


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015061

Date: 4 May 2015 Time: 1450Z Position: 5102N 000147W

Location: Salisbury

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	PA28
Operator	Civ Club	Civ Club
Airspace	FIR	FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	NK
Provider	Solent	NK
Altitude/FL	2200ft	NK
Transponder	A	NK
Reported		
Colours	Blue/white	NK
Lighting	Anti collision	HISL Anti - collision
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	20KM	NK
Altitude/FL	2200ft	NK
Altimeter	QNH (1005hPa)	NK
Heading	080°	NK
Speed	105kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	NK
Alert	N/A	NK
Separation		
Reported	200ft V/0.5NM H	NK
Recorded	NK V/NK H	



THE PA28 PILOT (AC1) reports flying straight-and-level on a VFR flight. Whilst heading 080° and at 2200ft he noticed another 'low-wing' aircraft about 5-6 miles ahead. At that point he judged the aircraft would pass down his left side so took no action. He continued to monitor the other aircraft and, at approximately 1nm from his aircraft, the other aircraft turned sharply left in a descending turn, which put the aircraft on a course to pass across the front of his aircraft. He turned his aircraft left approximately 40°, and the other aircraft passed down his right side. After passing his aircraft the other aircraft made another sharp turn to the right and resumed its original course.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28 PILOT (AC2) reports being in the area at the time of the Airprox and on a training flight, teaching stalling. He thinks the other aircrafts' description fitted his lookout turns of 90° prior to a stall but he saw no other aircraft.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

Factual Background

The Southampton weather was recorded at the time as:

METAR EGGH 051350Z 24028G40KT 210V270 9999 FEW027 BKN031 13/06 Q1000

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The PA28 was in receipt of a Basic Service from Solent Radar at Southampton, and was squawking the assigned code of 3661. The pilot reported seeing the conflicting aircraft at a range of approximately 5-6 miles, and judged that it would pass down his left side. However, the other aircraft then made a sharp left turn which took it across the flight path of the P28 before it then turned back onto its initial course and passed down the right side of the P28. There was no mention of the Airprox at the time to Solent Radar. Radar recordings showed the P28 just prior to the occurrence at 1449:45 (Figure 1). This Figure 1 also showed another unidentified aircraft approximately 7 miles to the east which is potentially the other aircraft. Radar coverage at this height was poor in this area, and both these contacts disappeared from radar after this screen shot only to reappear at approximately 1453:00 (after CPA). It was therefore not possible to measure the minimum distance between the aircraft as neither aircraft were displayed at the time of passing. Figure 2 showed the position a 1453:36 after both aircraft had created a number of radar returns. It was not possible to identify the other aircraft. [UKAB Note: fortunately RAC were able to trace the aircraft subsequent to this report being compiled, although its pilot's report did not materially alter the ATSI analysis]. A controller providing a Basic Service is not required to monitor a flight. Under a Basic Service pilots are ultimately responsible for their own collision avoidance.

Both the Radar screenshots depicted below show Old Sarum Airfield ('LS') which is approximately 2 miles north of Salisbury.




Figure 1 (Swanwick MRT at 1449:45)

Figure 2 (Swanwick MRT at 1453:36)

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the geometry of the incident was such that the aircraft were considered to be converging then both should alter course to the right.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when two PA28 aircraft flew into proximity at 14:50 on 4th May 2015. PA28 (1) pilot was flying VFR under a Basic Service from Solent radar and saw PA28 (2) ahead, which he turned to avoid. PA28(2) pilot was also flying VFR and conducting lookout turns prior to a stalling exercise but did not see PA28(1). The incident was not shown on NATS radars and so exact separation is not known.

¹ SERA 3502 Proximity

² SERA 3510 Right of Way

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first discussed the barriers that were available to prevent this incident and some members wondered whether the pilots could have made better use of ATC to provide a greater level of service given that they were both operating near to Boscombe Down. However, it was pointed out that this incident had occurred on a Bank Holiday when Boscombe Down LARS would not have been available. Because of this, the first aircraft was in receipt of only a Basic Service from Solent Radar, and was unlikely to have gained anything else at that altitude due to the degradation of Solent Radar's coverage due to the distance from the radar head; a controller member confirmed that radar coverage from Southampton is particularly poor in that area.

Turning to lookout, the Board commended the PA28 (1) pilot for his lookout, and for maintaining good situational awareness on the other aircraft as they approached. Members thought it was simply unfortunate that PA28 (2)'s pilot had decided to turn just as they approached each other, but noted that the pilot of PA28 (1) was ready to react, and did so, in a timely and effective manner. The fact that he had had to turn left rather than right was a matter of circumstance at the time resulting from their propinquity at the point the PA28(2) turned. The Board did not have access to the PA28(2) pilot's report at the time of assessment, but it was ironic that he reported that he was likely conducting lookout turns, and had not seen PA28(1) approaching from ahead.

The fact that the report from the second aircraft involved was not received until just after the Board had sat was deemed by Director UKAB not to have affected their assessment of cause and degree of risk. The Board determined that the cause had been a simple conflict in Class G airspace that had been resolved by the PA28 (1) pilot. This was not a situation of a late sighting by PA28 (1) pilot (albeit it was subsequently discovered to be a non-sighting by the PA28 (2) pilot) but was simply a matter of him reacting to a conflict that did not arise until a late stage. Board members again commended the pilot of PA28 (1) for his alertness, situational awareness, and timely and effective avoiding action; they assessed the risk as Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A conflict in Class G airspace resolved by the PA28 (1) pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.