

**AIRPROX REPORT No 2015025**

Date: 21 Mar 2015 Time: 1342Z Position: 5218N 00110W Location: 12.5nm SE Coventry Airport. (Saturday)

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C404	R2160
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Trg
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Traffic	Basic
Provider	Coventry	Coventry
Altitude/FL	3000ft	3100ft
Transponder	A/C/S	A/C/S
Reported		
Colour	White/purple	Black/gold
Lighting	Nav, wing-tip strobes	Nav, strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	8km Haze	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	3300ft
Altimeter	QNH (1027hPa)	NK
Heading	170°	090°
Speed	130kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/300m H	100ft V/2nm H
Recorded	100ft V/0.3nm H	



**THE CESSNA 404 PILOT** reports that his task was a survey calibration flight requiring the flying of a precise track and altitude. Visibility was reduced by haze and, being a weekend afternoon, the airspace around the area was very busy with GA traffic. Coventry ATC could only provide a reduced Traffic Service because of traffic density. The controller notified him of traffic in his 1 o'clock position at 5nm at a similar altitude crossing right to left. Despite both crew members looking out for this traffic it was not spotted until the Systems Operator saw it in their 3 o'clock position about 0.5nm away. He called this out and the pilot turned to see the other aircraft initially heading straight toward them at the same altitude before its pilot made a sharp avoiding turn to the left and disappeared from view. The pilot stated that risk would be reduced by not conducting survey flights at the weekend or in poor visibility.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE ROBIN R2160 PILOT** recalls that he was heading toward Daventry Town explaining an upcoming manoeuvre to his trial lesson student. When over Daventry he saw the C404, whom he heard was on the frequency in the area, heading south. Once he saw the aircraft, he turned to ensure that he would not disrupt either the other pilot's flight or his own. He appeared to be 2nm away and he judged that no risk of a collision existed. He saw the C404, and turned away as he had always done, and would expect to do in the training area of a number of busy aerodromes in Class G airspace.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

## Factual Background

The Coventry weather was:

METAR EGBE 211320Z 03013KT 360V060 9999 FEW032 SCT039 09/01 Q1027=

## Analysis and Investigation

### CAA ATSI

CAA ATSI had access to Coventry RTF and area radar recordings together with reports from both pilots. Coventry were not aware of the Airprox and therefore no reporting action was taken by them and no controller report was available. The C404 pilot was operating under VFR on a calibration flight in the vicinity of Daventry and was in receipt of a Traffic Service, with reduced Traffic Information due to the traffic density, from Coventry Radar. The R2160 pilot was operating on a local VFR flight from Coventry and was in receipt of a Basic Service from Coventry Radar.

At 1334:00, the R2160 pilot departed from Coventry to the south-east displaying the Coventry conspicuity code 4360. At 1335:42, the R2160 pilot contacted Coventry Radar and reported passing 1400ft. A Basic Service was agreed and the R2160 pilot continued to the south-east.

At 1336:02, the C404 pilot contacted Coventry Radar requesting a Traffic Service, reporting 3nm north of Bitteswell on a survey flight at 3000ft. The C404 pilot was instructed to squawk 4362 with Coventry QNH 1027hPa. At 1337:00, the controller advised "(C404 C/S) *identified be reduced Traffic Service in the vicinity of Gaydon and er Daventry due to the er number of er unknown contacts*", which was acknowledged.

At 1339:10, radar showed the C404 tracking south at 3000ft with two aircraft shown in the C404's half past one position at a range of 7.2nm. Both aircraft were displaying the Coventry conspicuity squawk 4360 (see Figure 1).




Figure 1 – Swanwick MRT at 1339:10

At 1340:10, the C404 was 10.7nm east of Coventry Airport. The controller passed Traffic Information "(C404 C/S) *there's traffic right one o'clock five miles crossing right to left indicating three thousand seven hundred feet*" which was acknowledged "(C404 C/S) *roger*". This traffic was the R2160. (Figure 2.)




Figure 2 – Swanwick MRT at 1340:10 (R200=R2160)

The two aircraft continued to converge and, at 1342:20, the controller advised “(C404 C/S) *the previously reported traffic’s just to the west of you about quarter of a mile indicating three thousand feet eastbound*” and the C404 pilot acknowledged “(C404 C/S) *roger*”. The distance between the two aircraft was 0.6nm horizontally and 100ft vertically. (Figure 3.)




Figure 3 – Swanwick MRT at 1342:20

At 1342:26 the R2160 pilot made a left turn to route behind the C404 and at 1342:30 (CPA) the distance between the two aircraft was 0.3nm horizontally and 100ft vertically. (Figure 4.)




Figure 4 – Swanwick MRT at 1342:30

The C404 pilot continued south and the R2160 pilot turned onto a north-westerly track. Neither pilot reported an occurrence to Coventry Radar.

The ATSU indicated that the controller had little recollection of the event which had occurred two weeks earlier and which was not reported at the time. The controller remembered passing Traffic Information to the C404 pilot on an aircraft which could have been one of a number of aircraft on frequency at the time. The controller passed Traffic Information to the C404 pilot regarding the R2160 at a range of 5nm. This was updated when the two aircraft came into proximity. CAP774, Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.5 state:

'A Traffic Service is a surveillance based ATS, where in addition to the provisions of a Basic Service, the controller provides specific surveillance-derived traffic information to assist the pilot in avoiding other traffic...however, the controller is not required to achieve deconfliction minima, and the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance.

Under a Traffic Service the controller shall pass traffic information on relevant traffic, and shall update the traffic information if it continues to constitute a definite hazard, or if requested by the pilot. However, high controller workload and RTF loading may reduce the ability of the controller to pass traffic information, and the timeliness of such information.'

The R2160 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service where the avoidance of other traffic is ultimately the pilot's responsibility and where a controller is not required to monitor the flight. The R2160 pilot sighted the C404 and turned to pass behind. CAP774, Paragraph 2.1 states:

'A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conducts of flights. This may include weather information, changes of serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, general airspace activity information, and any other information likely to affect safety. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility.

*Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight.'*

## UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. Because the geometry of the flights was converging, the C404 pilot was required to give way<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3210 Right of Way.

## Summary

An Airprox occurred in Class G airspace between a C404, whose pilot was in receipt of a reduced Traffic Service, and an R2160, whose pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service. Both services were being provided by Coventry Radar on the same frequency. The Coventry Radar controller passed Traffic Information to the C404 pilot regarding the R2160, and this was updated as the two aircraft converged and came into proximity. The C404 pilot saw the R2160 when it was in his 3 o'clock position about 0.5nm away, by which time its pilot was taking avoiding action. The R2160 pilot reported that he saw the C404 at a range of 2nm and turned to avoid it. The minimum separation was recorded as 100ft vertically and 0.3nm horizontally.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available included reports from both pilots, area radar and RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first looked at the actions of the Coventry controller and noted that both aircraft were on the same Coventry frequency, Members wondered if the controller could also have issued Traffic Information to the R2160 pilot as a reciprocal to that which he had given to the C404 pilot. However, they recognised that the R2160 pilot was only in receipt of a Basic Service and, although he had been issued with a conspicuity SSR code (as had several others), he had not been required to be identified and so the controller would not necessarily have been aware that the R2160 was the specific conflicting traffic.

Turning to the actions of the pilots, the Board noted that the R2160 pilot had reported that he had not been concerned about the presence of the C404, which he had seen at 2nm and from which he had turned away. For his part, the Board noted that the C404 pilot was carrying out a survey calibration flight, and reasoned that he would therefore have been somewhat reluctant to deviate from his planned route. One Board member wondered whether it was appropriate to carry out such an operation in likely busy airspace on a Saturday, but commended him for at least requesting a Traffic Service and ensuring that other crew members participated in the lookout. The Board noted that the C404 pilot had been given Traffic Information about the R2160 when it was at a range of 5nm, and that this had been updated with further Traffic Information when the two aircraft were on conflicting tracks, 0.6nm apart, now at similar levels. Given his responsibility to give way to the R2160, the Board commented on the fact that the C404 pilot had not acted on the Traffic Information provided by the Coventry controller. Notwithstanding any imperative to maintain his track and altitude for his survey, the Board therefore considered that the cause of the Airprox was that the C404 pilot had flown into conflict with the R2160, which he knew was tracking towards him. The fact that he had not acted on the Traffic Information was considered to be a contributory factor.

The Board then turned its attention to the risk. They noted that the R2160 pilot had reported being in visual contact with the C404 from 2nm, and had turned away to avoid it in a controlled manner. They considered that this action had been timely and effective, and that there had been no risk of collision as a result. Consequently the Airprox was categorised as risk Category C.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

<u>Cause:</u>	The C404 pilot flew into conflict with the R2160.
<u>Contributory Factor:</u>	The C404 pilot did not react to Traffic Information.
<u>Degree of Risk:</u>	C.