


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015179

Date: 3 Oct 2015 Time: 1505Z Position: 5231N 00215W Location: Halfpenny Green

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Ikarus C42	C182
Operator	Civ Trg	Civ Pte
Airspace	Halfpenny Green ATZ	Halfpenny Green ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AFIS	AFIS
Provider	Halfpenny Green	Halfpenny Green
Altitude/FL	NK	NK
Transponder	Off	A,C
Reported		
Colours	White, black, grey	White
Lighting	Strobes	Strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	500ft	200ft
Altimeter	QFE (1004hPa)	NK
Heading	340°	340°
Speed	70kt	70kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	TCAS I
Alert	N/A	Unknown
Separation		
Reported	400ft V/120m H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE IKARUS PILOT reports that he was instructing a student in the visual circuit. On two occasions the C182 performed a go-around behind him, overtaking on the starboard side each time. On the second occasion, after the go-around the C182 overtook on the starboard side, approximately 400ft away and then turned left on a crosswind leg immediately in front of the Ikarus. This unnerved the student, who then reduced the power and lowered the nose to avoid getting closer to the C182; because the C182 was faster, separation was soon achieved. Had the student been less experienced, or on a first solo, this could have been much more serious; nevertheless, it concerned the student enough to make him consider learning to fly somewhere else because he perceived Halfpenny Green to be too dangerous.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C182 PILOT reports that he did not consider the incident to be an Airprox. The Ikarus was in front on late-finals for a touch-and-go, so he went around. He kept the other aircraft in sight and at a safe distance at all times. He kept his aircraft above the Ikarus, turned to the right as he overtook to keep clear, and kept full power on. He described the event as 'no risk and very relaxed'.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE HALFPENNY GREEN FISO reports that it was a reasonably busy day at Halfpenny Green and, at the time of the Airprox, there were two helicopters operating short-duration flights and four in the fixed-wing circuit. The ATC log showed that the Ikarus took-off for a circuit detail and did 14 movements (7 landings and 7 take-offs); the C182 also took off for a circuit detail and did 14 movements (take-offs, landings and go-arounds). The Ikarus microlight was flying more slowly than

the other circuit traffic and, at various times, traffic went around from final approach because it was ahead on final or occupying the runway. The C182 went around on two occasions, and a PA28 (not involved in the Airprox) also went around. On each occasion the pilot reported final visual with the one ahead, the FISO asked the pilots to confirm visual and visual sighting was confirmed in every case. He believed there was no failure by any aircraft to see the aircraft ahead. No comment or Airprox was mentioned on the RT but, sometime after landing, the pilot of the Ikarus came to the tower to ask how to make a complaint and was told about the Airprox procedure, but it was suggested that he speak to the other pilot in person first. He declined to do either at the time, but some days later came back to ask for an Airprox form.

Factual Background

The weather at Birmingham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGBB 031450Z VRB02KT 9999 OVC026 12/07 Q1014=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The Ikarus and C182 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an Ikarus and a C182 flew into proximity at 1505 on Saturday 3rd October 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, were in the visual circuit at Halfpenny Green and receiving an Airfield Flight Information Service from Halfpenny Green.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft and a report from the FISO involved.

The Board first looked at the actions of the C182 pilot. Both the Ikarus and the C182 were flying a circuit detail, and it was evident that the Ikarus was slower than the other aircraft in the circuit, resulting in their need to go around from the final position on a number of occasions. Despite their speed differential, the Board noted that the aircraft were flying in the same circuit and that there was a fundamental requirement for all the pilots to think ahead and integrate with each other in a considerate manner and with due concern. Some members wondered whether the C182 pilot had become frustrated by having to give way to the Ikarus and that perhaps this had resulted in him turning tightly in front of the Ikarus in order to get well ahead on the next circuit. Other members thought it likely that the C182 pilot had simply underestimated the distance between himself and the Ikarus, turning at what he thought was adequate separation when the Ikarus pilot clearly thought otherwise. The Board noted that they frequently see Airprox reported when pilots fly too close to another aircraft whilst believing they had left adequate separation, and the Board cautioned pilots against assuming that the pilot in the other cockpit had the same risk appetite as themselves.

Turning to the Ikarus pilot, the Board noted that he was instructing a student in the visual circuit. They wondered whether this might have meant that he was focused inside the cockpit on his student and was taken by surprise by the aircraft turning ahead of him. This 'startle-factor' is a well-known phenomenon which may have caused the pilot to perceive the situation as more dangerous than it

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

actually was. The incident did not show on the NATS radars and so the Board were not able to determine the exact separation. What they did note was that there was a significant discrepancy in the two pilots' assessment of the risk, with one judging the risk of collision as 'high' and the other as 'none'. They also noted that the AFISO, who had witnessed the event, had not perceived a problem with the separation and had reported that each time an aircraft reported final with the Ikarus ahead, the pilot reported visual with it; he was content that the pilots were able to sequence themselves effectively.

In determining the cause, it was quickly agreed that the C182 pilot had simply flown close enough to cause the Ikarus pilot concern. Turning to the risk, the Board reasoned that because the C182 pilot was visual with the Ikarus as he turned ahead of it, there was no actual risk of collision; therefore, they assessed the risk as Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The C182 pilot flew close enough to cause the Ikarus pilot concern.

Degree of Risk: C.