


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2025081**

Date: 09 May 2025 Time: 1113Z Position: 5609N 00247W Location: 4.5NM SE Elie

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

| Recorded                 | Aircraft 1        | Aircraft 2                 |
|--------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Aircraft                 | Long-EZ           | BE200                      |
| Operator                 | Civ FW            | Civ Comm                   |
| Airspace                 | Scottish FIR      | Scottish FIR               |
| Class                    | G                 | G                          |
| Rules                    | VFR               | VFR                        |
| Service                  | Traffic           | Traffic                    |
| Provider                 | Leuchars          | Leuchars                   |
| Altitude/FL              | FL064             | FL063                      |
| Transponder              | A, C, S           | A, C, S                    |
| <b>Reported</b>          |                   |                            |
| Colours                  | White             | White/grey/blue            |
| Lighting                 | Nav, HISL, strobe | Nav, recognition           |
| Conditions               | VMC               | VMC                        |
| Visibility               | >10km             | >10km                      |
| Altitude/FL              | FL065             | 6500ft                     |
| Altimeter                | QNH (1020hPa)     | QNH (1020hPa)              |
| Heading                  | 160°              | 255°                       |
| Speed                    | 110kt             | 140kt                      |
| ACAS/TAS                 | Not fitted        | TAS                        |
| Alert                    | N/A               | Information                |
| <b>Separation at CPA</b> |                   |                            |
| Reported                 | Not seen          | 500ft V/3NM <sup>1</sup> H |
| Recorded                 |                   | 100ft V/1NM H              |



**THE LONG-EZ PILOT** reports being given climb-out instructions to climb to their requested cruise altitude of FL80, VFR to the south. Having assumed a climb rate of 600ft/min on a steady heading of 160°, they received a number of Traffic Information calls and attempted to visually acquire them. [BE200 C/S] was called to them a number of times as passing left-to-right slightly behind at FL65. As they were converging from the right, they maintained heading and continued asking for [Traffic Information] updates while attempting to gain visual with the BE200. [BE200 C/S] was on frequency and given reciprocal Traffic Information and said they 'would keep a good lookout', they then shortly afterwards declared they had TCAS [sic] contact on the Long-EZ. With better situational awareness, they expected [BE200 C/S] to give way to them and take avoiding action. At that stage they became visual with a twin engine aircraft approximately 2 miles to the south which they assumed was the [BE200 C/S] in conflict, but which, it became apparent, was in fact [a PA31 engaged in the same task], which had not yet been called out to them. It was at this stage that [BE200 C/S] declared that they had 'aborted their run' and requested the callsign of the aircraft that had 'cut them up', and passed them by 200ft. The Long-EZ pilot then [turned away from] the [PA31], which was turning towards them, and passed them by approximately 1NM and 2000ft. They were surprised to observe no NOTAM for 2 aircraft operating a persistent racetrack pattern made obvious by the ADS-B playback, in busy airspace. Had they known that this was their flight profile they would have levelled off earlier and avoided them vertically, but this information was not available [they believed] and they had assumed that the single [BE200] callsign they were aware of at the time was simply in transit.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

**THE BE200 PILOT** reports that, as a precaution, whilst operating in Class G airspace under a Traffic Service, during run number 6 of 8 data collect runs, a decision was made to abort the run due to an unseen aircraft, which appeared on the TAS to be climbing and converging. They had been advised by

<sup>1</sup> Not seen, estimated from TAS.

ATC about the other aircraft, and had responded with a “looking” call. However, as the other aircraft was approaching from below and to the right, they had no visual contact with it at any stage. Being on a ‘stable aircraft’ data collection run, it was not practical to make clearing turns in that regard. The other pilot was also notified of their presence by ATC, and a “visual with that traffic” call made by them. However, because the other aircraft appeared not to change its course or rate of climb on TAS, the BE200 pilot took the tactical decision to abort the run and make a right turn towards east when the other aircraft reached a range of approximately 3NM and 500ft below, climbing on TAS. They noted that the Long-EZ pilot may possibly have misidentified another aircraft as theirs.

The pilot did not make an assessment of risk of collision.

**THE LEUCHARS CONTROLLER** reports working 3 Traffic Service and one Basic Service aircraft, all operating on the same frequency. They were the ATCO I/C and only ATCO in the ACR, monitoring all frequencies. There was potential confliction with two of the three aircraft under a Traffic Service so they called Traffic Information to both pilots several times. [The Long-EZ] was VFR south climbing FL80 and the other was [BE200 C/S] operating at 6500ft RPS on east-to-west tracks. At no point did either pilot request deconfliction advice or speak to each other. At about 2NM separation, [the Long-EZ pilot] called “Visual, no confliction”. [The BE200 pilot] called on frequency that [the Long-EZ] passed across their 12 o'clock and asked for the registration of the other aircraft.

The controller perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Low’.

## Factual Background

The weather at Leuchars was recorded as follows:

METAR EGQL 091150Z 14006KT 9999 FEW020 18/08 Q1020 RMK BLU=  
METAR EGQL 091050Z 19003KT 9999 SKC 17/08 Q1020 RMK BLU=

A NOTAM was issued, as follows:

H2317/25  
Q) EGPX/QXXLW/IV/BO/W/000/100/5602N00224W022  
FLIGHT TRIALS WI AREA BOUNDED BY STRAIGHT LINES JOINING  
561100N 0025800W - 562000N 0020500W - 560000N 0020000W -  
554600N 0020000W - 554600N 0024000W - 560000N 0024800W -  
561100N 0025800W (EAST LOTHIAN). FOR INFO 01302 230486.  
AR-2025-2707/01.  
LOWER: Surface, UPPER: 10,000 Feet AMSL  
FROM: 05 May 2025 07:00 GMT (07:00 UTC) TO: 16 May 2025 17:00 GMT (17:00 UTC)  
SCHEDULE: 0700-1700

## Analysis and Investigation

### Military ATM

An Airprox occurred on 9 May 25, 18NM northeast of Edinburgh at 1112 UTC. The Long-EZ [pilot] was conducting a VFR transit and in receipt of a Traffic Service from Leuchars Radar. The BE200 [pilot] was conducting a data collect run and in receipt of a Traffic Service from Leuchars Radar.

The BE200 [pilot] was conducting east-west racetracks at 6500ft RPS as part of a stable aircraft data collect run. The Leuchars Radar controller was providing a Traffic Service to 3 [pilots] and a Basic Service to one.

At 1102:32, the Long-EZ [pilot] was cleared for departure from Leuchars, with a VFR south departure profile climbing to FL80.

At 1103:52, the Long-EZ [pilot] contacted Leuchars Radar as briefed, reported passing 1000ft and requested a Traffic Service. The Leuchars Radar controller issued the Traffic Service and reaffirmed the climb to FL80.

At 1107:12, Traffic Information was provided to the Long-EZ [pilot] regarding other traffic and not the BE200 *“traffic right one o’clock, four miles, crossing left right slightly ahead, similar altitude, maintaining”*. The Long-EZ [pilot] reported *“not sighted”*.

At 1108:19, Traffic Information was provided to the Long-EZ [pilot] regarding the BE200 *“further traffic left 10 o’clock, ten miles, crossing left right, slightly ahead, it’s a DA62 on this frequency at six thousand five hundred feet”*. The aircraft was incorrectly reported as a DA62, an aircraft type also operated by the BE200’s parent company. The Long-EZ [pilot] again reported *“not sighted”*.

At 1108:38, Traffic Information was provided to the BE200 [pilot] regarding the Long-EZ *“traffic right one o’clock, nine point five miles, crossing right left, slightly behind, on this frequency, it’s a Long-EZ, climbing through flight level four five for flight level eight zero”*. The BE200 [pilot] reported *“looking”*.

At 1109:13, the Long-EZ [pilot] requested an update on previous Traffic Information. The Leuchars Radar controller responded *“The right one o’clock is maintaining three thousand five hundred feet. The further traffic left ten o’clock, seven miles, crossing left-right slightly ahead is six thousand five hundred feet”*.

At 1110:12, the Leuchars Radar controller updated the BE200 [pilot’s] Traffic Information *“previously called traffic, right one o’clock, four miles, crossing right left, slightly ahead, one thousand feet below, climbing”*. Again, the BE200 [pilot] reported *“looking”*, but then stated *“I’ll keep a good lookout”*.

At 1110:49, the Long-EZ [pilot] reported traffic in sight. The Leuchars Radar controller requested confirmation of which aircraft was in sight by *“is that the one in your left, nine o’clock?”*, to which the Long-EZ [pilot] confirmed and stated the BE200’s callsign.

At 1111:01, the Leuchars Radar controller informed the BE200 [pilot] that the Long-EZ was passing through their 12 o’clock. The BE200 [pilot] reported not sighted but displayed on TAS as 200ft below.

CPA occurred with 1.0NM horizontal separation and 100ft vertical separation.

The Leuchars investigation did not identify any ATS-related causal and aggravating factors, deeming the ATS provision provided by the Leuchars Radar controller to be of a suitable standard.

## 2 Gp BM Analysis

The Leuchars Radar controller provided timely and accurate Traffic Information to both the Long-EZ and BE200 [pilots] to aid them in visually acquiring each other. Traffic Information was updated at relevant points and in keeping with the Traffic Service provision. With multiple aircraft operating in the area, the confirmation of which aircraft the Long-EZ had in sight was essential in avoiding a misidentification. Overall, the ATS provision by the Leuchars Radar controller was to a suitable standard.

## UKAB Secretariat

The BE200 and Long-EZ pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>2</sup>. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the BE200 pilot was required to give way to the Long-EZ<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>3</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Rutan Long-EZ and a BE200 flew into proximity southeast of Elie at 1113Z on Friday 9<sup>th</sup> May 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, both in receipt of a Traffic Service from Leuchars.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the pilots' actions and agreed that the Long-EZ pilot had not assimilated the relevant NOTAM. Despite this, members were of the opinion that a NOTAM simply stating that 'Flight Trials' would be conducted would not have been sufficient for the Long-EZ pilot to have understood the non-deviating requirement of the BE200 pilot. Members discussed the ease with which pilots were able to access NOTAMs relevant to their planned flight, and agreed that the functionality of the current 'official sources' left much to be desired. With hindsight, it would have been advantageous for the BE200 pilot to have briefed the Leuchars controller on their requirement to maintain course and level and consequently for the Long-EZ pilot to have been given a departure level below the BE200 track or a course to the west of the BE200 track, with either of which, the Board felt, the Long-EZ pilot would have been happy to comply. [UKAB Note: Post-Board, the BE200 pilot noted that, due to the proximity of this task to RAF Leuchars, they ensured that their operations team included RAF Leuchars as an addressee to every [BE200] flight plan throughout the entire 2 weeks, so that they would be aware of their location and run pattern, which did not alter throughout the whole period.] The Leuchars controller had passed Traffic Information on the BE200, albeit identifying it as a DA62, and the Long-EZ pilot had called visual with it after the controller's confirmation of its position, but in their narrative had reported sighting the (southerly) PA31. It was confirmed that the Long-EZ pilot had not seen the BE200 and had mistakenly reported visual with it having in fact sighted the southerly PA31 (the Board noted that the time of recorded R/T transmissions was in error by approximately 2min). In the event, and despite the mutual non-sighting, the aircraft had been 1NM apart at CPA after the BE200 pilot had turned to the right based on their TAS information, which the Board felt indicated no risk of collision, albeit to the frustration of the BE200 pilot. Therefore, the Board assigned a Risk Category E (normal safety parameters) to this Airprox and agreed on the following contributory factors:

**CF1:** The BE200 pilot had not briefed the Leuchars controller on their non-deviating course requirement.

**CF2:** The Long-EZ pilot had not assimilated NOTAM H2317/25 in their pre-flight planning.

**CF3:** The BE200 pilot was concerned by the proximity of the Long-EZ, as assimilated from their TAS display.

**CF4:** Neither pilot saw the other aircraft before CPA.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### Contributory Factors:

|    | 2025081                           |             |                       |                    |
|----|-----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| CF | Factor                            | Description | ECCAIRS Amplification | UKAB Amplification |
|    | Flight Elements                   |             |                       |                    |
|    | • Tactical Planning and Execution |             |                       |                    |

|                                                                |               |                                              |                                                                                                        |                                                                  |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1                                                              | Human Factors | • Accuracy of Communication                  | Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided | Ineffective communication of intentions                          |
| 2                                                              | Human Factors | • Pre-flight briefing and flight preparation | An event involving incorrect, poor or insufficient pre-flight briefing                                 |                                                                  |
| • Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action |               |                                              |                                                                                                        |                                                                  |
| 3                                                              | Human Factors | • Unnecessary Action                         | Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required                                | Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft       |
| • See and Avoid                                                |               |                                              |                                                                                                        |                                                                  |
| 4                                                              | Human Factors | • Monitoring of Other Aircraft               | Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft                                     | Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots |

Degree of Risk: E.

### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

### Flight Elements:

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **partially effective** because the Long-EZ pilot had not assimilated NOTAM H2317/25 during their pre-flight planning and the BE200 pilot had not briefed the Leuchars controller on their task requirement of a non-deviating track.

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **partially effective** because the BE200 pilot was concerned by the proximity of the Long-EZ.

**See and Avoid** was assessed as **not used** because the BE200 pilot reacted on the basis of their TAS information, without seeing the Long-EZ, and the Long-EZ pilot did not see the BE200 but separation at CPA was such that safety was maintained.



<sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).