AIRPROX REPORT No 2022003

Date: 12 Jan 2022 Time: 1446Z Position: 5434N 00304W Location: 3NM SE of Keswick

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2	Dutwith	A X			RUTS		SC 1	Grey
Aircraft	Hawk T1	BASE ¹ Canopy		155	Diagi	ram based and pilot		Second Construction 22 March	ngrisdale	BERRI 1020
Operator	HQ Air (Ops)	Civ Para	*1225					2241	Children and and and and and and and and and an	T
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR	1225	Sale E			284	8 scales	And Sol	ROUTB
Class	G	G	2 A	•1811	twiaite	Applethwaite	Threlkeld	Sol-		831
Rules	VFR	N/A	-1 Whinle	696	250 170	00 1203 01 1203	2 AP	CPA 1445:	36	60
Service	None	None		Brathwate	Portins / KE	SMICKA	N	NK V/NK	H	
Altitude/FL	NR	NR	26 •	*2595		E Canopy	1163		524	1578
Transponder	A, C	Not fitted	2792		altu	Inknown		2808	Aira Edice	
Reported			dists /		SLITTE TOWN	10		edurthwalte	SI C	Sandwick
Colours	Black	Green, black		Derwent	Fells			2890.	DIB R	2156
Lighting	NR	Nil	Buttermer	• 2417	Raven	1/2	STEL.	2050	rydding 1	Be
Conditions	VMC	VMC	9	241 Inormere For	Crag	Twatendiath	-	1445:20	10	
Visibility	>10km	NR	644			L Sol		Gree	• 2759	1
Altitude/FL	300ft	NR		State P		2370	Wythby	Criscor P		Brotpe
Altimeter	agl	N/A	27 x s		18/2	Ç (_{Da}	Fells nmail Rise	1445:04 28	64	
Heading	350°	NK	Pas pas	2950 •	2560	Hawl				ss
Speed	420kt	NK	-Wa		A.	alt unkno	own		2547	·)
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted	R	3210 -	N	a Constant	HE S	Grasmere		A
Separation at CPA			3	162.0	H 2960	4	6	1108	1959	
Reported	200ft V/100m H	500ft V/600ft H	Tam	ti	2815*		1529	AUBLESIDI	D.H 159	281.
Recorded	NK V	/NK H	000	2D	Antenott	WPass NM	M	Skelatory Bridge	Waterriea	Ditro
			CAR NO	A ma1904	Hardknott		AN.	TAN	mult	

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE HAWK PILOT reports that, while conducting a low-level navigation sortie in LFA² 17 in the vicinity of the north-west corner of Thirlmere, the rear cockpit (RCP) pilot-not-flying momentarily spotted a parachute pass under their aircraft about 100ft low and 150ft offset to the left. As the pilot flying, they did not see the parachute. The RCP pilot saw this because the pilot had begun a left roll and pull for terrain clearance. As they rolled, the RCP pilot naturally looked down and left, saw the flash of an object and said "I think that was a parachute". No evasive manoeuvres were made by the pilot flying. They climbed up and discussed what the RCP pilot saw, which they described as a green parachute passing beneath the aircraft. After further discussion, they terminated their sortie early and returned to base.

The sortie was properly planned, briefed, entered into CADS and reviewed. There were no NOTAMs in the vicinity of the Airprox. Multiple Hawks had flown the same route throughout the day, themselves included, as well as a pair of Hawks 5min earlier, and no other sightings were made by other pilots.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE BASE JUMPER reports that they and two other base jumpers hiked Raven Crag near Thirlmere. When they reached the exit point at the summit they kitted-up and, at that point, 3-4 jet aircraft passed through the valley south-to-north, so they decided to wait and make sure it remained clear. After a 10min wait all seemed clear, so the first two BASE jumpers exited the crag and landed in clear airspace. They were the last jumper to go; it was still clear at this point so they exited the crag and began their canopy descent. As they approached the road below Raven Crag they heard the roar of a jet and then saw the aircraft coming south-to-north through the valley. The aircraft was over Thirlmere about 600ft horizontally and 500ft vertically away from them. At no point did they feel any effect from the aircraft on their canopy nor did they feel any need to make any evasive manoeuvres. They have a method for submitting NOTAMs regarding their activity, but no NOTAM was submitted on this occasion.

¹ Buildings, Antennae, Spans, Earth.

² Low Flying Area.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

Factual Background

The weather at Warton and Newcastle was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNO 121450Z 27009KT 9999 FEW040 08/07 Q1040= METAR EGNT 121450Z 27011KT 9999 FEW015 09/06 Q1035=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken – the BASE Canopy was not detected by the NATS radars and the first detection of the Hawk was as it approached the southern end of Thirlmere. Mode C data from the Hawk had previously been available but had faded at the time of the Airprox. The Hawk could be seen progressing north through the Thirlmere valley and passed the reported location of the BASE Canopy at 1445:36 (CPA – see Figure 1).




Figure 1 – CPA – 1445:36

Article 23 of The Air Navigation Order (ANO) 2016 states that 'any parachute including a parascending parachute' is exempt from the provisions of the ANO 2016, apart from the following articles:

PART 1 Interpretation and categorisation

CHAPTER 1 Interpretative matter

2 (Interpretation)

PART 5 Operations

CHAPTER 3 Specialised activities

91 (Dropping articles for purposes of agriculture etc. and grant of aerial application certificates)

CHAPTER 4 Other aerial activities

- 92 (Mooring, tethering, towing, use of cables, etc.)
- 94 (Small unmanned aircraft)

95 (Small unmanned surveillance aircraft)

PART 10 Prohibited behaviour, directives, rules, powers and penalties

- CHAPTER 1 Prohibited behaviour
 - 239 (Power to prohibit or restrict flying)
 - 241 (Endangering safety of any person or property)
- CHAPTER 4 Powers and penalties
 - 257 (CAA's power to prevent aircraft flying) (apart from 257(2)(a))

The requirements to comply with The Rules of the Air 2015 are stated at Article 249 of the ANO 2016 and, as such, a person under a parachute, including a parascending parachute, is not required to comply with The Rules of the Air 2015. However, Article 241 of the ANO 2016 specifies that 'A person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.' (UK) SERA defines an aircraft as 'any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth's surface'. The ANO 2016 Schedule 1 defines a parascending parachute as:

"Parascending parachute" means a parachute which is towed by cable in such a manner as to cause it to ascend."

The Hawk pilot shared a responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.³ The BASE jumper was not required to operate in accordance with The Rules of the Air 2015, as provided for under Article 23 of The Air Navigation Order 2016.

Occurrence Investigation

As evidenced during conversations with local, civilian airspace users including paragliding clubs in the area where this incident occurred, there is a perceived opinion that the amount of RAF low-level operations within LFA 17 (and the wider Low Flying System in general) has reduced dramatically over the previous 10 years. Contact has been made with local paragliding clubs to again highlight the importance of using the NOTAM system to alert military crews of paragliding activity. Good working relationships have been fostered with these civilian clubs through the Regional Airspace User Working Groups (RAUWG) held bi-annually at RAF Leeming. The BASE jumping community has been contacted and encouraged to submit NOTAM or CANP.⁴

Comments

HQ Air Command

This Airprox has highlighted the previously unidentified hazard of BASE jumping to the military aviation community, as this is possibly the first Airprox of this kind. It is unfortunate that the BASE jumpers did not NOTAM their activity; had the crew had awareness of this, mitigations could have been employed to avoid this Airprox. Whilst the bi-annual RAUWGs are the prime means for engagement with local airspace users, the BASE jumping community has not been involved. Good relationships have been established between military flying units and the paragliding clubs in the area, encouraging notification of activity, and this model will now be applied to the local BASE jumping community. It is interesting to note that the local perception is of significantly reduced low flying in the area; RAUWGs held at RAF Leeming will continue to spread the word that RAF, USAF and visiting foreign air forces continue to operate in the low-level environment. Users are reminded that they still need to be vigilant to low-flying, fast-moving military aircraft.

³ MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.

⁴ Civil Aircraft Notification Procedure.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Hawk and a BASE Canopy flew into proximity 3NM SE of Keswick at approximately 1446Z on Wednesday 12th January 2022. The Hawk pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and not in receipt of an ATS; the BASE jumper was not required to operate in accordance with The Rules of the Air 2015.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DELIBERATIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the Hawk operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board discussed this event and concluded that normal safety standards and parameters had pertained and that that had been no risk of collision. Accordingly, the Board assigned a Risk Category E to this Airprox. However, members agreed that the following factors (detailed in Part C) had contributed to this Airprox:

- **CF1.** The Hawk pilot had not had any situational awareness of the presence of the BASE Canopy, and the BASE jumper had not had any situational awareness of the presence of the Hawk.
- **CF2.** The BASE jumper saw the Hawk after they had launched and so there was little that they could have done to increase separation, should it have been necessary.
- **CF3.** By the time the Hawk crew sighted the BASE Canopy, there was no opportunity for them to manoeuvre to increase separation.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2022003							
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification				
	Flight Elements							
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action							
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness				
	See and Avoid							
2	Human Factors • Identification/Recognition		Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots				
3	Human Factors • Monitoring of Other Aircraft		Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non- sighting by one or both pilots				

Degree of Risk:

Е

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as ineffective because neither pilot had any situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft/parachute.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the BASE jumper sighted the Hawk late, and the Hawk crew did not sight the BASE Canopy in time to increase separation.

	Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2022003	Outside	Conti	rolled Airs	pace			
	Barrier	Provision	Application	%	5%	Effectiveness Barrier Weightin 10%	g 15%	20%
hent	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance						, ,	
Element	Manning & Equipment							
Ground	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action							
Gro	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance							
	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	Ø						
Element	Tactical Planning and Execution	\bigcirc						
Flight Eler	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	8	\bigcirc					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	0						
	See & Avoid	8	8					
	Key: Full Partial None Not Preser Provision Image: Constraint of the second secon	nt/Not Ass	essab		<u>sed</u>			

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the <u>UKAB Website</u>.