


AIRPROX REPORT No 2014140**Date/Time:** 9 Aug 2014 0949Z (Saturday)**Position:** 5138N 00049W
(NW Wycombe Air Park)**Airspace:** London FIR (Class: G)**Aircraft 1** **Aircraft 2****Type:** Robin DR221 PA28**Operator:** Civ Pte Civ Pte**Alt/FL:** 2000ft 2000ft
QNH (1017 hPa)**Conditions:** VMC VMC**Visibility:** 50km >10km**Reported Separation:**

50ft V/0ft H 100ft V/75m H

Recorded Separation: 100ft V/ 0.1nm H**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

THE DR221 PILOT reports flying a white aircraft with transponder Modes 3A and C selected, he did not report which lights were illuminated. The aircraft was not fitted with a TCAS. He called Wycombe prior to entering their ATZ to request a transit 2nm to the northwest. This was granted and, shortly after entering the zone, a white single-engine aircraft flew underneath him on a reciprocal track. He reported the situation to the controller who replied that the aircraft was not talking to them. He opined that as an experienced pilot with well over 2500 hours flown in this aircraft, he was well aware that having been cleared into the Wycombe ATZ he was responsible for his own separation but, although he was looking for gliders, both being towed and soaring, and powered aircraft taking off, landing, and in the circuit, he was not expecting to see aircraft at the same level in the opposite direction “frighteningly close”. He saw it too late to take any avoiding action. He was concerned enough to telephone Wycombe on his return and was told that no action had been taken to trace the “infringing aircraft”, it was recommended to him that he file an Airprox.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘ Very High’.

THE PA28 PILOT reports flying a predominately white aircraft with all lights illuminated and transponder Modes 3A, C and S selected. The aircraft was fitted with TAS. The pilot had just got airborne from Wycombe Air Park and was transiting back through the ATZ prior to calling Luton to transit through their zone. There were 3 very experienced pilots in the aircraft. The co-pilot could recall hearing a clearance being given to another aircraft to transit the Wycombe ATZ at 2000ft, but the PF could not recall this and opined it must have been a late call, otherwise the other pilot would have heard his calls to get airborne and transfer to Luton. He also thought that routing through the overhead at 2000ft wasn’t a good idea because Wycombe Air Park can be extremely busy with fixed wing aircraft, gliders and helicopters, operating from different surfaces and strips. He felt that routing 2400ft, ie above the ATZ was a better idea. He had chosen to route back through the valley at 2000ft to be “noise neighbourly” and had switched to Luton frequency early to enable him to make the request to transit through the Luton zone. His Monroy TAS sounded, (it doesn’t give a direction, just a height difference, and experience has shown that it doesn’t give very much time warning), so he instantly searched for the traffic and saw it 400m away. He judged that there was no need to take avoiding action, as there was no risk of collision, and, although he acknowledged that it was closer than he would have liked, he did not judge it to be an Airprox. He thought that ATC at Wycombe were very professional and did a good job of controlling an incredibly busy airfield.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE WYCOMBE CONTROLLER reports that he had limited recollection of the details leading to the event. He noted that although many eastbound departures left the ATZ downwind, others left via local positions outside the circuit; however, he would expect a pilot to remain on the Wycombe Tower frequency if leaving downwind, and, in this case, having left the frequency climbing crosswind, not to re-enter the ATZ.

Factual Background


The weather at Benson was recorded as:

METAR EGUB 090850Z AUTO 23008KT 9999 FEW024 18/12 Q1008


Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The DR22 called Wycombe routeing NE-SW requesting a clearance through the northern portion of the ATZ at 2100ft QNH (approx 1600ft QFE) which was approved by the Wycombe Tower controller. The PA28 reported ready for departure from Wycombe and was given take-off clearance. The PA28 departed to the west, reporting clear of the ATZ at 0946:25 and changing frequency to Luton Radar on 129.550MHz. The PA28 subsequently requested a Basic Service from the Luton Radar controller, which was agreed, and an SSR code 4670 allocated to the PA28. The PA28 turned to the northeast, re-entered the Wycombe ATZ without a clearance and came into conflict with the DR22. The Airprox occurred 1.6nm north-northwest of the aerodrome, inside the ATZ. The DR22 reported to Wycombe Tower that traffic had just passed underneath approximately 200ft below, to which the Tower controller replied that he did not know who the traffic was. The Wycombe Tower controller reported that he would expect a pilot to remain on the Wycombe Tower frequency if leaving downwind and if that had been the case then appropriate traffic information would have been passed to both aircraft. As the PA28 reported changing frequency having left the ATZ to the West the Tower controller did not pass traffic information to either aircraft. The Wycombe Tower controller could remember little of the incident however it is likely that, with the PA28 outside the ATZ to the west and the DR22 entering the ATZ to the northeast, the controller did not think that the two aircraft were relevant to each other. The Luton Radar controller did not pass traffic information to the PA28 and, because the PA28 was under a Basic Service, was not required to monitor the flight. The Luton Radar controller had no recollection of the incident afterwards.



0948:55 PA28 squawking 4670, range 1.8nm from Wycombe



CPA at 0949:06, 1.6nm from Wycombe

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and for not flying into such proximity as to create a danger of collision¹. The geometry was head-on; therefore, both pilots were required to alter course to the right.² Additionally, pilots are required to seek permission from the ATCU to enable flight to be conducted safely within an ATZ, and to advise on entering the ATZ.³

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 9 Aug 2014 at 0949 when a Robin DR221 and a PA28 flew into proximity at 2000ft. The DR221 was transiting through the ATZ and receiving a Basic Service and the PA28 had just got airborne, was transiting back through the ATZ and had switched frequency to Luton.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first looked at the action of the DR221 pilot and agreed that he acted correctly in calling Wycombe ATC for an ATZ crossing in plenty of time, and that his choice of height seemed a reasonable one given the surrounding airspace restrictions. Having received a clearance to cross, he was aware of the need to continue his look-out, although was understandably not expecting to see an aircraft at the same height in the opposite direction.

For the PA28 pilot, having got airborne and left the ATZ, the Board thought he had probably become task-focused in calling Luton for his zone crossing and had not considered the consequences of leaving the Wycombe frequency early. It was clear that the controller had not expected him to re-enter the ATZ, had he remained on frequency he would have known about the other aircraft and would have been able to inform the controller (and provide valuable SA to the DR221 pilot) as he re-entered or flew close to the edge of the ATZ. If he needed the extra time to call Luton for the subsequent routing he would have been better placed to have remained outside the Wycombe ATZ and perhaps conducted an orbit to allow himself more time. Furthermore, the Board noted that he had criticised the DR221 pilot for crossing the ATZ at 2000ft when a higher altitude was available, but had proceeded to do the same thing himself.

¹ Rules of the Air 2007 (as amended), Rule 8 (Avoiding aerial collisions).

² Ibid., Rule 10 (Approaching Head-on)

³ Ibid., Rule 45 (Flights within Air Traffic Zones)

Considering the cause, the Board concluded that the PA28 pilot had re-entered the Wycombe ATZ without informing ATC and had then flown into conflict with the DR221. With regard to the risk, the Board could not reconcile the differing opinion in the assessment of risk of collision by the two pilots; however, given that the recorded separation was 100ft vertically and less than 0.1nm horizontally, they concluded that it was probably best described as Category B, safety margins had been much reduced below the normal.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause:</u>	The PA28 pilot re-entered the Wycombe ATZ without informing ATC and flew into conflict with the Robin.
<u>Degree of Risk:</u>	B
<u>ERC Score</u> ⁴ :	101

⁴ Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC.