AIRPROX REPORT No 2020080

Date: 29 Jul 2020 Time: 1804Z Position: 5110N 00101W Location: 1NM S Lasham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	ASK 21	Yak
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Basic
Provider		Farnborough
Altitude/FL	1800ft	2200ft
Transponder	Not Fitted	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, Red	Red
Lighting	Nil	NR
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	40km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1500ft	2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1019hPa)	QNH (1018hPa)
Heading	090°	'north'
Speed	50kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	PowerFLARM	Unknown
Alert	None	N/A
Separation		
Reported	200ft V/400m H	NR
Recorded	400ft V/>0.1NM[1] H	



THE ASK 21 PILOT reports that after taking a winch launch to 1600ft above Lasham, they headed towards the south of Lasham to try and find any evening thermals but with only limited success. Approaching 1000ft QFE circuit options were considered and at the same time they saw an aircraft coming on a converging track from the south at what appeared to be a similar altitude. Unsure of the aircraft's intentions and without a radio call from the other aircraft, they decided to take avoiding action to mitigate the risk of a mid-air collision. The nose was lowered to increase the rate of decent and in doing so, speed was increased from 50 to 65kts and a descent of 50-100ft achieved to ensure clearance from the other aircraft's immediate path. From there they continued the circuit and landed. At no point did they see the aircraft take any avoiding action and given that Lasham is marked on the charts, they noted surprise to see an aircraft routing through the direct overhead of Lasham, and very close to the circuit. After landing they reported the Airprox and were made aware that the aircraft had been identified. The duty instructor had stopped any further launches as soon as the aircraft was sighted as there was a serious possibility of a winch cable hitting the aircraft had any further launches progressed.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE YAK PILOT reports that they contacted Farnborough as they coasted in at Spinnaker Tower. Shortly after, they notified Farnborough of their routing and were given a Basic Service. The visibility was greater than 10km with no cloud cover. The sun was low, they were heading north and had a clear view without any glare from the sun. They requested a clearance through the Odiham MATZ, this was agreed at 2000ft on the London QNH. Shortly after Farnborough advised that if they were routing over the top of Lasham they may see some glider activity. This was acknowledged and as usual, a good look out was maintained. Lasham do not have an ATZ and they were well above at 2000ft. As they approached Lasham they spotted some low level activity and at the same time received a call from the 'radar operator' to confirm this. They maintained a good lookout. They did see a glider pass below from

[1] Separation derived from comparing the glider's GPS file with radar

left to right. This coincided with the call from LARS. It was not a near miss but clearly visible. Had it been a near miss they would have reported this as an incident.

The pilot opined that they were not at fault and did not believe that poor airmanship was displayed. Clearly the glider pilot saw them above. It had a large glass canopy and the Yak has a low wing. They believed the glider continued under the Yak without any change in attitude. It appeared that Lasham did not want any GA flying anywhere near their overhead, and Lasham should reinstate an ATZ if they wish to control the airspace around them. If they do not wish to do this then they must accept the fact that aircraft will fly through the overhead in order to avoid gliders climbing out on cables or with tugs. Since Farnborough have recently secured a large Class D control zone around them and now appear to be less than enthusiastic at managing VFR transits, more and more GA powered flights will push up and over Lasham. This is likely to be an ongoing issue unless the airspace above Lasham is restricted. They felt that they were well within their rights to fly over Lasham at 2000ft whilst VFR. They were displaying a squawk in Mode S and the controller was aware of every stage of their route.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE FARNBOROUGH CONTROLLER reports that they were working west, zone and approach bandboxed in low traffic levels. The Yak was validated and verified and on a Basic Service. They gave the Yak pilot a Odiham MATZ transit and told them that Lasham appeared to be active and operated winch launching and glider towing. This was acknowledged. About 1NM before the Lasham overhead the controller told the pilot about a primary contact close ahead, this was not acknowledged. The controller saw the Yak go through the Lasham overhead at 2000ft. Later, a colleague took a call from Lasham about the Yak pilot. Lasham initially said they were going to file a safety report. The colleague then called the Yak pilot to pass on Lasham's concerns. Later on Lasham called again, they said that the pilot of one of the gliders, an ASK21, was filing an Airprox report. The Yak pilot did not mention at any point that he had had an Airprox.

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGLF 291750Z AUTO 25007KT 9999 NCD 21/10 Q1019=
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The ASK21 and Yak pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Yak pilot was required to give way to the ASK21.[3] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[4]

Comments

BGA

Lasham is clearly marked as having winching operations up to 3700ft, and has a dedicated radio frequency. It is highly concerning that the Yak pilot does not appear to comprehend the risk associated with their actions, both to their own aircraft and others. In this particular case, winching was stopped as the aircraft was seen by the Duty Instructor before it overflew the winch run but this obviously cannot be relied on.

[2] SERA.3205 Proximity.
[3] SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.
[4] SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

There are plenty of questionable places in the sky where you have a 'right' to be. One would hope that airmanship, or failing that, self-preservation would keep pilots away from them, especially when there are easy alternative routes and/or safety calls on the radio that can be made.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an ASK21 and a Yak flew into proximity in the Lasham overhead at 1804Z on Wednesday 29th July 2020. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the ASK21 pilot was listening out on the Lasham gliding frequency and the Yak pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, and a report from the air traffic controller involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Due to the exceptional circumstances presented by the coronavirus pandemic, this incident was assessed as part of a 'virtual' UK Airprox Board meeting where members provided a combination of written contributions and dial-in/VTC comments.

The Board first considered the actions of the Yak pilot. Even though Lasham does not have an ATZ, members thought that the pilot's actions displayed a lack of airmanship in flying directly over the gliding site below winch launch height (**CF5**). They noted that the height of the winch launch was clearly marked on the charts and highlighted that the area of greatest danger was overhead the launch run, which is contained within the boundaries of the airfield (**CF2**, **CF4**). Furthermore, the pilot was warned by ATC that Lasham was active, but did not adapt his plan accordingly (**CF3**). In this particular case, winching was stopped as the aircraft was seen by the Duty Instructor before it overflew the winch run, but this obviously cannot be relied upon. Members noted that the CAA Skyway Code contains guidance regarding gliding sites and they urged pilots to familiarize themselves with it[5]. The Lasham glider frequency is published on the charts and members thought at the very least the Yak pilot should have called on the frequency to advise of his intentions (**CF6**). Despite only receiving a Basic Service from Farnborough, generic Traffic Information on the glider was given, but the Yak pilot considered the separation to be such that action was not necessary (**CF8**, **CF10**).

Turning to the actions of the glider pilot, the glider was equipped with PowerFLARM, but despite the Yak displaying a serviceable transponder, the PowerFLARM did not alert. Members were unsure why this would be the case, other than simple aerial blanking (**CF9**), but whatever the reason it meant that the glider pilot had no prior notification that the Yak was approaching (**CF7**) until they saw it. Fortunately, having seen the Yak, the pilot was able to take avoiding action to ensure that there was adequate separation.

Farnborough ATC were providing a Basic Service to the Yak pilot and so were not required to pass Traffic Information unless they knew a definite risk of collision existed, nor were they required to monitor the flight and advise on routing. Nonetheless, despite only having generic information in the form of a primary radar only track (**CF1**), the controller did pass Traffic Information to the Yak pilot and also advised the pilot that Lasham was active, the Board commended them for this. The NATS advisor told the Board that they disputed the assertation made by the Yak pilot that Farnborough was discouraging pilots to cross through their airspace, and noted that, on the contrary, they were doing their best to accommodate VFR transits and urged pilots to make the request rather than assume it would be refused.

[5] CAA Skyway Code can be found at https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP1535_Skyway_Code_V2_INTER.pdf . Guidance regarding gliding sites is on page 69.

When assessing the risk, the Board quickly agreed that although safety had been degraded, the actions of the glider pilot ensured that had been no risk of collision. Accordingly the Airprox was assessed at Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2020080		
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**Amplification**
	Ground Elements		
	• Situational Awareness and Action		
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	The controller had only generic, late or no Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements		
	• Tactical Planning and Execution		
2	Human Factors	• Flight Planning and Preparation	
3	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Inadequate plan adaption
4	Human Factors	• Aircraft Navigation	Flew through promulgated and active airspace
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
6	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Ineffective communication of intentions
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action		
7	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Pilot had no, late or only generic, Situational Awareness
8	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern despite Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance		
9	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	CWS did not alert as expected
	• See and Avoid		
10	Human Factors	• Lack of Individual Risk Perception	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[6]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the Yak pilot did not plan to avoid the Lasham overhead.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the glider pilot had no situational awareness of the Yak, and the Yak pilot was given only generic Traffic Information from ATC.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the PowerFLARM in the ASK21 did not alert.

[6] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2020080
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness