


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015039

Date: 9 Apr 2015 Time: 1319Z Position: 5121N 00035W Location: Fairoaks

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	SR20
Operator	Civ Trg	Civ Pte
Airspace	Fairoaks ATZ/ London CTR	Fairoaks ATZ/ London CTR
Class	D	D
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Aerodrome FIS	Aerodrome FIS
Provider	Fairoaks	Fairoaks
Altitude/FL	1100ft	800ft
Transponder	A, C	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, black	White
Lighting	Landing, strobe	NK
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	7km	CAVOK, hazy
Altitude/FL	1100ft	800ft
Altimeter	QNH (1026hPa)	QNH (NK hPa)
Heading	240°	120°
Speed	90kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation		
Reported	200ft V/0.1nm H	300ft V/300m H
Recorded	300ft V/0.1nm H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports flying ‘touch-and-goes’ in the Fairoaks ATZ, using RW06LH. When mid-point downwind an aircraft came on frequency with 3 miles to run (1 mile from the ATZ boundary). The other pilot requested to join base leg and was clearly informed by ATC to join 06 left hand circuit, informing him also of the PA28’s position. The other pilot continued, and was prompted by the controller and asked if he was visual. Following what seemed like a long pause, he called visual, but at this point was passing beneath the PA28. The PA28 pilot stated that had the other aircraft been at the correct altitude for the circuit, a collision would have been very likely and he noted that an overhead join is available to pilots at Fairoaks... The PA28 pilot commented that he had contacted the Heathrow controller after landing and was informed that the other pilot had been released at 1500ft with five miles to run to the [Fairoaks ATZ] boundary.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE SR20 PILOT reports working Heathrow SVFR on his transit to Fairoaks. He was advised by Fairoaks ATC on first contact to give way to aircraft in the circuit. He saw the other aircraft above him and turned away to sequence behind it downwind. He advised ATC he would give way. The pilot noted that he had also been warned of circuit traffic by Heathrow and so was vigilant.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’.

THE FAIROAKS FISO reports that the PA28 was operating in the Fairoaks circuit. Runway 06 L/H was in use. The SR20 pilot made a late call to Fairoaks to state he was joining from the North and wished to join left base. The FISO believed that Heathrow had passed Traffic Information to the SR20 pilot. Airfield details were passed on the SR20 pilot’s initial contact, along with Traffic information on the PA28. Having acknowledged this, the SR20 pilot stated he would be joining left base. The FISO suggested that he give way to circuit traffic. The SR20 pilot was asked whether he had visual contact

with the PA28. After a pause, he replied that he was visual. The FISO understood from the PA28 pilot that this call was not made until the SR20 was passing underneath the PA28. The PA28 pilot passed his concerns both by RT and on the telephone after landing. The SR20 pilot visited the Tower before departure to apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough and Heathrow was recorded as follows:

```
METAR EGLF 091320Z VRB04KT 9000 FEW040 16/05 Q1026
METAR EGLL 091320Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW043 17/07 Q1026 NOSIG
```

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The Fairoaks RW06 left hand circuit was active. Fairoaks ATZ lies partly within the London CTR Class D controlled airspace. Aircraft operating VFR within the London CTR inbound to Fairoaks must not assume permission has been issued to penetrate the Fairoaks Local Flying Area¹ (LFA). Heathrow Radar will, whenever possible, permit an aircraft to leave the frequency temporarily to obtain such permission. If this is not possible, aircraft must leave the CTR clear of the Fairoaks LFA and route to Fairoaks from a southerly direction².

The SR20 pilot was inbound to Fairoaks from the north and was routeing through the London CTR in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Heathrow SVFR. At 1317:00, the SR20 was 6nm northwest of Fairoaks and the SVFR controller advised “[SR20 C/S] *the circuit at Fairoaks is active I can see one in the circuit I believe left hand for zero six if that’s their runway*”. The SR20 acknowledged “*Thanks for that*” and the SVFR controller added “*Just let me know when you’ve got the field in sight*”.

At 1317:38, the SR20 pilot reported “[SR20 C/S] *is now visual with Fairoaks through the murk*” and the SVFR controller replied “[SR20 C/S] *roger thank you retain this squawk until established in the circuit, you can free-call Fairoaks on one two three decimal four two five*”. The SR20 pilot responded “*one two three four two five keeping the squawk on thanks very much for the service*”. At this point the SR20 was 4nm northwest of Fairoaks.

At 1318:42, area radar showed the SR20 2nm from Fairoaks and entering the Fairoaks ATZ, tracking towards the overhead. The SR20 was indicating a groundspeed of 142kts at an altitude of 900ft with the PA28 in the SR20’s 11 o’clock at a range of 0.9nm, crossing from left to right and 200ft above (see Figure 1).

¹ Up to 1500ft and consisting in plan view of the Fairoaks ATZ and fillets to the east and west, as defined in UK AIP AD 2.EGTF-7, Flight Procedures, Local Flying Area.

² UK AIP AD 2.EGTF-7, dated 14 Nov 2014.




Figure 1 - Swanwick Radar at 1318:38

At 1318:58 (CPA), the SR20 was shown 0.1nm north-northeast of the PA28 and 300ft below, at 146kts groundspeed (see Figure 2).




Figure 2 - Swanwick Radar at 1318:58

The SR20 pilot had been passed Traffic Information on the PA28 which was downwind, and the SR20 pilot had indicated an intention to position on left base. Radar showed that the SR20 appeared to be tracking towards the overhead, which brought it into proximity with the PA28.

UKAB Secretariat

The PA28 and SR20 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard³. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall: (a) observe other aerodrome traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision and (b) conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation⁴.

³ SERA.3205 Proximity.

⁴ SERA.3225 Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a SR20 flew into proximity at 1319 on Thursday 9th April 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of an Aerodrome Flight Information Service within the Class D airspace of the Fairoaks ATZ.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the FISO involved and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

The Board first considered the pilots' actions. The PA28 pilot was established downwind in the RW06LH circuit pattern and was aware of the approaching SR20, whose pilot had made contact on the Fairoaks RT frequency. He saw the SR20 pass below him in close proximity, as he was approaching the end of the downwind leg. For his part, the SR20 pilot had been approaching Fairoaks through the London CTR, in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Heathrow SVFR, who had passed Traffic Information on the PA28. The SR20 pilot contacted Fairoaks and passed his intention of making a left-base join. He was advised of the PA28 in the visual circuit, and reminded to 'give way' to circuit traffic. The Fairoaks FISO also advised the SR20 pilot of the PA28, and asked whether he was visual with it. It appeared that the SR20 pilot advised he was visual as he was about to pass the PA28.

Members noted that the SR20 pilot had approached the Fairoaks ATZ at a groundspeed of about 140kt, in less than ideal visibility, and with the intention of joining left-base; the SR20 pilot had earlier advised he was visual with Fairoaks "through the murk". After some discussion, members agreed that the SR20 pilot had flown into the Fairoaks visual circuit at an inappropriately high speed, in reduced visibility, and seemingly without an apparent plan as to how he would conform to the visual circuit pattern formed by the PA28 without flying into conflict with it. Members also noted that, subsequently, the SR20 pilot had made a left-hand 270° turn after CPA, caught up with the PA28, and then flown a number of 'S-turns' on final to increase separation, all of which seemed to indicate a lack of awareness or consideration for other circuit traffic. Although the separation at CPA was recorded as 300ft vertically and 0.1nm horizontally, members were of the opinion that the high closure speed, reduced visibility and workload in the PA28 all contributed to a situation in which safety margins had been much reduced below normal.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The SR20 pilot did not integrate into the visual circuit and flew into conflict with the PA28

Degree of Risk: B.