


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025020

Date: 28 Feb 2025 Time: 1022Z Position: 5048N 00249W Location: 15NM Southwest Yeovilton

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Falcon 20	Paramotor
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Para
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	IFR	Untraced
Service	Traffic	
Provider	Yeovilton App	
Altitude/FL	3150ft	
Transponder	A, C, S+	
Reported		
Colours	Blue	
Lighting	Navigation, anti-coll	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	3000ft	
Altimeter	RPS (1026hPa)	
Heading	090°	
Speed	230kt	
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	
Alert	None	
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/0.5NM H	Untraced
Recorded	NK	



THE FA20 PILOT reports that, after departing [...] for ATC training at Yeovilton, they had conducted a brief Navex to the southwest of Yeovilton to allow for engine igniter cooling before commencing vectors for the first approach. Throughout, they had [been in receipt of] a Traffic Service from Yeovilton Approach. After turning onto heading 090°, the first officer spotted a paramotor at co-altitude directly in the twelve o'clock position at an estimated range of 1NM, with an estimated heading of 210°. The autopilot was disengaged and avoiding action was taken to the left, with the paramotor eventually passing at an estimated minimum distance of 0.5NM. The Airprox was reported to Yeovilton Approach who had no knowledge of the traffic.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PARAMOTOR PILOT could not be traced.

THE YEOVILTON APPROACH CONTROLLER reports that the FA20 pilot was operating under a Traffic Service at 3000ft on the Portland RPS 1026hPa, under their own navigation to the southwest of RNAS Yeovilton and tracking easterly. The pilot had called at 1021 to say that a glider [they recall] had been spotted in their vicinity at a similar altitude. The trainee controller in the seat responded that nothing was seen on radar. [...]. After the Airprox call, the sortie continued without incident.

The controller perceived the severity of the incident as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Yeovilton was recorded as follows:

METAR EGDY 281020Z 27003KT 8000 HZ FEW004 05/04 Q1030 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU=

Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

A mandatory local DASOR was raised and investigated by RNAS Yeovilton ATC (in accordance with RA1410), utilising radar replay and tape transcripts, following notification of the events.

The Yeovilton Approach controller correctly discharged their duties in accordance with national and local procedures and regulations. The FA20 pilot had been in receipt of a Traffic Service at the time but the conflicting paramotor was not visible on radar. Therefore, Traffic Information could not have been given.

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At 'CPA' 1021:48 – Paramotor not seen on radar. FA20 initiated a left turn as described at 1021:44.




Figure 2: This extract from the CAAs Airspace Analyser shows the path to and from the point at which the FA20 turned left to avoid the paramotor. The paramotor did not show on this system.

The FA20 and paramotor pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.²

Comments

BHPA

The BHPA canvassed the clubs around southern England to see if any recalled a close encounter (by either a paraglider or paramotor pilot) with an FA20 business jet, but none have been reported to date. The FA20 pilot was probably very accurate in their assessment of the other aircraft having been a paramotor due to it being a cold February morning with a very low cloudbase, therefore negating the possibility of this being a paraglider pilot flying at 3000+ ft AMSL using thermic lift.

Although the incident happened in Class G airspace (albeit inside an AAIA) and the paramotorist had every right to be there, it is not unusual for them to have been flying at the incident altitude. The terrain height was around 900ft and the paramotorist had been flying at 3150ft AMSL or 2250ft AGL. The majority of paramotorists generally tend to fly in the 500ft-2000ft (AGL) bracket. However, that is not to say that some paramotorists like to fly higher than that. For information, a paramotorist with a run-of-the-mill machine of mid-range power would be quite capable of climbing (with permission) to in excess of FL100.

Unfortunately, it doesn't appear that the paramotorist contacted any ATC agency regarding their intentions and position or that they had submitted a CANP. Neither does it appear that they had been carrying any form of EC which may have alerted the FA20 and/or ATC. Therefore, both the FA20's pilot and FO must be congratulated on their good observation at spotting the paramotorist and their prompt actions in disengaging the AP and manoeuvring the aircraft in time to avoid a collision.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an FA20 and a paramotor flew into proximity 15NM southwest of Yeovilton at 1022Z on Friday 28th February 2025. The FA20 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Traffic Service from Yeovilton Approach. The paramotor pilot could not be traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the FA20 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly discussed the actions of the FA20 pilot, noting that they had been in receipt of a Traffic Service from Yeovilton Approach and had been equipped with a TCAS II unit and had displayed navigation and anti-collision lighting. The pilot, on gaining sight of the paramotor towards their 12 o'clock, had assessed the apparent direction of travel – appearing to be flying on a left-to-right course – and, being concerned by its proximity (**CF4**), had judged the best course of action to have been a left turn to remain clear to the north. On passing the paramotor, the FA20 pilot had resumed their initial heading and had continued with their exercise. At no time had the FA20 pilot seen any indication on their TAS unit (**CF3**), or had indication from Yeovilton Approach, of the presence of the paramotor and members agreed that the FA20 pilot had not had any situational awareness of its presence (**CF2**). Members noted that the FA20 pilot had seen a potentially difficult aircraft whilst looking broadly into sun and praised the pilot for having maintained a good lookout in an area popular with both military and general aviation aviators.

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

Unfortunately, the paramotor pilot could not be traced. It had not been seen on radar or any of the other tracking tools available to the UKAB Secretariat. The FA20 pilot made no assessment of avoiding action that the paramotor pilot may have taken.

Members moved on to discuss the role of the Yeovilton Approach controller, noting that they had provided a Traffic Service to the FA20 pilot but had not had any indication of the paramotor and therefore had not had any situational awareness of its presence (**CF1**) and had been unable to offer Traffic Information on this occasion. Members felt that the controller could have done no more in this case.

Concluding their discussion, members noted that the FA20 pilot had visually acquired the paramotor at a range that had enabled them to assess the best course of action and had turned to avoid it. It was unfortunate that it had been impossible to trace the paramotor pilot. Members felt that, although safety had been degraded, there had been no risk of collision. Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025020			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Yeovilton controller was unaware of the presence of the paramotor.

Flight Elements:

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot was aware of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the FA20 had not received any electronic missions from the paramotor.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025020				Outside Controlled Airspace				
		Provision	Application	Effectiveness				
				Barrier Weighting				
Barrier				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	<div></div>				
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓	<div></div>				
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✗	✗	<div></div>				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○	<div></div>				
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	<div></div>				
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✓	<div></div>				
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓	<div></div>				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✗	✓	<div></div>				
	See & Avoid	✓	✓	<div></div>				
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable		Not Used	
Provision		✓	⚠	✗	○			
Application		✓	⚠	✗	○			
Effectiveness		■	■	■	■		□	