change course to pass clear of [the EC145's] path and eventual landing site so that they wouldn't pass directly overhead. They said that they would be happy to and immediately changed course by 10° to their left. They recall that the separation distance had already increased by this time. Their new heading took them to the south of POL VOR (rather than north of it) as they saw the helicopter descend somewhere to the east of Burnley. They didn't believe that any incident occurred, and they felt safe and in control at all times. They noted that, with hindsight, they could have changed heading pre-emptively before being asked to do so and will do so if a similar situation arises in the future.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

**THE LEEDS BRADFORD CONTROLLER** reports that [the EC145] and [the TB20] were in receipt of a Basic Service, on track toward POL, below controlled airspace, and had received Traffic Information on each other. They were later advised that [the EC145 pilot] was filing an Airprox due to the positioning of the TB20.

## Factual Background

The weather at Leeds/Bradford airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNM 281350Z 28014KT 9999 SCT035 18/11 Q1020=

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken. Both aircraft could be seen in SSR only and identified using Mode S data, with the EC145 indicating FL020 and the TB20 FL018, see Figure 1. Proprietary ADS-B data sources were assessed, on which the EC145 could be seen using ADS-B data sources, but the TB20 in MLAT only.




Figure 1 – 1414:17

The two aircraft continued on track , both climbing slightly, see Figures 2 and 3.




Figure 2 - 1415:52




Figure 3 -1416:11

CPA occurred at 1416:19 when the EC145 appeared to climb 100ft and turn behind the TB20.




Figure 4 – CPA 1416:19

After the CPA, the two aircraft continued on a similar track with the TB20 directly below the EC145, with 500ft vertical separation, see Figure 5. The situation described by the EC145 pilot in their report with another aircraft at a similar level occurred at 1419:39 (Figure 6), by which stage the TB20 was 0.4NM behind the helicopter.




Figure 5 - 1417:23




Figure 6 - 1419:39

The EC145 and TB20 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the EC145 pilot was required to give way to the TB20.<sup>2</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the EC145 pilot had right of way and the TB20 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.<sup>3</sup>

### Leeds Bradford ATC Investigation

MOR narrative: [EC145 C/S] and [TB20 C/S] were in receipt of a Basic Service, on track toward POL below CAS.

Prior to [EC145 C/S] and [TB20 C/S] getting “close” to one another at approximately 1414, appropriate Traffic Information was passed to each pilot with [the TB20 pilot] declaring they were visual with [the EC145]. Both aircraft then followed similar tracks to POL at similar altitudes.

At 1423 [the EC145 pilot] requested to talk directly to [the TB20 pilot], which they did, informing [the TB20 pilot] that [the EC145] would be descending shortly. [The TB20 pilot] acknowledged and stated they would go around [the EC145].

At 1426 [TB20 C/S] left the frequency. At 1427 both aircraft were still in the vicinity of POL.

### Summary

An Airprox was reported when an EC145 and a TB20 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Ossett at 1416Z on Monday 28<sup>th</sup> July 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of a Basic Service from Leeds/Bradford Radar.

### PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant

<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

<sup>3</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the actions of the EC145 pilot. They had been conducting a helimed task and, as such, would have been under some pressure to arrive on scene as quickly and expeditiously as possible. They had only requested a Basic Service from Leeds/Bradford ATC but had received Traffic Information on the TB20 and so members agreed that a request for an upgraded service would not have made any difference to this event. Once they had been given Traffic Information on the TB20, the pilot had reported visual with it and they had also received information from their TCAS (**CF2**). The pilot then manoeuvred to go behind the TB20. Although at CPA the pilot had been fairly sanguine about the separation, it had been the TB20 pilot's actions after the event that had concerned them. They had continued on track to their tasking, but the TB20 pilot had turned onto a similar heading and had proceeded to follow the EC145. Members with helimed flying experience noted that the workload in the cockpit would have been high at this time, as the aircraft prepared to descend, there would have been a number of briefings and risk assessments to conduct and that the added factor of worrying about where the TB20 had been in relation to their aircraft would have been a distraction. Controller members noted that the pilot could have requested a zone transit from Leeds/Bradford, which would have allowed the pilot to climb above the TB20 and would also have kept it clear of any other traffic transiting beneath CAS, noting that controllers will normally try to accommodate requests by HEMS aircraft. Ultimately, the Board acknowledged that the pilot had been uncomfortable with the situation and that, even though the separation may have been considered to have been adequate by some pilots, the nature of helimed operations meant that the EC145 pilot had needed the freedom to have been able to manoeuvre as required, without having to factor-in the positioning of another aircraft (**CF4**).

Turning to the actions of the TB20 pilot, they too had been receiving a Basic Service from Leeds/Bradford ATC, had also received Traffic Information on the EC145, and had reported visual. Once visual, they had continued with their routeing as planned, which happened to have taken them on a similar track to the EC145. Members thought that, although the TB20 pilot had considered the separation adequate, they perhaps could have considered the tasking of the EC145, which ATC had told them had been undertaking helimed activities and could have given the other aircraft a wider berth (**CF2**). Members opined that the TB20 pilot had not known what the other pilot's intentions had been but, by following closely behind and at a similar altitude, they had become a concern to the EC145 pilot, which could be considered to have been a lack of consideration for the other pilot, and members highlighted that pilots should try to consider the other pilot's point of view in such circumstances (**CF3**).

The Board briefly looked at the role of ATC. The controller had been providing a Basic Service to both pilots and had provided both with Traffic Information on each other. Once the pilots had called visual, the controller would have been unlikely to have updated the Traffic Information, unless they had had cause to believe something had been amiss, and the controller had received no information that the EC145 pilot had been uncomfortable with the positioning of the TB20 until the pilot had asked to speak on the RT to the TB20 pilot. The Board therefore agreed that there had been little more the controller could have done in the circumstances.

When determining the risk of the Airprox, the Board considered the reports from both pilots and that of the controller, together with the radar replay. They discussed how both pilots had been visual with one another, and how the EC145 pilot had felt uncomfortable with the positioning of the TB20 behind and slightly below them. Some members opined that this had been normal operations in Class G airspace (Risk Category E), but others countered that the helimed operation, with the necessity to descend rapidly into a landing site and the additional cockpit workload, meant that the situation had been a distraction to the EC145 pilot, and therefore safety had been reduced. The Chair put it to a vote and, by a majority of 1, the Board assessed that safety had been degraded and assigned a Risk Category C to this event.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK****Contributory Factors:**

	2025164			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
<b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>				
1	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
<b>• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance</b>				
2	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS TA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning triggered	
<b>• See and Avoid</b>				
3	Human Factors	• Lack of Individual Risk Perception	Events involving flight crew not fully appreciating the risk of a particular course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

**Degree of Risk:** C.


**Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>**

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Flight Elements:**

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **partially effective** because the TB20 pilot could have taken earlier action to have allowed the EC145 more room, in order to avoid causing the other pilot concern.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **partially effective** because the TB20 pilot flew close enough to cause concern to the EC145 pilot.



<sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).