AIRPROX REPORT No 2025096

Date: 22 May 2025 Time: ~1414Z Position: 5436N 00309W Location: ivo Portinscale

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Paraglider	Typhoon
Operator	Civ Hang	HQ Air (Ops)
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Listening Out
Provider	N/A	LL Common
Altitude	~1746ft	NK
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Red	NR
Lighting	None	NR
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5-10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	400m (1312ft)	500ft (RADALT)
Altimeter	NK	RPS (1015hPa)
Heading	270°	290°
Speed	30kt	420kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	700ft V/100m H	NR
Recorded	NK	



THE PARAGLIDER PILOT reports that they were on a cross-country flight trying to get back home. While very low over the village of Portinscale they entered a thermal at approximately 150m [500ft] AGL. They [executed] 2-4 360° [turns] before a jet fighter flew underneath them, very close both vertically and horizontally. They fly regularly in the Lake District, and are used to the jets coming through, but this was the closest in 35 years of paragliding.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE TYPHOON PILOT reports that they were on a currency sortie, conducting Low Level (LL) flying as part of the sortie. On a section of the Low Level route in the vicinity of Keswick in LFA17, [the Typhoon] was flying northbound. On this leg of the route, at 1414:12, [the Typhoon pilot] became visual with a small paraglider over the north of Derwent Water, overhead the main LFA17 flow arrow. With [the Typhoon] established in a left-hand turn, the paraglider was observed in the high 12 o'clock at a range of 1NM with a perceived vertical separation of 1000ft. A late pick-up due to the terrain and with an avoid on the right, [the Typhoon pilot] elected to continue the left turn with a descent, happy that ample vertical separation existed. Low level calls from [the Typhoon pilot] were being transmitted throughout the sortie on the VHF LL common frequency, including a call at 1412:48, with no response heard. [The Typhoon pilot] did not assess that visual separation was reduced to a level of that requiring a [report] submission and therefore this [report] is being submitted at the request of the UKAB and [the Unit] Flight Safety Cell.

The pilot perceived the severity of the incident as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Blackpool Airport (50NM south) and Teesside Airport (60NM east) was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNH 221420Z 30010KT 9999 SCT036 15/05 Q1020
METAR EGNV 221420Z 04011KT 010V070 9999 SCT040 13/03 Q1021
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Analysis and Investigation

Typhoon Unit Flight Safety

The investigation outcome was a perceived Airprox in LFA17 when [the Typhoon pilot] became visual with a small paraglider over the north of Derwent Water, overhead the main LFA17 flow arrow. With [the Typhoon] established in a left-hand turn, the paraglider was observed in the high 12 o'clock at a range of 1NM with a perceived vertical separation of 1000ft. The mitigation had been, after a late pick-up due to the terrain and with an avoid on the right, [that the Typhoon pilot] elected to continue the left turn with a descent, happy that ample vertical separation existed. Low level calls from [Typhoon C/S] were being transmitted throughout the sortie on the VHF LL common frequency, including a call at 1412:48, with no response heard.

A causal factor had been that both the paraglider and the Typhoon pilots were not aware of the other's presence until potential loss of safe separation occurred. The paraglider pilot did not have access to CADS and the Typhoon pilot did not have awareness of the paraglider pilot's plans. A secondary causal factor was considered to be that the Low Level common frequency continued to be a weak barrier.

Summary: The Typhoon pilot reacted well in response to spotting the paraglider, with neither pilot having situational awareness before take-off of the other's movements. This occurrence highlights the importance of lookout and Low Level and route study to allow quick reactions if required.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and only the Typhoon was positively identified using Mode S data after having passed Portinscale to the north. The Typhoon was not visible on radar immediately prior to the reported CPA.

ADS-B and other aircraft tracking sources were analysed and neither aircraft could be seen. The paraglider pilot provided their GPS-based navigation file. This was used in conjunction with the radar data. The diagram above depicts the Typhoon and paraglider positions tied at 1414:43 when the Typhoon first appeared on radar. The Typhoon indicated 800ft altitude and the paraglider indicated 1755ft altitude at that time.

The depicted track of the Typhoon is based on the pilot's report. The Typhoon was estimated, by interpolation, to have passed closest to the paraglider's track at approximately 1414:23, 20sec before the Typhoon appeared on radar. Although neither the exact position nor altitude of the Typhoon is known, the pilots' reports indicated that the Typhoon passed beneath the paraglider in the vicinity of Portinscale. The paraglider's position at 1414:23 was very similar to the tied position at time 1414:43 as it had been orbiting, and its recorded GPS altitude was approximately 1746ft. CPA was assessed to have occurred at approximately 1414 with the vertical and lateral separation unknown.

The paraglider and Typhoon pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Typhoon pilot was required to give way to the paraglider.[2]

Comments

HQ Air Command

The Typhoon [pilot] was conducting a low flying training sortie in LFA17 following the flow arrow from Grasmere to the north end of Bassenthwaite Lake. While paragliding activity was notified for approximately 6NM to the east, no NOTAM was in place for the area in the vicinity of Keswick. As a result, the Typhoon pilot was unable to deconflict their sortie from that of the paraglider at the planning stage. Due to the terrain and operating heights, it was not practical for either the Typhoon pilot or the paraglider pilot to have been in receipt of an ATS. As the paraglider pilot was not listening out on [the] LL Common frequency, they were unaware of the presence of the Typhoon until they became visual with it. Due to the terrain, this was a late sighting for the Typhoon pilot. Their decision to continue the left turn and descend allowed sufficient vertical separation from the paraglider while remaining outside the avoid for the Calvert Trust Riding for the Disabled site at Keswick.

BHPA

The BHPA notes the paraglider pilot's comment about this being the closest they had come to a collision in 35 years so, on that basis, the BHPA is relieved that there was not a more serious outcome. Although the Airprox did occur in an area marked as having hang glider and paraglider activity, the BHPA commends the Typhoon pilot's situational awareness in visually acquiring the paraglider when they clearly were not expecting to find any other aircraft there. Although this Airprox occurred mid-week, the paraglider pilot was on a cross-country flight and therefore, the submission of a NOTAM would not have helped in this instance.

We note the Typhoon pilot's comments (and other fast-jet military pilots' comments in similar Airprox reports) on their reliance of the Low Level Frequency monitoring barrier against Airproxes during low level sorties. The BHPA feels that the majority of GA pilots are still unaware of this barrier and certainly almost all BHPA members would be unable to utilise it anyway - even if they were aware of it - due to the non-carriage of air-band radio.

The BHPA will continue to educate its membership regarding the constant need for a good lookout, the timely use of the CANP system and the use of EC devices.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a paraglider and a Typhoon flew into proximity in the vicinity of Portinscale at approximately 1414Z on Thursday 22nd May 2025. The paraglider pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and not in receipt of a FIS, and the Typhoon pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and making use of the Low Level Common frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data from the paraglider, and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the paraglider pilot, and noted that they had had many years of experience flying in the area where the Airprox had occurred. The Board also noted that they had not carried an aviation band transceiver, which was the norm among the paraglider community. The

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 12.

Board noted that many paraglider pilots carry 2m radios to communicate with each other and wondered why they did not, therefore, carry a receiver to listen to the LL Common or other pertinent frequencies, but acknowledged that there is a limit to what can be carried on one's person when paragliding. With no information available to the pilot from radio transmissions, members agreed that, although the pilot had known that fast jets occasionally operated in the vicinity, they had had no situational awareness of the presence of the Typhoon prior to sighting it (**CF2**). The Board also noted that the pilot had been carrying electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment which was common with the glider community but had not been able to detect the emissions from the transponder fitted in the Typhoon. Members agreed that the paraglider's EC equipment had not been compatible with that of the Typhoon (**CF3**). Members felt that it was fortuitous that both pilots had seen the other's aircraft and agreed that the paraglider pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the Typhoon (**CF4**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the Typhoon pilot, the Board noted that the pilot had seemed unaware that paraglider pilots quite often carried no radio equipment and would likely, therefore, have been unaware of their transmissions on the LL Common frequency. Members were pleased that the Typhoon pilot had seen the paraglider but concerned that their track had taken them towards the hang/paraglider launch site to the north of Portinscale and agreed that the pilot had flown close to a known paragliding site (**CF1**). The Board recognised the need for Low Level flight training and thought that, in this case, where military pilots had also had a known avoid area over Keswick (unmarked on civilian charts), low level traffic would need to mitigate known risks as much as possible. Members agreed that the Typhoon pilot had had generic awareness of the possibility of paragliding taking place in the vicinity of a paragliding launch site (**CF2**) albeit the paraglider in question had not launched from that location.

Concluding their discussion, the Board noted the paraglider pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence of the Typhoon and the Typhoon pilot had had only generic situational awareness of the possibility of paragliders operating in the vicinity of a paraglider launch site. Members agreed that although safety had been degraded, both pilots had seen the other's aircraft and that the Typhoon pilot had been comfortable with their subsequent manoeuvre and maintenance of safe separation from the paraglider (the paraglider pilot had reported an estimated 700ft vertical separation). As such, the Board assigned Risk category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025096			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Aircraft Navigation	An event involving navigation of the aircraft.	Flew through promulgated and active airspace, e.g. Glider Site
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the Typhoon had flown over a known hang-glider/paraglider launch area in the vicinity of Portinscale.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the paraglider pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the Typhoon and the Typhoon pilot had only generic awareness of the possibility of paragliding activity in the vicinity of Portinscale.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the paraglider's EC equipment had been unable to detect the emissions from the Typhoon's transponder.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.