AIRPROX REPORT No 2025080

Date: 10 May 2025 Time: 1016Z Position: 5058N 00210W Location: final RW08 Compton Abbas

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	Eurofox
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Compton Abbas ATZ	Compton Abbas ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Compton Radio	Compton Radio
Altitude[1]	~1200ft	~1192ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White & blue with red lettering	White with red wingtips
Lighting	Anti-colls, landing, and strobes	None
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1300ft	350ft
Altimeter	QNH (1017hPa)	QNH
Heading	080°	080°
Speed	75kt	55kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	SkyEcho
Alert	N/A	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/<50m H	50ft V/150ft H
Recorded	~10ft V/ <0.1NM H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were an FI(A) returning from an experience flight when the incident took place. As it was [a special event] weekend, they mentioned in their passenger safety brief that it was a particularly busy day at the airfield and not to hesitate to let them know if they spotted other aircraft. Prior to the incident, they called downwind left-hand RW08 and were aware of two aircraft ahead of them and one behind them. They called final for RW08 and were advised of the wind velocity. Their passenger then told them that they could see another aircraft. They then spotted the Eurofox turning onto final beside them. They immediately initiated a go-around.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE EUROFOX PILOT reports that they were enroute to Compton Abbas and had maintained a cruising altitude in excess of 4000ft until they passed a gliding site. By that time, they were monitoring the Compton Abbas air/ground radio and were aware that RW08 was in use. The standing instruction for landing at Compton Abbas was for a standard overhead join (2800ft QNH) or a deadside join to cross the upwind runway threshold (1800ft QNH). When overhead Gillingham they contacted Compton Radio, confirmed their position, advised their PPR number and informed [the Compton Radio operator] that they would position for a standard overhead join and would report overhead the field. They commenced a gradual descent and flew slightly north of their magenta route line in order to position for a RW08 overhead join. Their [navigation device] altitude profile clearly showed that they were established on straight and level flight at 2800ft QNH well before the Compton Abbas airspace. They reported overhead, descending deadside for RW08, full stop.

[1] The altitudes used are based on dissimilar data sources, with the PA28 altitude derived from MLAT data and the Eurofox altitude from its GPS navigation data file compared with ADS-B data.

The pilot provided an expanded SkyDemon printout, showing the actual ground track and altitude profile they followed for their join and circuit at Compton Abbas. They reduced altitude by 1000ft on the deadside (south of the runway) and crossed the upwind end of the runway (RW26 threshold) at 1800ft QNH. They made a further call of downwind and commenced a gradual descent on the remaining downwind and left base legs of the circuit. They made 'left base' and 'turning final RW08 to land' calls; on making their final call they were given relevant wind information on the runway by the air/ground radio [operator].

Turbulence and wind shear are well-reported problems in the [airfield] guides for RW08 arrivals in southeasterly winds, and being a very vulnerable lightweight aircraft they remained a little high on the base/final turn, side slipping to reduce height once established on a stable final approach. They were only a few hundred feet above the ground and less than 1min from landing when, for a split second, they saw a single engine, low wing aircraft, slightly behind and to their right side, which appeared to be turning to the right towards the deadside of the circuit. They had no idea what it was doing there or where it had come from, although were satisfied that it was turning away from them and was not an immediate threat. Being so close to the ground and established on final approach, their attention immediately reverted to safely landing their aircraft, which they did. They recorded 'brakes on' at 1018 (following their roll out, runway clearance and taxi for parking), and estimated their landing was at 1016, within 1min of their allocated arrival time. They remained uncertain as to why another aircraft, from whom they had heard no radio calls, would be that close to them on final approach in a circuit which has so specific and well published joining instructions. Upon reflection, they wondered if the other aircraft was perhaps making a long final straight-in approach, with a much higher approach speed, and [the PA28 pilot had] found themselves overtaking [the Eurofox] (approach speed 50kt) and had to take avoiding action by turning away towards the deadside? They believed [as their flight-plan logs demonstrated] that they had flown an appropriate circuit join, along with accurate left base and final legs, arriving at their allotted landing time whilst making all appropriate radio calls.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE COMPTON AIR/GROUND RADIO OPERATOR reports that this was a busy day with a fly-in with 68 aircraft expected during the day, spaced out at agreed slots.

Compton Flying Club had already given notice to conduct 4 training sorties during the day, with the one in question at approximately 0930 for a 45min sortie in a PA28. All aircraft were asked to join overhead, including resident aircraft to ensure spatial awareness. One visiting aircraft, the Eurofox, joined overhead and joined the circuit to land on RW08LH. As far as they remembered, [the PA28] entered the circuit crosswind ahead of [the Eurofox] and both pilots made downwind calls. [The PA28 pilot] called final for RW08 and they gave the wind speed and direction. They then heard [the PA28 pilot] declare a go-around and saw [the Eurofox] join final from what appeared to be base leg inside [the PA28]. [The Eurofox pilot] called final and they gave the wind direction and speed as [the PA28] flew to the right of RW08 and rejoined the circuit.

This account was confirmed as accurate by the Ops Supervisor also on duty at the time.

Factual Background

The weather at Bournemouth Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGHH 101020Z 11013KT 9999 FEW045 20/03 Q1016
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The arrival information for visiting pilots at Compton Abbas is published as follows:

> Circuit altitude: 1800 ft on QNH
> Standard Overhead Join: 2800 ft on QNH
> Runway 08: Please avoid flying below the required glide path on the final approach due to local wind conditions.

Figure 1 – Compton Abbas circuit procedures

As a noise abatement measure, pilots on the base and final legs for RWY 08 are asked to avoid flying over the built up areas of Compton Abbas and East Compton, as highlighted by the red circles. In particular, please avoid using the church at the western edge of Compton Abbas as a waypoint or turn-point. On the downwind leg, pilots are asked to remain to the North of Cann Common.

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

Further to the report from the AGO, Compton Abbas provided audio and video recordings of the event, neither of which had specific timelines. The R/T recordings confirmed that both pilots had made standard circuit calls and were in the following order:

The Eurofox pilot had called descending deadside, followed by the PA28 pilot calling downwind.

The Eurofox pilot called downwind, followed by the PA28 pilot calling final.

The Eurofox pilot was heard starting a call for final RW08 which was stepped-on by the PA28 pilot who had called that they were '*going around'*.

The frequency was busy with other aircraft in the circuit and one other call for a go-around was made at the beginning of the recordings.

A video recording, taken from inside the PA28, confirmed the sighting of an aircraft heading toward the PA28 at approximately the same altitude on, what appeared to be, a base leg and turning beneath the PA28 for the final approach as the PA28 was climbing away from the approach to the deadside (south) of Compton Abbas RW08. The video complemented the narrative of the PA28 pilot.

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and, although both aircraft were identified using Mode S data, neither were visible at the closest point of approach. Further analysis of ADS-B data sources was undertaken and combined with information from the navigation data file provided by the Eurofox pilot.

Figure 2 – Time 1015:30

Figure 2, above depicts the flight paths and joining pattern flown by each aircraft, as depicted by ADS-B data. The Eurofox track was coincident with the navigation track data provided by the pilot.



Figure 3 – Time 1015:20

At 1015:20 the Eurofox could be seen on a base leg for RW08, heading towards the PA28 which was established on the final approach for RW08. Separation at this time was approximately 100ft vertically and 0.23NM laterally (Figure 3).



Figure 4 – Time 1015:30

After analysis and interpolation of available data sources, CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1015:30 when the Eurofox was seen to initiate a turn from left base onto final for RW08, with vertical separation approximately 10ft and lateral separation less than 0.1NM (Figure 4).

The PA28 and Eurofox pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[3]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a Eurofox flew into proximity on final for RW08LH at Compton Abbas at 1016Z on Saturday 10th May 2025. Both the PA28 and Eurofox pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an AGCS from Compton Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, MLAT tracks from aircraft tracking software, GPS data from the Eurofox pilot, and a report from the air/ground operator involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the Eurofox pilot and noted that, although the pilot had implied that their pre-flight planning had been thorough, they had likely reverted to flying a standard pattern matching the capabilities of their aircraft rather than adhering to the published circuit pattern at Compton Abbas. Members agreed, therefore, that the pilot had not noted in their pre-flight preparation that they would need to fly a slightly wider circuit to the north of Cann Common, as required, rather than to the south as they had (**CF4**). Members further agreed that the pilot had neither complied with the published procedures, in this case, by having flown too far south (**CF1**), nor correctly executed the circuit pattern (**CF2**). The Board also noted that the pilot had, seemingly, not heard the PA28 pilot's R/T calls and members agreed that they had neither appropriately monitored the R/T communications (**CF5**) nor assimilated the R/T information available to them (**CF7**). The Board felt that the pilot's lack of assimilation from the R/T communications had caused them to have been unaware of the other circuit traffic and members agreed that the pilot had, therefore, not integrated or conformed with the pattern of traffic already established in the circuit (**CF3**). The Board was pleased to note that the Eurofox pilot had fitted electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment in their aircraft and members considered it unfortunate that the EC device had been unable to detect the transponder transmissions from the PA28 (**CF8**). The Board noted that the pilot's situational awareness may have been much improved had their EC device

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[3] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

detected the PA28, however, members agreed that the pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28 (**CF6**) until after the Airprox event had occurred. Members agreed that this also meant that the pilot effectively not sighted the PA28 (**CF10**).

The Board then turned their attention to the actions of the PA28 pilot and noted that, although the pilot had heard the Eurofox pilot's circuit calls and had been aware of an aircraft behind them, they had not realised how tight the Eurofox circuit had been and how close the Eurofox had been to them until the student pilot had seen it on base leg to turn final behind them, whereupon the pilot had made the decision to go around. Members agreed that the PA28 pilot had only had generic situational awareness of the Eurofox being behind them (**CF6**) and that they had subsequently sighted it at a late stage (**CF9**).

The Board briefly discussed the actions of the air/ground operator and recognised that they had had no involvement in this Airprox event other than to pass pertinent airfield information to the pilots.

Concluding their discussion, members turned their attention to the determination of the risk of collision. The Board summarised that the Eurofox pilot had neither been aware of nor seen the PA28 until after the CPA and that the PA28 pilot had only seen the Eurofox as it had turned onto final behind them. The Board noted that, by briefing the student to lookout thoroughly for other aircraft due to the busy airspace, the PA28 pilot had been alerted to and seen the Eurofox in time to initiate a go-around and materially increase separation. Members agreed that safety had not been assured (**CF11**) and, as such, assigned a Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025080			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
4	Human Factors	• Pre-flight briefing and flight preparation	An event involving incorrect, poor or insufficient pre-flight briefing	
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Communications	Events involving flight crew that did not appropriately monitor communications	
6	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
7	Human Factors	• Understanding/ Comprehension	Events involving flight crew that did not understand or comprehend a situation or instruction	Pilot did not assimilate conflict information
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
8	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
9	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
10	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

	• Outcome Events			
11	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Air/Ground operator was not required to pass Traffic Information to the PA28 and Eurofox pilots.

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Eurofox pilot did not follow the circuit instructions as published.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the Eurofox pilot remained inside the published circuit procedure and did not integrate with the pattern of circuit traffic already formed.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Eurofox pilot, by not assimilating the R/T communications, had no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28. The PA28 pilot had only generic awareness of the Eurofox's position behind them in the circuit pattern.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity equipment fitted to the Eurofox was unable to detect the transponder signals from the PA28.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the Eurofox pilot had not seen the PA28 until after CPA.

[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025080
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness