AIRPROX REPORT No 2025156

Date: 23 Jul 2025 Time: 1513Z Position: 5110N 00131W Location: 2.9NM NE of Middle Wallop

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Rallye	Baron
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Comm
Airspace	Boscombe CMATZ	Boscombe CMATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Basic
Provider	Cmn glider freq.[1]	Boscombe Zone
Altitude	~2000ft	2100ft
Transponder	None detected[2]	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Blue and white	White, gold/blue trim
Lighting	Strobes	Strobes, anti-colls
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5-10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1800ft	2500ft
Altimeter	QFE (1005hPa)	NK
Heading	030°	035°
Speed	70kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	TAS[3]
Alert	None	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/100m H	200ft V/ 'above'[4]
Recorded	~100ft V/~0.4NM H	



THE MIDDLE WALLOP AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that a glider was in free glide slightly above Middle Wallop ATZ, and a tug aircraft, [the Rallye], was towing another glider in a similar area but within the ATZ [they believe]. Without any radio contact, a Beech Baron flew through the ATZ at 2100ft travelling south-to-north, passing within 100ft-150ft from the glider in free flight and the tug with a glider on tow. There was a NOTAM active advising of a major gliding competition taking place at the time from Middle Wallop airfield.

The operator further explained that they were a Nominated Airfield Supervisor (NAS) for Middle Wallop with a Radio Operator's Certificate of Competence (ROCC) normally operating at the weekend with their gliding club. On the day in question, at 1100, Wallop Tower closed and handed the airfield to them for the period until 1700. During this time, they monitored [the Tower frequency]. If they received initial calls to 'Wallop Tower' they always corrected and advised that they were 'Wallop Radio'. Gliding activities, including launching and returning gliders and tugs, operated on a recognised gliding frequency.

The competition day had been cancelled on the day in question due to poor weather for gliding, although approximately 10 gliders were airborne or on tow at the time, flying primarily in the ATZ. They stated that it was very fortunate that the day's competition had been cancelled else there would have been a further 25 gliders in the vicinity.

[1] The Rallye pilot was on the common gliding frequency used by tugs and gliders at the time. However, they were also monitoring 'Wallop Radio'.
[2] The Rallye pilot reported the transponder as operating with Modes A, C, and S. However, these were not detected on the NATS radar replay.
[3] Referring to TAS, the Baron pilot indicated avionics which likely had 'add-on' TAS capable of detecting ADS-B in.
[4] The Baron pilot reported having seen another aircraft above them from 2-3NM away and descended to avoid. They were likely not referring to the Airprox Rallye with glider-on-tow.

The Air/Ground operator perceived the severity of the incident as 'High'.

THE RALLYE PILOT reports that they were towing a DG1000 glider during the NOTAM'd Inter-Services gliding competition at Middle Wallop. Due to the low rate of climb, they were concentrating on maintaining an accurate airspeed and monitoring tug position as well as looking out. They did not see the conflicting twin until just after starting a gentle left turn, probably as it was closing on a steady bearing and, they suspected, previously below their level but now climbing. The twin passed almost overhead.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PILOT OF THE DG1000-ON-TOW reports that they were acting as Pilot Under Training (PUT) seated in the rear of the glider, with the PIC seated in the front. The flight was part of instructor training. They were being aerotowed by the Rallye tug.

At approximately 1800ft AGL, heading east, they observed an aircraft converging on their position from approximately the 2 o'clock direction and closing rapidly. At the same time, the tug pilot initiated a gentle turn to the left. This was not an evasive manoeuvre but rather a standard turn typically executed by tug pilots to remain within the vicinity of the airfield.

They queried the PIC on whether they should take further evasive action, to which the PIC replied that it was not necessary. However, the continued left turn increased their separation from the approaching aircraft. The converging aircraft passed directly overhead the tug and glider combination with a vertical separation they estimated to have been no more than 100ft. [They thought that] it was clear that the Baron pilot had not seen them on the nose as their path had not changed.

In their assessment, had they not already been in the process of turning left, the outcome could have been far more serious.

This statement was reviewed by the PIC and they believed there was no more to add.

The pilot perceived the severity of the incident as 'High'.

THE BARON PILOT reports that they were returning to [their base] via Bournemouth overhead. After leaving their control they contacted Boscombe who were providing a Basic Service. Traffic Information was passed to them regarding the other aircraft. They noted that they first saw the other aircraft at approximately 2-3NM and above them, and they had descended to avoid the other aircraft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE BOSCOMBE ZONE CONTROLLER reports that they had no recollection of the event.

Factual Background

The weather at Middle Wallop was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGVP 231520Z AUTO 34010KT 9999 FEW045/// OVC069/// 21/10 Q1014
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The NOTAMs for Middle Wallop were as follows:

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H5641/25 NOTAMN Q) EGTT/QWGLW/IV/M /AW/000/055/5109N00134W006 A) EGVP B) 2507190800
C) 2507261700 E) GLIDING COMPETITION UP TO 40 GLIDERS AND TUGS WI 5NM RADIUS 510857N
0013412W (MIDDLE WALLOP AD). FOR INFO FREQ 129.980 OR CTC 07877 440132. AR-2025-
5013/01. F) SFC G) 5500FT AMSL

U3421/25 NOTAMN Q) EGTT/QFAAH/IV/BO /A /000/999/5109N00134W005 A) EGVP B) 2507210000
C) 2507252359 E) AD HR OF SVC NOW: MON - THU 0600-1100, 1700-0100 FRI 0600-1100
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Analysis and Investigation

2Gp BM Safety

The 2 Gp investigation included the Boscombe Down Radar occurrence report and noted the following sequence of events:

At 1506:57, the Beech Baron [pilot] contacted Boscombe Down Radar requesting a Basic Service.

At 1510:04, the Boscombe Down Radar controller passed Traffic Information with reference to gliders to the Beech Baron [pilot]: *"there are multiple gliders in between you and* [destination] *so keep a good lookout".* The Beech Baron [pilot] acknowledged this and completed the sortie without mention of the Airprox to the Boscombe Down Radar controller.

CPA was undetermined as only one aircraft appeared on radar.

Local BM Investigation: A local investigation was conducted by Boscombe Down following the event. The controller could not remember the event and the unit Safety Team was content the controlling was to a satisfactory standard.

2Gp BM Analysis: The Boscombe Down Radar controller provided a satisfactory Basic Service, providing situational awareness to the Beech Baron pilot regarding *'multiple gliders'* on the intended route. As one aircraft did not appear on radar, no further analysis of this event could be conducted.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the Baron was identified using Mode S data. There was an unknown primary track detected in the vicinity of Middle Wallop which was not in the position of the Rallye tug with a glider on tow. Neither the Rallye nor glider on tow were detected on radar. The Baron was seen transiting the Boscombe/Middle Wallop CMATZ, passing the unknown primary target at 1512:11 with 0.8NM lateral separation.



Figure 1 - Time 1512:11 Baron passed unknown primary track

Further analysis of flight data tracking software was undertaken, and the Baron was detected using MLAT sources at approximately 2100ft while the glider-on-tow was detected intermittently, using data from its EC equipment, at approximately 2000ft. The Rallye tug was undetected on all sources.

The pilot of the glider-on-tow provided their GPS navigation data in lieu of no data being available from the Rallye tug, and that was combined with the radar track of the Baron. CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1512:58 with approximately 100ft vertical separation and 0.4NM lateral separation before the Baron passed behind the glider.

The Rallye and Baron pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[5] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Baron pilot was required to give way to the Rallye towing the glider.[6]

Comments.

AOPA

Until the Department for Transport announces a common EC standard, the best form of Mid-Air Collision and Airprox avoidance is with a radar-based Traffic Service coupled with effective lookout.

BGA

The tow rope used in glider towing operations is typically 50-65 metres in length. The length of the combination of towing aircraft, tow rope and glider in flight must not exceed 150 metres (ANO 2016 §87(2)). Glider/Tug aerotow combinations have limited manoeuvrability and are best given a wide berth.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Rallye with a glider-on-tow and a Baron flew into proximity 2.9NM northeast of Middle Wallop at 1513Z on Wednesday 23rd July 2025. The Rallye pilot was operating under VFR in VMC operating on a common glider frequency and monitoring Wallop Radio, and the Baron pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Boscombe Zone.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots (including the pilot of the glider-on-tow), radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data, reports from the air traffic controller and Air/Ground Operator involved, and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the Rallye pilot and noted that they had been towing a glider at the time of the Airprox. The Board noted that the pilot had been operating on a common glider frequency and monitoring Wallop Radio. The Board also noted that, as the Baron pilot had been working a different frequency for their CMATZ transit, the Rallye tug pilot had been disadvantaged by not having heard the Baron pilot's transmissions. Additionally, the Rallye's electronic conspicuity (EC) device had not been able to detect the other aircraft and members agreed that the EC device fitted in the Rallye tug was incompatible with that of the Baron (**CF4**) and that, consequently, the combined effect of no information received via R/T and no detection via EC devices meant that the Rallye pilot had had no situational awareness of the Baron's presence (**CF3**). The Board noted that the Rallye pilot and the pilot of the glider-on-tow had both reported the Baron aircraft as having flown overhead, and members agreed that the pilot of the Rallye had been concerned by the proximity of the Baron (**CF6**). The Board also noted that the Rallye had been undetected on radar and, given that the pilot had believed they had been transmitting Modes A, C and S, members wondered whether the pilot had carried out a pre-flight transponder check, as had been recommended to Lasham Gliding Society and the wider BGA community in an earlier Airprox event.[7] The Board felt that such a check might have made the tug and

[5] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[6] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.
[7] Airprox Report 2025099.pdf

glider combination more visible on radar for the Boscombe controller providing a service to the Baron pilot. Members also considered it unfortunate that they were unable to determine whether the transponder might have transmitted a detectable return to the TAS fitted in the Baron.

The Board then turned their attention to the actions of the Baron pilot and noted that the pilot had been in receipt of a Basic Service from Boscombe Down. The Board noted that, despite being in receipt of a Basic Service, the Baron pilot had received generic Traffic Information from the Boscombe Zone controller and had been informed of multiple gliders between their aircraft and their destination. At this juncture, members discussed the advantages of requesting a Traffic Service rather than a Basic Service, noting that under the terms of a Basic Service the controller is not required to monitor the flight and that the pilot should not expect any Traffic Information. The Board further added that, if a Traffic service is requested and subsequently refused, the pilot should submit a completed form FCS 1522.[8] Only by reporting a refusal of service can the evidence be gathered to influence change. Returning to the Airprox itself and based on the information provided to the Baron pilot, members agreed that the pilot had had generic situational awareness of the presence of gliders on their route (**CF3**). The Board noted that the Baron's TAS had not detected either the Rallye tug or glider-on-tow, both of which had been carrying EC commonly used by glider pilots, and members agreed that the TAS fitted in the Baron aircraft had not been compatible with that of the Rallye tug (**CF4**). The Board noted that the Baron pilot had seen a glider and had descended to remain clear, before climbing to resume their previous altitude. Members agreed that when the Baron pilot had climbed to resume their transit altitude, they had not seen the Rallye tug and glider combination (**CF5**) and had climbed past their altitude just prior to CPA. The Board wondered whether the Baron pilot had been aware of the NOTAM'd gliding competition at Middle Wallop and members agreed that, under the circumstances, routeing around the area would have been a better option (**CF2**). Members further agreed that, as it was, the Baron pilot had flown through active and promulgated airspace, which had materially contributed to the Airprox (**CF1**).

The Board then turned their attention to the actions of the Boscombe controller and noted that the controller had notified the Baron pilot of multiple gliders in the vicinity of Middle Wallop, which had been acknowledged. The Boscombe controller had no further recollection of the event. The Board concluded that the Boscombe controller could have done no more to have assisted matters.

In considering the actions of the Wallop Radio Air/Ground Operator (AGO), members thanked them for providing their report to the Board and agreed that the AGO had not been involved in the Airprox.

In drawing their conversation to a conclusion and in consideration of the risk of collision, some members felt that safety had not been assured and that there had been a risk of collision, whilst others considered that there had been no collision risk but that safety had been degraded. The Chair put it to a vote, with the majority agreeing that the Rallye tug pilot had been able to monitor the situation once they had seen the Baron approaching them from the right, shortly after they had already commenced a left turn away from the Baron, and pass *'almost overhead'.* As such, the Board agreed that there had been no risk of collision and assigned a Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025156			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Aircraft Navigation	An event involving navigation of the aircraft.	Flew through promulgated and active airspace, e.g. Glider Site
2	Human Factors	• Pre-flight briefing and flight preparation	An event involving incorrect, poor or insufficient pre-flight briefing	
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness

[8] FCS 1522 - UK Airspace Access or Refusal of ATS Report

	• **Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance**			
4	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• **See and Avoid**			
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
6	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[9]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the Baron pilot had flown through airspace notified as active with a gliding competition.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Rallye pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the Baron and the Baron pilot had only generic awareness of multiple gliders in the vicinity.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity equipment fitted in each aircraft had been incompatible and unable to detect the other aircraft.



[9] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.