


AIRPROX REPORT No 2016076

Date: 15 May 2016 Time: 1300Z Position: 5159N 00210W Location: 1nm W Tewkesbury

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	LS8	Biplane
Operator	Civ Trg	Unknown
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	NK
Service	None	
Provider	N/A	
Altitude/FL	NK	
Transponder	Not Fitted	
Reported		
Colours	White	Silver
Lighting	Nil	NK
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	40km	
Altitude/FL	2500ft	
Altimeter	NK	
Heading	120°	
Speed	54kt	
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	
Alert	None	
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/50m H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE LS8 PILOT reports that he was about 1km west of Tewkesbury. He had been circling right hand in a thermal and straightened up to continue en-route. About 15 seconds later, while looking down and to his right, he saw another aircraft heading straight for him and assessed that it would hit him if they both continued on their current trajectories. He wasn't sure whether the other aircraft was in the first part of a loop manoeuvre or in a straight climb. He hoped that by turning to his left and climbing it would pass behind him provided that it did not then turn to its right. Whilst turning, he lost sight of the other aircraft but heard it pass behind him. Then he turned back on track and caught a glimpse of the other aircraft behind and on his right. Thinking that the pilot may still have been unaware of his presence whilst performing aerobatics he thought it best to continue on track to increase the separation.

THE BIPLANE PILOT could not be traced.

Factual Background

The weather at Gloucester was recorded as follows:

METAR EGBJ 151250Z 33006KT 280V350 9999 FEW040 17/06 Q1022

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The LS8 and Biplane pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a LS8 and a Biplane flew into proximity at 1300 on Sunday 15th May 2016. The LS8 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, the LS8 pilot was not in receipt of a Service.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the LS8 pilot and the LS8's IGC recording.

Unfortunately neither aircraft were seen on any radar recordings which resulted in the Biplane pilot not being able to be traced, and precluded any form of radar analysis. Notwithstanding, the Board quickly determined that although the LS8 pilot had seen the Biplane late, he had probably successfully carried out a turn to increase their separation. For his part, given the apparent lack of reaction by the biplane pilot, the Board thought that he probably did not see the LS8. However, both of these assessments were based solely on the report from the LS8 pilot and a copy of his IGC recording; the Board agreed that they could not conclusively determine what happened.

With the evidence available, the Board cited the probable cause of the incident as being a late sighting by the LS8 pilot and a probable non-sighting by the Biplane pilot. However, there was insufficient evidence to positively assess the risk, although it seemed that this had been a close encounter indeed given the LS8 pilot's assessment that the two aircraft would have collided had he not manoeuvred. Notwithstanding, the degree of risk was reluctantly classified as Category D due to insufficient information.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A late sighting by the LS8 pilot and a probable non-sighting by the Biplane pilot.

Degree of Risk: D

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.