


AIRPROX REPORT No 2024270

Date: 03 Nov 2024 Time: 1318Z Position: 5104N 00051E Location: Ham Street, Kent

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	AA5	DR400
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	IFR	IFR
Service	Procedural	None
Provider	Lydd	N/A
Altitude/FL	3300ft	3300ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, Black	White, Blue, Orange
Lighting	Nav, Beacon	Strobe
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	NR	>10km
Altitude/FL	2800ft	3200ft
Altimeter	NK	QNH
Heading	NK	180°
Speed	118kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	TAS
Alert	Alert	Alert
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0.5NM H	0ft V/1.5NM H
Recorded	0ft V/2.4NM H	



THE AA5 PILOT reports that they had just left the holding pattern at ROMTI when they spotted the other aircraft at the same altitude and closing, just as they were attempting to establish on the outbound track towards the 14DME arc. They immediately executed a sharp turn to avoid the other traffic. The aircraft was perhaps 300ft above an overcast layer at about 3100ft, whilst they were at 3200ft. They checked with the Lydd Approach controller who said the other traffic was unknown to them and they weren't talking to the other pilot. However, the traffic remained in the area, but by deviating from the procedure and keeping visual (luckily they were just above a cloud layer at the time) they were able to complete the rest of the flight safely. If they had both been in IMC at the time, or distracted with procedures, this could have ended tragically.

A few ways that this could be improved in the future:

Given the traffic was at exactly the same altitude as the instrument approach procedure, and in Class G airspace, it would have been very useful if the Lydd controller had had access to [surveillance] information to be able to better provide separation and safety for IFR aircraft arriving on an instrument approach procedure. Unfortunately, due to not having [surveillance] access, they were unaware of the potential conflict. It would also be useful to increase awareness among pilots, whether flying in accordance to VFR or IFR, to be aware of the locations of an instrument approach procedure they might fly close to and either choose a different altitude, or speak to the relevant controller when doing so, so that separation can be more easily provided. Finally, establishing controlled airspace around instrument approach procedures could also be helpful.

THE DR400 PILOT reports that they were flying at an altitude of about 3200ft over Ham Street, travelling in a southerly direction. Visibility was excellent above a layer of stratus cloud. They were monitoring other traffic electronically and visually, and they identified two other light aircraft south of them. One was at a higher altitude, the other was at a similar level, travelling from left-to-right. At a distance of

around two miles from this aircraft, they altered course by turning left to avoid any conflict. They did not believe the safety of either aircraft was compromised. Their track was logged by SkyDemon running on their iPhone using the inbuilt GPS receiver.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE LYDD CONTROLLER reports that the AA5 was in the holding pattern at ROMTI (3.2A, right-hand), and cleared for the ILS/DME RW20 approach. At 1116 UTC, the pilot reported over ROMTI starting the procedure. A couple of minutes later, the pilot reported manoeuvring to avoid an aircraft at a similar level nearby. This aircraft was unknown as there is no radar at Lydd and the AA5 pilot was informed of this. The pilot later reported back on heading to intercept the 14DME arc, they also reported the registration of the subject aircraft as [DR400 C/S]. The controller confirmed that this aircraft was unknown to them. At no time did the pilot of the AA5 state that they wished to file an Airprox or an MOR.

Factual Background

The weather at Lydd was recorded as follows:

METAR EGMD 031250Z 09008KT 9999 BKN012 12/10 Q1028=

METAR EGMD 031320Z 12006KT 9999 BKN012 12/09 Q1028=

The UK topographical VFR chart 1:250,000 depicts the Lydd hold as:



Figure 1

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be seen and identified using Mode S data (see Figure 2). The UKAB Secretariat also had access to the Lydd RT recordings.




Figure 2 – 1317:11

As the AA5 continued in the hold, the DR400 headed south, see Figure 3.



Figure 3 – 1318:01

At 1318:20, the AA5 pilot reported on the Lydd frequency that they had turned off the procedure due a 'conflicting aircraft', however, they did not report the incident as an Airprox. At that stage, the two aircraft were 2.4NM apart and the AA5 could be seen to have turned onto a westerly heading. See Figure 4.




Figure 4 -1318:21

Although this was the point at which the AA5 pilot had reported the Airprox, the two aircraft did continue to get closer, albeit the AA5 pilot had turned away and they were no longer on a conflicting course.



Figure 5 – 1319:23

At 1320 the AA5 pilot reported the callsign of the DR400 and told the controller that the other aircraft was at the same level as them and wondered whether it was talking to anyone, to which the controller stated that they had no knowledge about the other aircraft. Although the AA5 pilot did not mention the other aircraft again, at 1323:47 the two aircraft were 0.7NM and 200ft apart, see Figure 6.




Figure 6 – 1323:47

The AA5 and DR400 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an AA5 and a DR400 flew into proximity at Ham Street at 1318Z on Sunday 3rd November 2024. The AA5 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Procedural Service from Lydd, and the DR400 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC not in receipt of an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the air traffic controller involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the actions of the AA5 pilot. They had just left the Lydd Hold at ROMTI and had been receiving a Procedural Service from Lydd ATC. The pilot had not expected to see traffic in the vicinity at a similar level and, although they had not received any Traffic Information from Lydd, they had received some information from their CWS and had become visual with the DR400 at range. Once visual, the pilot had elected to diverge from the procedure in order to remain clear, thus ensuring that there had been adequate separation between the two aircraft at all times.

The Board then discussed the actions of the DR400 pilot. Whilst noting that there was not controlled airspace around Lydd, nevertheless members highlighted that the Hold and the feathers for Lydd were published on VFR charts and they thought that the DR400 pilot could have called Lydd to advise of their presence in the vicinity. Alternatively, they could have chosen a different height to transit at, one which would not have conflicted with traffic in the Lydd Hold. The DR400 pilot had been visual with the AA5 and had not been concerned by their proximity.

Turning to the Lydd controller, members noted that Lydd operates without any form of surveillance equipment, therefore the controller could only ever have information on aircraft whose pilots had called for a service. The first time that the Lydd controller had known about the DR400 had been when the AA5 pilot had reported it to them. They therefore could not have provided any earlier information to the AA5 pilot.

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

Concluding their discussion, members agreed that, whilst the position of the DR400 had caused the AA5 pilot concern, the separation between the aircraft had been sufficient that normal safety margins had pertained. Members were in full agreement that, with a separation of 2.4NM, there had not been a risk of collision and agreed on the following contributory factors and outcomes:

CF1: The Lydd controller had received no information that the DR400 had been in the vicinity.

CF2: The DR400 pilot could have requested a Basic Service from Lydd.

CF3: Both pilots received information from their CWS.

CF4: The AA5 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the DR400.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2024270			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Lydd controller had no knowledge about the DR400.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the DR400 pilot could have informed Lydd about their intention to transit through the Hold.

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2024270		Outside Controlled Airspace				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness		
				Barrier Weighting		
				0%	5%	10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	<div><div></div></div>		
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓	<div><div></div></div>		
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicition & Action	✗	✗	<div><div></div></div>		
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●	<div><div></div></div>		
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	<div><div></div></div>		
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	!	<div><div></div></div>		
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✓	✓	<div><div></div></div>		
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✓	✓	<div><div></div></div>		
	See & Avoid	✓	✓	<div><div></div></div>		
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used
Provision		✓	!	✗	●	
Application		✓	!	✗	●	○
Effectiveness		■	■	■	■	■