


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018287

Date: 23 Oct 2018 Time: 1033Z Position: 5052N 00047W Location: Chichester/Goodwood ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	DR400	PA28
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Goodwood ATZ	Goodwood ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AFIS	AFIS
Provider	Goodwood	Goodwood
Altitude/FL	1400ft	1400ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C
Reported		
Colours	Red, White	Blue, White
Lighting	Beacon	Not reported
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1200ft	1200ft
Altimeter	QNH (1031hPa)	QFE (1027hPa)
Heading	330°	NK
Speed	80kt	95kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/150m H	0ft V/400m H
Recorded	0ft V/0.1nm H	



THE DR400 PILOT reports that he took off from RW24, turned to avoid overflying the built-up area and continued a climbing turn towards the downwind leg of the circuit for a departure to the east. The PA28 pilot was joining from the west on the downwind leg. Near the end of the climbing turn, he heard the other pilot call 'joining downwind' but did not know where the aircraft was. While he was asking his colleague if he knew exactly where the other aircraft was, he saw the PA28 in his 10 o'clock and slightly above. Both aircraft turned right to increase separation. The PA28 pilot continued his circuit and landed. The DR400 pilot continued the turn onto downwind and departed east. The incident was immediately reported to Goodwood Information.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that he was inbound to Goodwood and had just called downwind at 1200ft (the circuit height for the airfield) when an aircraft appeared in front of him, climbing and turning to its right, he immediately turned right as well, the other aircraft passing down his port side about 400m away he estimated. The other aircraft transmitted stating it would submit an Airprox report. He landed as normal on RW24R, after leaving the aircraft at maintenance he was asked to check in at the control tower where the other aircraft registration was given to him.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE GOODWOOD FISO reports that the PA28 reported downwind to land on RW24. The pilot of the DR400 was departing RW24 and reported the other aircraft in sight. From the tower, it appeared that the DR400 made the after take-off noise abatement turn to the NW early and the climb-out, therefore, conflicted with the aircraft established in the circuit. The pilot of the DR400 stated that the PA28 was at 1200ft, which is the correct circuit height. The pilot of the DR400 appeared to continue the climb-out and passed ahead of the PA28, turning left [UKAB note: in fact, the DR400 turned right]. The pilot of the PA28 stated that he turned to the right to avoid the DR400. The pilot of the DR400 reported that he

estimated the other aircraft to be at a distance of approximately 100 yards, and the pilot of the PA28 stated that he estimated the distance to be approximately 300 yards. After a brief interval, the pilot of the DR400 stated that he wished to file an Airprox.

Factual Background

The weather at Goodwood was estimated by the AFISO as follows:

The wind was approximately 280/08kts and CAVOK.

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The DR400 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

UKAIP Entry for Goodwood:

EGHR AD 2.21 Noise Abatement Procedures for RW24

Take off: Turn right as soon as practicable to do so and establish a Westerly track. Maintain track until West of built up areas. If remaining in the circuit, ensure that crosswind and downwind track is West/North West of Lavant village. No practice engine failures or low level circuits are permitted on runway 24. Avoid overflight of Lavant village.




Figure 1: Chichester/Goodwood Noise Abatement Procedure

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DR400 and a PA28 flew into proximity at 1033hrs on Tuesday 23rd October 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an AFIS from Goodwood.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the AFISO involved.

The Board began by looking at the actions of the DR400 pilot. He was aware of the PA28 joining the circuit and had been flying the noise abatement profile when he saw the PA28 in his 10 o'clock and turned right to avoid it. Members noted that the DR400 pilot was in a climbing turn when he had heard the PA28 joining downwind, and that this turn would have likely restricted the DR400 pilot's view of the joining PA28 to some extent. Although noting the requirements of the noise abatement procedure, some members thought that it would have been prudent for the DR400 pilot to have either rolled out of his turn or remained below 1200ft until he was visual with the PA28; some wondered if the DR400 pilot may have been prioritising the noise abatement requirement above his deconfliction priorities.

The Board then turned to the actions of the PA28 pilot. The radar replay showed that the PA28 pilot had not joined the circuit in accordance with the noise abatement procedures, with his position being much closer to the runway than that published in the UKAIP (see front page diagram). This was considered to have been contributory to the Airprox because the DR400 pilot could reasonably have expected the PA28 to have been much wider than it was. Although there were no R/T recordings available in this case, members agreed that pilots transmitting "joining downwind" should ideally accompany such a call with further information such as range or a geographical feature to enable other pilots to gain SA and thereby ensure deconfliction. Furthermore, in comparing the Airprox location with the pilots' respective comments, it appears that the PA28 pilot reported downwind early; although this did not have any bearing on the Airprox, it served as a reminder that pilots must make their calls at the specified points if they are to ensure that others are properly aware of their location and intentions.

The Board then looked at the actions of the AFISO. Although the DR400 had some SA on the PA28 from the PA28 pilot's 'joining downwind' call, the PA28 pilot's surprise at encountering the DR400 made it apparent that the PA28 pilot had no SA on the departing DR400. When the PA28 pilot called that he was joining downwind, the AFISO should have passed Traffic Information to both pilots on the other aircraft. The pilots' reports indicated that this had not happened, and this was considered to be a contributory factor in the Airprox.

The Board then looked at the cause of the Airprox. They agreed that neither pilot had been fully aware of the other aircraft's position until the last moment, and that this had been aggravated by the contributory factors of the FISO not passing Traffic Information on the DR400 to the PA28 pilot and the PA28 pilot not flying the promulgated downwind track. Notwithstanding, the Board agreed that it was ultimately for the pilots to avoid each other. Some members thought that the PA28 pilot should have integrated better with the DR400 already in the visual circuit, but they acknowledged that he could not integrate with an aircraft that he did not know about. Others thought that the DR400 pilot should have done more to take the PA28 into account when he became aware that it was joining downwind as he himself was also approaching the downwind leg. Given the lack of R/T transcript and timing information, the Board could come to no conclusion as to which perspective to take given the somewhat uncertain circumstances and so, in the end, they decided that the incident was probably best described as a conflict in the visual circuit resolved by both pilots. The Board then looked at the risk and agreed that both pilots had taken action to avoid the other at the last minute, and that, with ~0.1nm separation at CPA, safety had been much reduced below the norm. Accordingly, they assessed the risk as Category B.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A conflict in the visual circuit resolved by both pilots.

Contributory Factor(s): 1. The FISO did not pass Traffic Information on the DR400 to the PA28 pilot.
2. The PA28 pilot did not fly the downwind track.

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:


ANSP:

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Goodwood AFISO did not pass Traffic Information to both aircraft on the other aircraft's reported position.

Flight Crew:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures, Instructions and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot did not appear to have provided sufficient information as to his location when he called 'joining downwind, and also appeared to have called downwind early.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because both pilots saw the other aircraft late and had to turn to avoid at a late stage.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).