


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015032

Date: 20 Mar 2015 Time: 1530Z Position: 5140N 00203W Location: Kemble

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Thruster T600N Sprint	PA28
Operator	Civ Pte	Civ Pte
Airspace	Kemble ATZ	Kemble ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	FIS	None
Provider	Kemble	Kemble
Altitude/FL	800ft	NK
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	NK
Alert	N/A	Unknown
Transponder	Not fitted	A, Mode C off.
Reported		
Colours	Red and blue	Blue and White
Lighting	Strobes	Strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5km	8km
Altitude/FL	800ft	2200ft
Altimeter	QNH	NK
Heading	260°	200°
Speed	65kt	130kt
Separation		
Reported	0ftV/100m H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE THRUSTER T600N PILOT reports that he was on a flight to Kemble in good flying conditions. At 1530 he reported in the Kemble overhead for RW08RH and descended on the deadside; he was told to report crosswind, which he did halfway along the crosswind leg. He called downwind abeam the 26 numbers and did his downwind checks. He saw two aircraft ahead already established downwind; a PA28 immediately ahead of him and, in front of that, a helicopter. He then saw another low-wing aircraft fly between him and the PA28 ahead, at circuit height. It passed from left to right, behind him, and continued towards the airfield, at its closest point it was 100m away. He informed Kemble Information about the other aircraft, and they then called the aircraft, asking him where he believed his position to be; he stated that he was overhead Lyneham. Kemble corrected him and the pilot apologised.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that he was overflying Kemble and talking to them at all times. He didn't see any other aircraft and didn't perceive an Airprox.

THE KEMBLE FISO reports that a visiting microlight in the circuit reported an aircraft flying against the downwind traffic, the aircraft then flew between a PA28 and the Microlight in the circuit before turning overhead the tower. The Tower Assistant was able to read the registration and the FISO realised that the aircraft had called him earlier advising that he would be flying in the local area up to 1500ft. When he then called the aircraft the pilot stated that he was not over Kemble, but was in fact over Lyneham. The FISO advised that the pilot was indeed over Kemble and the pilot apologised, turned south over the 08 numbers and departed the ATZ.

Factual Background

The weather at Brize Norton was recorded as :

EGVN 141550Z 36005KT CAVOK 13/04 Q1024=

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The T600N had got airborne at 1340 for a flight to Kemble. The pilot reported overhead Kemble at 1530 and entered the circuit – right-hand pattern for RW08. The pilot was following two other aircraft in the circuit and was downwind for RW08 when another fixed wing aircraft flew between the aircraft he was following and him – opposite direction to the circuit. The pilot of the T600 reported this to Kemble Tower who observed a P28B flying towards the overhead. Kemble tower were able to identify the aircraft visually and confirm they were working the traffic. When the pilot of the P28B was challenged he apologised for his mistake as he thought he had routed over Lyneham (10miles South of Kemble). In his report the pilot of the P28B did not see any other traffic. It was not possible to identify the T600 on the Radar replay as it was not transponder equipped. As for the other aircraft, although not positively identified, there was a contact observed that left the area of a private site about 10 minutes prior to the occurrence. It then tracked northbound, turned overhead Kemble then returned southbound and continued to the Lyneham overhead. The contact then returned northbound and faded from radar just south of the private site. This corresponds to the time the pilot of the P28B called Kemble to report shutting down on the ground at his landing site. After landing, the P28B pilot apologised again and cited problems with his compass. The unit spoke to the pilot of the P28B later by phone and the pilot commented on being disorientated leading to the misidentification of the aerodrome.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall: (a) observe other aerodrome traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision; (b) conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 20th March at 1530 between a T600N Microlight and a PA28. The Microlight pilot was in the Kemble visual circuit at 800ft when he saw the PA28 fly through the circuit. The PA28 pilot was on a local flight and believed he was overhead Lyneham. The incident does not show on the NATS radars so the exact separation is not known.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board were somewhat perplexed by the actions of the PA28 pilot in this Airprox. A local pilot operating from a private strip just south of Kemble, they found it surprising that he had become so lost that he was confused as to which airfield he was over, whether his compass was working or not. Furthermore, with at least three other aircraft in the visual circuit, it was disappointing that he didn't see any other traffic. The Board could only surmise that he was concentrating on trying to determine

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

his position or compensate for his malfunctioning compass at the expense of a robust lookout. For his part, the Board commended the T600N pilot for maintaining his awareness and look out beyond the visual circuit when the temptation is often to concentrate on looking towards the airfield rather than away from it. It had been his sharp lookout that had enabled him to warn others and bring it to the attention of the FISO in order that they could identify the aircraft in question. The Board commented in general terms about the frequency of Airprox in the visual circuit, and that this instance highlighted the need to maintain constant vigilance and look-out when operating in that environment. This whole incident was a salutary reminder that, although the ATZ should provide a degree of protection to aircraft operating in the visual circuit, prudent pilots should always factor in those who are lost or otherwise unaware of the ATZ's existence and/or procedures.

The Board quickly determined that the cause of the Airprox was that the PA28 pilot entered the Kemble ATZ and flew into conflict with the T600N. They agreed that the fact that the PA28 pilot was clearly lost (and thought he was over Lyneham) was a contributory factor. Given that the PA28 pilot didn't see the microlight, and the T600N pilot had very little opportunity to take avoiding action had it been required, the risk was assessed as Category B; normal safety margins had been much reduced.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The PA28 pilot entered the Kemble ATZ and flew into conflict with the Thruster.

Contributory Factor: The PA28 pilot was lost.

Degree of Risk: B.