## AIRPROX REPORT No 2019169

Date: 02 Jul 2019 Time: 1820Z Position: 5114N 00126W Location: 2NM E Andover

## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

| Recorded | Aircraft 1 | Aircraft 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Aircraft | Paramotors | CH47 Chinook |
| Operator | Civ Gld | HQ JHC |
| Airspace | London FIR | London FIR |
| Class | G | G |
| Rules | VFR | VFR |
| Service | Listening Out | Basic |
| Provider | On site | Salisbury Ops |
| Altitude/FL | NK | NK |
| Transponder | Not fitted | A, C, S |
| **Reported** | | |
| Colours | Various | Green |
| Lighting | Not fitted | HISL, nav, landing |
| Conditions | VMC | VMC |
| Visibility | >10km | 25km |
| Altitude/FL | 0ft | 500ft |
| Altimeter | agl | NK |
| Heading | N/A | 100° |
| Speed | N/A | 120kt |
| ACAS/TAS | Not fitted | TAS |
| Alert | N/A | None |
| **Separation** | | |
| Reported | 500ft V/315m H | Not seen |
| Recorded | NK | |




**THE PARAMOTOR INSTRUCTOR** reports that the flying school CFI issued a CANP at 10:29Z resulting in NOTAM H3835/19. The NOTAM was published and promulgated at or before 12:24Z. Training commenced at 17:30Z at the published location with student pilots flying within a 1500m radius of that location to altitude 1000ft agl. The training consisted of paramotor circuits and landings. At 18:20Z, a Chinook was heard then sighted 4 miles to the west, directly approaching the NOTAM location at an estimated 500ft agl. The instructor immediately called all students to land, who all did so just prior to the Chinook flying directly through the NOTAM location at estimated 500ft agl and estimated 1000ft to the north of the published lat/long. It was appreciated that the NOTAM did not create an exclusion and served only to alert pilots to the navigational hazard. However, it was expected that crews would elect to route well to the side or well above the published activity given that paraglider wings present very limited visual or electronic conspicuity.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE CHINOOK PILOT** reports that he was exiting the Salisbury Plain Training Area, transiting from Ludgershall to Odiham. He was informed that an Airprox had been reported in the vicinity of Andover between the Chinook and paramotors. Neither he nor the 5 crew saw any paramotors.

**SALISBURY OPS** did not file a report.

### Factual Background

The weather at Middle Wallop was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGVP 021820Z 35009KT CAVOK 20/08 Q1024 RMK BLU=
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NOTAM H3835/19:

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Q) EGTT/QWELW/IV/BO/W/000/025/5114N00126W001
B) FROM: 19/07/02 15:00
C) TO: 19/07/05 20:30
E) MICROLIGHTS OPERATING IN LOW FLYING AREA 1A WI 1NM RADIUS
OF PSN 511331N 0012548W (ANDOVER, HAMPSHIRE). 2000FT AGL. CIC
07511 957129. 19/07/013/LFBC
LOWER: SFC
UPPER: 2416FT AMSL
SCHEDULE: 1500-2030
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## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The Paramotor and CH47 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard[1].

## Comments

### JHC

The Chinook was exiting Salisbury Plain Danger Area at 500' agl in good weather conditions with all crew members looking out. Due to the planning cycle / sortie time, the planning for this sortie had taken place prior to the NOTAM being issued and loaded onto the planning software. As such, during the planning phase the aircrew were not aware of the paramotor activity. The Station Mission Support Centre operate a system to promulgate and brief late warnings to ensure that aircrew receive any further NOTAMs published in the interim between planning and departure, but in this instance the aircrew did not receive / assimilate the information. The investigation was not able to determine what element of the late warning system failed on this occasion.

The specific location of the NOTAM was not a typical area to encounter civilian traffic; however, the wider area is known for its potential for high levels of aerial activity and aircrew are trained and competent at keeping a good look out and were doing so, despite not being aware of the warning. The pilot and 5 crewmembers did not report seeing any paramotors. This is likely due to the good look out of the paramotor instructor who, having sighted the Chinook early, instructed his students to land, which in a descending profile would likely have made them more difficult to spot.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Chinook flew into proximity to some paramotors 2nm to the east of Andover at about 1820Z on Tuesday 2nd July 2019. The Chinook pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Salisbury Ops.

## PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the paramotor NOTAM and its dissemination to the Chinook crew. Members agreed that it had been filed in good time but were disappointed that the Odiham investigation was unable to determine why it did not reach the Chinook crew. Members agreed that it should have been promulgated and the fact that it hadn't, indicated a deficiency in ground and flight procedures (**CF1**, **CF3**). It was pointed out that, although not pertinent to this incident, the Chinook crew could have lifted

[1] SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.

from their main base many hours before NOTAMs might be promulgated and some members wondered whether the Chinook crew had adequate planning facilities 'in the field' to cater for such eventualities (**CF4**). In that regard, the BHPA member informed the Board that BHPA advice was to file NOTAMs the day before the planned activity so that they would be present on the systems prior to daily operations commencing. The JHC Flight Safety member confirmed that such filing would ensure that the NOTAM appeared in the Chinook pre-flight planning phase and, in this case, would not have been missed.

Members acknowledged that the NOTAM was not an avoid, and that the Chinook crew were maintaining a good lookout. Nonetheless, they had reportedly flown through the NOTAM's lateral and vertical limits (**CF5**) with no SA as to the paramotor activity (**CF6**). That they did not see any paramotors was probably due to the fact that they were already on the ground. With regard to other safety barriers, the Chinook crew were not under a FIS that required the controller to monitor their position (**CF2**); had they been so then there was a possibility that the controller might have issued a warning about the NOTAM. Also, the Chinook TAS could not detect the paramotors (**CF7**) because the paramotor pilots were unlikely to be carrying compatible conspicuity systems. The Board noted that the paramotor instructor had heard the approaching Chinook and had gained sufficient SA to instruct the paramotor pilots to land before the approaching Chinook passed the site. As a result, members discussed whether the Chinook had flown close enough to cause concern to the paramotors or whether this incident was more about the paramotor instructor being concerned by the Chinook flying through the NOTAM. As such, the Board felt that this incident was probably best described as a sighting report (**CF8**). Having said that, members also felt that normal procedures, safety standards and parameters had not pertained because the Chinook crew had flown through a NOTAM without being aware of its existence. Consequently, the Board agreed that safety had been reduced and they accordingly assessed the risk as Category C.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

| | **2019169** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CF | **Factor** | **Description** | **Amplification** |
| | **Ground Elements** | | |
| | **• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** | | |
| 1 | Organisational | • Organisational Documentation and Publications | Inadequate regulations or procedures |
| | **• Situational Awareness and Action** | | |
| 2 | Contextual | • Situational Awareness and Sensory Events | Not required to monitor the aircraft under the agreed service |
| | **Flight Elements** | | |
| | **• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** | | |
| 3 | Organisational | • Flight Operations Documentation and Publications | Inadequate regulations or procedures |
| | **• Tactical Planning and Execution** | | |
| 4 | Organisational | • Flight Planning Information Sources | Inadequate planning material |
| 5 | Human Factors | • Aircraft Navigation | Flew through promulgated and active airspace or sporting site |
| | **• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** | | |
| 6 | Contextual | • Situational Awareness and Sensory Events | Generic, late, no or incorrect Situational Awareness |
| | **• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** | | |
| 7 | Technical | • ACAS/TCAS System Failure | Incompatible CWS equipment |
| | **• See and Avoid** | | |
| 8 | Human Factors | • Monitoring of Other Aircraft | Sighting report |

Degree of Risk: C.

Recommendation: Nil.

Safety Barrier Assessment[2]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Ground Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **partially effective** because the Chinook crew were not aware of the paramotor NOTAM.

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **not used** because the paramotor pilots were not in receipt of a FIS and the Chinook pilot was not in receipt of a FIS that required the controller to monitor his position.

**Flight Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **partially effective** because the Chinook crew were not aware of the paramotor NOTAM.

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **partially effective** because the Chinook pilot flew through a promulgated and active paramotor NOTAM without establishing whether paramotors were airborne within it.

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **partially effective** because only generic SA was available to the Chinook pilot but the paramotor CFI had heard the approaching Chinook.

**Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because the paramotor pilots were not equipped with TAS and were not compatible with the Chinook TAS.




[2] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.