AIRPROX REPORT No 2025024

Date: 05 Mar 2025 Time: ~1203Z Position: 5319N 00144W Location: ivo Camphill

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	SZD-50	C152
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Basic
Provider	N/A	London Info
Altitude/FL	~2806ft	3000ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C[1]
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	none	Nav and beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1500ft	3000ft
Altimeter	QFE	QNH (1021hPa)
Heading	270°	195°
Speed	50kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	Not fitted
Alert	Information	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	200ft V/100m H	50ft V/100m H
Recorded	~194ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE SZD-50 PILOT reports that [the SZD-50] is a two seat training glider. P1 [the reporter] was in the rear seat. P2 was flying a check flight for the conditions. [The SZD-50] winch-launched from Camphill, into a south-westerly wind, releasing in ridge lift on the west side of the airfield. P1 had flown a previous training flight, and was aware of the potential for wave lift further to the west and north. After a beat north then south along the ridge, P2 turned into wind in the strongest section of lift, facing west. They became aware of a FLARM warning, indicating an aircraft on a bearing 90° to their track and they commenced a visual search for it.

When flying slowly in wave, with associated strong winds, track and heading can vary significantly. Aware of this, P1's search was to their right, scanning as much as they could. The rear seat of the SZD-50 has restricted visibility in the rear quarters, from 90° back. P1 had some doubt as to whether the indication was for a helicopter or fixed-wing. Helicopters were more common in the area, and typically fly at low altitudes. They were also aware of the need to look out of the cockpit for the threat, and hence that was their action. In hindsight, taking more time to digest the information the EC device was signalling may have helped them to focus their search. In the event, they prioritised the visual search. [The C152] was spotted as it came above their horizon, seen at approximately 60°, 200-300ft above and 200-300m distance. It was close enough to easily read the registration markings on the underside of the wing as it passed. They instructed P2 to roll hard left, to avoid flying beneath the other aircraft. It continued on its path south, and it took no evasive action, nor altered course. Their analysis of the incident was that their glider would have been quite stationary in the view of the other aircraft, likely on or just below its view of the horizon, and disappearing from view beneath their nose as they approached.

[1] The pilot reported their transponder as Mode A only, however, radar returns had identified the altitude which would indicate Mode C capability. Mode S was not seen on the radar replay. The aircraft was identified by correlating the specific 1177 squawk and return with the pilot's position report to the FISO.

They were unable to see it any earlier, as it was most likely stationary on their visible horizon, but behind their starboard wing for most of its approach.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C152 PILOT reports that they were flying back to [destination] past Camphill gliding site as there were no NOTAMs for gliding and no mention of active gliding sites on the radio. As they passed the gliding site on their left they could see a glider on the runway. They did a quick look around and saw no other aircraft, turned around to check behind the aircraft while continuing straight and spotted a glider behind them to their right (about 5 o'clock) very slightly below them. Their immediate thought was they must have come from below them as no other aircraft had been spotted in front of them. They immediately put on full power and remained straight and level to gain separation between the aircraft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that the conflict was not reported on the LFIS frequency, and they had no recollection of the flight.

Factual Background

The weather at Manchester Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR COR EGCC 051250Z AUTO 20008KT 160V240 9999 NCD 11/03 Q1018 NOSIG
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East Midlands Radar provides LARS to 60NM and 20,000ft UK AIP Pt 3_AD 2_EGNX 2.18 (Figure 1).



Figure 1 LARS coverage and frequencies

Analysis and Investigation

NATS Safety Investigations

Safety Investigations was notified by the UKAB of an Airprox which occurred outside controlled airspace. One of the aircraft involved, [a C152], was in receipt of a Basic Service from the London Information FISO at the time of the reported Airprox, however, no mention of the event was made over the R/T.

Information available to the investigation included: Form CA4114 from the London Information FISO, Airprox reports from both pilots and radar and R/T recordings.

The pilot of [the C152] called onto the FIS North frequency at 1133:33 and reported that they were routeing from [departure] to [waypoint] and return. Both pilots subsequently reported that the Airprox occurred as [the C152] was tracking in a southerly direction a short distance northwest of Camphill gliding site. The pilot of [the C152] reported that they were returning to [their departure point].

[The C152] passed to the northwest of the Lat/Long position of Camphill gliding site at 1203:00 (Figure 2); there were no other radar returns in the vicinity at this time, as such it was not possible to determine the closest point of approach between [the C152] and [the SZD-50].



Figure 2 Time 1203:00

The Airprox reports from both pilots assessed the minimum lateral separation as 100m and the minimum vertical separation as between 50ft and 200ft. The pilot of [the C152] made no reference to the event over the RTF and continued to their destination, leaving the London Information frequency at 1236:36.

The pilot of [the SZD-50] described in their Airprox report that they first observed the other aircraft 300ft above at relative bearing of 045° whilst tracking west. The pilot stated that they turned left to avoid flying beneath [the C152].

The pilot of [the C152] described in their Airprox report that the other aircraft was behind to the right and slightly below adding that they added power and continued straight and level to gain separation between the aircraft.

CAP774 – UK Flight Information Services, Chapter 2 Paragraph 1 defines a Basic Service as:

> *'A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. This may include weather information, changes of serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, general airspace activity information, and any other information likely to affect safety. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility.'*

London Information provides Basic and Alerting Services only and is not radar equipped. The pilot of [the SZD-50] was not in contact with London Information, therefore the FISO was unaware of the aircraft.

The Airprox occurred when [the SZD-50] and [the C152] flew into close proximity whilst operating outside controlled airspace. The pilot of [the C152] was in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information, [the SZD-50] was not visible on radar at the reported time of the Airprox. The Closest Point of Approach could not be ascertained from radar data as [the SZD-50] was not displaying on radar; pilot reports estimated the CPA to be approximately 100m and 50-200ft.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the C152 was identified as the only aircraft on radar in the vicinity of the reported area of the Airprox. NATS Safety Investigations further reported that, to ensure that this was the C152, they correlated the radar return with the pilot's position report given to the FISO when they called onto frequency and observed the squawk change to 1177 when issued. They then tracked its flight, correlating it with a position report which was given when the pilot reported at their turning point and a further position report when they left the frequency. As a further check they filtered the radar replay for all 1177 squawks in the UK (total of 8), none showed a Mode S identity of the C152.

The SZD-50 was not visible on radar, however, it appeared on ADS-B tracking software and the pilot provided a navigation file for the flight. Using the combined radar and ADS-B data, CPA was assessed to have been at 1203:00 with approximately 194ft vertical and less than 0.1NM separation.

The SZD-50 and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the SZD-50 pilot had right of way and the C152 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.[3]

Comments

AOPA

When flying close to or overhead a known glider site it is worth giving the site a radio call to improve everyone's situational awareness.

BGA

UK glider launch sites are listed in UK AIP ENR 5.5 and labelled on the CAA 1:500,000 and 1:250,000 charts with a "G" symbol. NOTAMs are not issued for normal operations at gliding sites listed in AIP ENR 5.5, and a greater density of gliders may be expected nearby at any time during daylight hours. The hills around Camphill can generate mountain lee wave, which is used by gliders to fly at all altitudes up to the base of the overlying controlled airspace (FL65 with a minimum altitude 5500 ft near the site, higher elsewhere).

Like many gliding sites, Camphill has a dedicated VHF radio channel, notified on VFR charts and in AIP ENR 5.5. If transiting nearby, a brief broadcast call on this channel using "Unattended Aerodrome" phraseology (CAP 413 Ed 23 §4.162 et seq) could help avoid conflicts and increase everyone's situational awareness.

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[3] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a SZD-50 and a C152 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Camphill gliding site at approximately 1203Z on Wednesday 5th March 2025. The SZD-50 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC not in receipt of a FIS and the C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a GPS track file from the SZD-50 pilot, a report from the FISO involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the C152 pilot and was concerned that the pilot had seemingly believed that the glider site would not have been active without a NOTAM. Members wondered if the pilot may have been confused by previously having seen NOTAMs for paragliding, which had happened to the north of Camphill, and had thought that this had been for the gliding site. The Board agreed that, had this been the case, it was important to clarify that Camphill gliding site is active 7 days a week and gliding sites are not, under normal circumstances, required to NOTAM their activity. The Board further considered the pilot's comment that there had been '*no mention of active gliding sites on the radio'*, and wondered if the pilot had thought that London Information would have been aware of glider activity and wanted to be certain to remind pilots that they would not get information of this nature from London Information. Members discussed whether East Midlands radar may have been a better choice of frequency to have used with a Traffic Service, although they agreed that radar would have been unlikely to have detected a non-transponding glider. The Board felt that the pilot could have called Camphill to inform them of their intended routeing (**CF2**) and to increase the situational awareness of others on frequency. Members further agreed that the pilot had not adapted their plan (**CF3**) so as not to be in such close proximity to the glider site. Members agreed that the pilot had had generic situational awareness of the likelihood of glider activity in the vicinity of a glider site (**CF4**) but had not seen the SZD-50 (**CF6**) until after they had passed it.

Turning their attention to the actions of the SZD-50 pilot, the Board noted that the pilot had been utilising a west facing ridge and had been manoeuvring back and forth along it. A member familiar with the electronic conspicuity equipment used in the glider explained that, although the pilot had reported that their device had indicated *'an aircraft on a bearing 90° to their track'*, they could not have known whether the aircraft detected had been to their left or right, as the alert would have been non-directional, and that the pilot had therefore not sighted the other aircraft on first looking out for the traffic. The Board agreed that the pilot had had situational awareness of an aircraft nearby because their electronic conspicuity equipment had detected the presence of the C152 (**CF5**) within the limits of the device's capabilities, which had excluded exact directional guidance, and also agreed that the pilot had become concerned by the proximity of the C152 as they had seen it pass off to their right and above them (**CF7**).

The Board then explored the actions of the London Information FISO and agreed that they had not been required to monitor the C152 under a Basic Service (**CF1**).

Concluding their discussions, members determined the category of risk by agreeing that safety had been degraded, but that the information from the SZD-50's electronic conspicuity device had alerted the SZD-50 pilot to sufficiently enable them to thoroughly monitor the situation until they had sighted the C152 above and to the right of them, whereupon they had manoeuvred left to prevent their aircraft coming into closer proximity. As such, the Board assigned a Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025024			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
3	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the London FISO was not required to monitor the C152 under the terms of a Basic Service.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the C152 pilot could have called Camphill to inform them of their routeing close to the glider site or planned to route further away from an active gliding area.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the C152 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the potential for glider activity in the vicinity of a glider site.

[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because, although the SZD-50 electronic conspicuity equipment had detected an aircraft in the vicinity, it had taken the pilot some time to visually acquire the C152.