


AIRPROX REPORT No 2016048

Date: 10 Apr 2016 Time: 1323Z Position: 5236N 00102W Location: Leicester Airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Cabri G2	CJ-6
Operator	Civ Trg	Civ Pte
Airspace	Leicester ATZ	Leicester ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Leicester Radio	Leicester Radio
Altitude/FL	NK	NK
Transponder	On/C, S	On/S
Reported		
Colours	Grey, yellow, white	Green
Lighting	Strobe, landing	Navigation
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NK
Altitude/FL	50ft	500ft
Altimeter	QFE	QNH
Heading	150°	010°
Speed	30kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Alert	N/A	N/A
Separation		
Reported	<40ft V/<100m H	700ft V/1nm H
Recorded	NK	



THE CABRI G2 PILOT reports that he and his student had joined the circuit downwind after a training sortie in the local area; he was using the duty runway RWY15L for rotary traffic (RWY15R for fixed wing). His student made all the radio calls as required and they turned onto the final leg. One helicopter had just landed and one fixed-wing aircraft was ahead of them and had called final for RWY15. His student called final for the H (in the centre of the airfield between the runways). A CJ-6 was lined up at the threshold of RWY10 and called ready for departure. The CJ-6 held his position until the fixed-wing aircraft on final had crossed RWY10 to land on RWY15. The CJ-6 then called for takeoff. The Cabri G2 pilot immediately called that he was on a short final for the H on circuit 15L. The CJ-6 pilot 'ignored' his radio call and started the take-off run. The Cabri G2 pilot slowed to a high hover as the CJ-6 passed less than 100m in front of him and approximately 40-50ft below.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE CJ-6 PILOT reports that RWY15 was in use but, with respect to the aircraft performance and recent maintenance, he requested to use RWY10 'which was granted'. He requested line up on RWY10 and advised contact with 1 fixed-wing on final to RWY15, 1 helicopter on final to the grass in a 15 direction, and one further helicopter far out to his left. After the landing fixed-wing and helicopter, he called rolling with contact with the helicopter to the left, which was still in a similar position to when he had first called Leicester Radio; Leicester Radio acknowledged his call with wind information. He commenced his takeoff roll but had no response from the helicopter. He carried out a normal takeoff and, when he had departed the ATZ, called changing frequency.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

Factual Background

The weather at Wittering was recorded as follows:

METAR EGXT 101150Z AUTO 11011KT 9999 BKN190/// 11/01 Q1008

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The Cabri G2 and CJ-6 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Cabri G2 and a CJ-6 flew into proximity at Leicester Airfield at 1323 on Sunday 10th April 2016. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an Air/Ground Service from Leicester Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft and a video of the CJ-6 as it rolled for departure.

The Board firstly considered the operation at Leicester aerodrome and asked why a report had not been received by the Air/Ground operator. A member who was familiar with their operation highlighted that, often, the Leicester Air/Ground operator couldn't actually see the aircraft due to their location and therefore would probably not have been able to contribute any further information; this was not unusual for airfields operating under an AGCS, which solely provides information to aircraft about the aerodrome status and does not provide any control functions.

The Board then viewed the video of the CJ-6's departure. The Cabri G2 was not visible in the video, although members were mindful that the video gave a limited view of the approach to the helicopter landing area. However, the video field of view was wide enough to show that, in its absence, the Cabri G2 must have been much further away from the CJ-6 at CPA than it's pilot's estimate. GA members acknowledged that the CJ-6 was required to give way to the Cabri G2 but, given that it was not present on the video, there were some grounds for the CJ-6 pilot's decision that it was sufficiently far away and slow enough that he could depart safely ahead. Notwithstanding, the Board agreed that getting airborne in front of another aircraft already on an approach to land was not a wise move.

The Board then moved to the cause and risk of the Airprox. Taking into account both pilots' reports and the video, they determined that, although the Cabri G2 technically had right of way over the CJ-6, the CJ-6 pilot had departed on the assumption, apparently backed up by the video, that he would be safely airborne well ahead of the Cabri G2. The Board therefore concluded that although the Cabri G2 pilot had rightly been concerned by the proximity of the CJ-6, effective and timely actions had been taken to prevent a collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The Cabri G2 pilot was concerned by the proximity of the CJ6.

Degree of Risk: C.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.