

AIRPROX REPORT No 2025124

Date: 19 Jun 2025 Time: 1018Z Position: 5128N 00057W Location: IVO Caversham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	T67	C152
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	Basic
Provider	Waltham Radio	London Info
Altitude/FL	2400ft	2600ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Yellow	White, Blue
Lighting	Landing, Nav	Landing, Taxy, Nav, Beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NR
Altitude/FL	2200ft	2500ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH
Heading	275°	'southerly'
Speed	95kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/400m H	Not Seen
Recorded	200ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE T67 PILOT reports that when conducting a sortie, they observed an aircraft on a constant bearing about 4NM away. As the student was handling and working hard at straight and level, they monitored the situation and didn't intervene until the aircraft was close enough to become a concern and they realised it wasn't going to take any avoiding action. They manoeuvred to pass safely slightly below and behind the other aircraft. Having seen the registration clearly and suspecting it would either be working Farnborough or Blackbushe, they tuned into both and heard [the other pilot] call up Blackbushe. They asked the controller [sic] there to ask the pilot to give them a call. [The two pilots] spoke later and the other pilot confirmed that they did not see [the T67] and were fairly busy heads-in with their iPad. They had a decent chat about the importance of lookout and left it at that. They have since been informed that an Airprox had been reported. They had good visual with the other aircraft from an early stage and thus did not consider it to be an Airprox.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE C152 PILOT reports that it had been a clear day cloud-wise but quite hazy. They were flying on a southerly heading and monitoring their altitude due to close proximity of Class A [airspace] (London TMAs), along with the Benson MATZ and Farnborough airspace, with lookout being completed consistently. No aircraft were sighted when completing their lookout, they changed over to Blackbushe Info and made an initial call. All was well, until the other pilot came onto the frequency and highlighted the Airprox. They landed with no further issues and provided all details to Blackbushe Tower in person. They noted that they had not got the other aircraft visual and hadn't been warned of any collision risk, so no avoiding action had been taken; after speaking with the other pilot, they had said that they had taken avoiding action to pass behind because they [the C152] had been approaching from the right.

THE WHITE WALTHAM AGO reports that they were on RW25 for the whole day on the 19th of June.

The Operations staff had no knowledge of any interaction between the reported aircraft. The C152 pilot

would have been unlikely to have contacted Waltham Radio. The T67 pilot would most likely have been in contact with Waltham Radio on 122.605MHz as 1NM north of WOD NDB is close to the airfield.

THE BLACKBUSHE FISO reports that the aircraft that was joining Blackbushe was [C152 C/S], a visitor. They believe that the event happened approximately 10NM north of Blackbushe and believe that neither aircraft was on their frequency.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that it had been brought to their attention that [the pilot of C152 C/S] had subsequently filed an Airprox whilst under a Basic Service with them at 1018 on 19th June.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Benson was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGUB 190950Z 21001KT CAVOK 26/16 Q1025 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU=
METAR EGUB 191020Z 34003KT CAVOK 27/15 Q1025 NOSIG=
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Analysis and Investigation

NATS Investigation

The pilot of [C/S], a Cessna 152 from [redacted], was in communication with the London FISO in receipt of a Basic Service, squawking 1177.

The UK Airprox Board notified Safety Investigations of the event, reporting an Airprox between [the C152] and [the T67] in the vicinity of WOD at 1018 (all times UTC). Radar replay indicated that, at this time, [the T67] squawking 7004 was tracking westbound at 2400ft. The UK AIP, ENR 1.6 detailed squawk 7004 as indicating 'Aerobatics and Display'. It was noted that the squawk was:

'For use by civil or military aircraft conducting solo or formation aerobatic manoeuvres, whilst displaying, practising or training for a display or for aerobatics training or general aerobatic practice.'

The London FISO was not in communication with the [T67] pilot. [The C152] was tracking southbound at 2400ft.

Although the London FIS position was non-radar, Safety Investigations reviewed the radar replay of the event. The closest point of approach between [the C152] (FIS) and [the T67] (7004) occurred at 1018:12 and was measured on the Multi-Track Radar as 0.0NM and 200ft (Figure 1). There were no separation requirements outside controlled airspace.




Figure 1

A [redacted] pilot report from [the C152] was provided by the UK Airprox Board. The pilot noted, 'I had not got the other aircraft visual, hadn't been warned of any collision risk, so no avoiding action had been taken; after speaking with the other pilot after, he had said he had taken avoiding action to pass behind as I was approaching him from the right.' No pilot report from [the T67] was received by NATS. Radar replay did not indicate any deviation in altitude from the aircraft, and no deviation laterally was observed.

Conclusion

The Airprox occurred when [the C152] and [the T67] passed close to each other outside controlled airspace. [The C152 pilot] was in receipt of a Basic Service from London FIS. Closest Point of Approach occurred at 1018:12 and was recorded on Multi-Track Radar as 0.0NM and 200ft. The incident was reportedly resolved by [the T67 pilot] turning to pass behind [the C152].

UKAB Secretariat

The T67 and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the T67 pilot was required to give way to the C152.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a T67 and a C152 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Caversham at 1018Z on Thursday 19th June 2025. The T67 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of an AGCS from White Waltham and the C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the AGO and FISO involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first looked at the actions of the T67 pilot. Members familiar with the area where the Airprox took place noted that it was a known bottleneck, with lots of pilots routeing just outside the London TMA. They thought that, on this occasion, the pilot had been on the correct frequency, because they had been routeing close to the White Waltham VRP and therefore had needed to be aware of inbound traffic. However, the White Waltham frequency would not have provided any information on transiting aircraft and so the pilot had not received any prior situational awareness on the C152 (**CF2**). Members noted that the T67 had not been fitted with any form of additional electronic conspicuity equipment but were told that the flying school that operated the aircraft had since put measures in place to rectify this, which members were heartened to hear. Noting the NATS comment about the squawk of 7004, members thought that, because the T67 pilot would have been conducting an aerobatics exercise once they had routed further west, selecting that squawk early had provided local ATC units with the knowledge that the aircraft may have suddenly begun unexpectedly manoeuvring. The pilot had been conducting an instructional exercise, which at that point required that the student maintain straight and level. Although the Instructor had seen the C152 at range, the instructor had been reluctant to interrupt the student too early in order to take avoiding action. The Board discussed whether the T67 pilot would have been better placed taking earlier action, especially given that the C152 pilot had had right of way and had therefore been required to maintain course and speed. Some members opined that, in this restricted area of airspace, the 200ft vertical separation could have been considered normal operations, while other members thought that to keep going until the last moment risked being caught out if the

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

other pilot had behaved unexpectedly and turned towards them (**CF3**), urging pilots to err on the side of caution in such situations.

Turning to the actions of the C152 pilot, they had been receiving a Basic Service from London Information. Members noted that pilots should not expect to receive Traffic Information from London Information FISOs, who are operating without the benefit of surveillance equipment, but instead should contact a LARS unit, in this case Farnborough was the designated LARS unit, although members also noted that Benson ATC was also happy to provide a service in this area. Without a surveillance-derived service, and without any form of electronic conspicuity equipment, the Board agreed that the C152 pilot had not received any prior situational awareness about the T67 in the vicinity (**CF2**). Members wondered why the C152 pilot had not seen the T67 in close proximity (**CF4**) and surmised that they may have been distracted within the cockpit setting up for the frequency change. Whatever the reason, this Airprox demonstrated the importance of maintaining a good lookout, even when conducting in-cockpit tasks.

The Board then discussed the actions of the London Information FISO. Members noted that the Basic Service was being provided with a non-licensed radar position (a flight information display - FID), meaning that the FISO had the FID for information purposes only and was not allowed to provide radar-derived specific Traffic Information, only information derived from other pilot reports. The FISO had not been required to monitor the flight and therefore it had been unlikely that the FISO had known the exact position of the C152, and so the Board noted that pilots should not expect to receive specific Traffic Information from London Information FISOs (**CF1**).

When determining the risk, the Board considered the radar replay together with reports from both pilots and that of the London Information FISO. Members noted that the T67 pilot had been visual with the C152 for some time before CPA and therefore agreed that there had not been a risk of collision. However, although some members opined that this had been normal operations in this portion of airspace, others countered that the separation had been such that safety had been degraded; the latter view prevailed – Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025124			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Situational Awareness and Action				
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
Flight Elements				
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid				
3	Human Factors	• Lack of Individual Risk Perception	Events involving flight crew not fully appreciating the risk of a particular course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the London Information FISO had been providing a non-surveillance-based Basic Service.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any prior situational awareness that the other aircraft had been in the vicinity.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).