

## AIRPROX REPORT No 2013074

Date/Time: 12 Jul 2013 1628Z

Position: 5049N 00113W  
(Lee-on-Solent Airfield-  
elevation 32ft)

Airspace: London FIR (Class: G)

Type: Reporting Ac Reported Ac  
Ikarus C42 PA-28

Operator: Civ Trg Civ Pte


Alt/FL: 300-400ft 300ft  
NK NK (1021hPa)

Weather: VMC NK VMC NK

Visibility: 25km >10km

Reported Separation:  
150-200ft V/NK H 200ft V/500ft H

Recorded Separation:  
NK



### PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

**THE C42 PILOT** reports he was conducting cct training with a student on RW23 RH at Lee-on-Solent and was in receipt of an A/G service. He had just rotated from his second touch-and-go of the sortie, with the student as the handling pilot, when he observed an ac on final approach to RW05, coming straight towards his ac. He took control immediately and as he was sitting in the right-hand seat, he banked L, in order to maintain visual contact with the ac. He positioned the C42 on the dead-side of the RW and continued to climb on RW heading. He asked the A/G operator if she was aware of the ac making an approach to RW05. She confirmed she was not aware of any other traffic in the cct. The other ac continued its approach to RW05 and as he passed through about 300-400ft, it passed down his R side in the opposite direction at an estimated height of 150-200ft. He identified the ac's registration and informed the A/G operator, who repeatedly tried to contact the ac without success. The other ac was seen to land on RW05.




**THE PA28 PILOT** reports operating solo on a VFR flight from Jersey to Lee-on-Solent. Navigation and landing lights were illuminated and SSR Mode C Code 7000 was selected. He obtained a briefing from Jersey on weather and operational procedures at Lee-on-Solent, which informed him that A/G shuts at 1700L. He, therefore, did not expect A/G to be manned. Because the wind conditions from the nearest official MET (Southampton) showed a light northerly wind, he expected the RW in use to RW05. He explained that when he checked the Southampton ATIS as he passed KATHY, it confirmed that the wind was still northerly. When 6nm S of Lee-on-Solent he advised London Information that he was changing to Lee Radio on frequency 118.25MHz (correct frequency 118.925MHz). This was acknowledged and BS was terminated. On contacting frequency 118.25MHz with his C/S there was no reply. Approximately 15 seconds later he 'blind' called his registration, position and intention to land on RW05, as he was fully under the assumption that A/G was closed. Once established for RW05, he called again, advising his registration, position, distance from RW and his intention of making a straight-in approach. He repeated the same call

approximately 1nm from the airfield. During his scan for cct traffic, at about 300ft above the RW height, he noticed a C42 approximately 200ft above his ac, but some distance to the R. He considered that this ac did not appear to pose a risk due to its distance and direction. However, he was concerned that traffic could be taking off from the grass glider strip (RW23L) as the wind might have allowed landing/take off from RW23 or 05. He evaluated the situation and noted the wind sock was limp, suggesting light and variable wind. With a further scan of the airfield, which had no further traffic, he decided it was appropriate to land on RW05.

**THE LEE-ON-SOLENT A/G OPERATOR** reports that RW23 with a RH cct was in use and at the time of the incident, 1628Z (1728L) there was one ac in the cct, a C42 carrying out touch-and-goes. The C42 reported on final for a touch-and-go and shortly afterwards reported an ac coming directly towards him, looking to land on RW05. The C42 took avoiding action by turning R (she thought) and from her perspective in the tower, which overlooks the RW05 threshold, the ac were in close proximity. She made numerous attempts to contact the landing ac, a PA28, but none were returned and after landing the ac proceeded to taxi to 'B Hangar' on the NE side of the airfield. She closed the radio watch and went to 'B Hangar' to speak to the pilot, who did not appear to realise he had been in close proximity to another ac. He stated he was given the frequency '118.25' (incorrect frequency) by London Information and had this '118.25' frequency confirmed by his GPS. In addition, the pilot also reported he had read a weather report from Southampton EGHl at approximately 1200 GMT that stated the wind direction as 040°. He landed on RW05 based solely on this piece of information, despite the fact that two windsocks at Lee on Solent clearly showed wind favouring RW23 and there was another ac, the C42, in the circuit using RW23RH. She asked the pilot whether he was visual with the C42 on final for RW23, to which he stated he was when the C42 was to the R of him (after the avoiding action). He commented that it was his first visit to Lee-on-Solent airfield.

## Factual Background

Lee-on-Solent airfield is situated within the Portsmouth/Fleetlands (Government Aerodrome) ATZ. The ATZ is a circle, 2nm radius centred at 500006N 0011010W, with an upper limit of 2000ft. There is a LOA on Flight Operations within the MOD Fleetlands Heliport ATZ, agreed between Fleetlands and Lee-on-Solent. The ATZ is notified in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Regulations, for which an ATS is provided by an AFISO at Fleetlands Heliport. Lee-on-Solent Airfield is designated as a civil, unlicensed aerodrome. It is therefore, not required to establish its own ATZ and is not required to provide an ATC service. Under Rule 45, pilots of ac wishing to enter the Fleetlands ATZ are required to obtain sufficient information to enable them to safely conduct their flight through the zone during the notified hours.



Pilots of ac approaching or landing at Lee-on-Solent and who intend to transit the western sector of the ATZ, bounded by the disused railway line to the E of Lee-on-Solent, are not required to contact Fleetlands if in contact with Lee Radio. The UK AIP<sup>1</sup> promulgates Lee-on-Solent as a gliding site (Winch and Tow) with an upper limit of 2000ft, operating from Sunrise to Sunset.

The official Lee-on-Solent Visitor Guide and the Aerodrome Manual, both of which can be accessed on the internet, state the 'Lee Radio' frequency as 118.925MHz (also shown on the CAA/NATS Aeronautical Charts 1:500,000 and 1:250,000). The airfield operating hours, effective from 4<sup>th</sup> July 2011, are Monday-Friday, 0900-1700L or sunset. The procedures for joining RW05 state that the RW uses a LH cct. When joining from the S it is advisable to join on a L base giving way to any traffic already in the cct. It requests that joins overhead and use of the dead-side is avoided due to intense

<sup>1</sup> Page ENR 5.5-9 (27 Jun 2013)

gliding activity. The Aerodrome Manual states that visiting pilots shall not be permitted to land outside airport operational hours unless a prior request for extension has been made and accepted.

The Southampton METAR: 121620Z 07004KT 010V120 CAVOK 24/11 Q1023=

Lee-on-Solent reported surface wind was 260/08kt, QNH 1024, QFE 1023.

## **Analysis and Investigation**

### **CAA ATSI**

ATSI reports that it had access to area and Southampton radar recordings together with written reports from both pilots concerned and the Lee-on-Solent A/G operator. Lee-on-Solent are not required to record their RTF and consequently no RTF recording was available.

The PA28 was in receipt of a BS from London Information and at 1621:26 the pilot requested, “(PA28)c/s request radio er sorry frequency change to the...” At this point there was a crossed transmission from another ac. London Information responded to the PA28 pilot, “(PA28)c/s frequency change is approved squawk 7000 good-day”. The PA28 pilot responded “7000 good-day (PA28)c/s”.

At 1622:00 radar showed the PA28 aircraft’s squawk change from 1177 (FIS) to the general conspicuity squawk of 7000 and at 1623:52 the PA28 was 2.8nm SSW of Lee-on-Solent passing an altitude of 1200ft in the descent before the PA28 faded from radar.

The ATSI analysis of the incident corresponds with the reports filed by the two pilots and the A/G operator.

## **Summary**

The C42 was carrying out training ccts RW23RH at Lee-on-Solent. As the ac was climbing out after a touch-and-go, the pilot observed an ac positioning on final approach to RW05. He made an avoiding action L turn away from this ac, keeping it in sight. The PA28 pilot, having selected an incorrect frequency, was unable to contact the A/G operator at Lee-on-Solent. He believed that the A/G operation was closed. Based on wind direction from Southampton Airport’s ATIS, he decided to land on RW05. He did not see the C42 climbing from RW23, until after it had passed his ac.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSION**

Information available included reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcript of the London Information frequency, radar video recordings, although they did not show the Airprox, a report from the Lee-on-Solent A/G operator and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

The Board first considered the actions of the C42 pilot who, in communication with A/G, had just carried out a touch-and-go on RW23 and, not surprisingly, was surprised to observe another aircraft (the PA28) on final to RW05; the Board agreed that the C42 pilot was conducting his flight in an appropriate manner. Conversely, the PA28 pilot had used the Lee-on-Solent web site to brief himself prior to his flight but had obtained an incorrect frequency and hours of operation of A/G. This led him to believe wrongly that the A/G operation had ceased, and he elected to land on RW05 without properly assessing the state of operations at the airfield. A GA pilot Member considered, simply, that the PA28 pilot was badly self-briefed and this was a contributory factor to the Airprox. He added that it was fortuitous that the pilot had not entered the Fleetlands ATZ, without obtaining the correct information, in breach of Rule 45. The Board decided that the cause of the Airprox was that the PA28 pilot flew into conflict with the C42 in the Lee-on-Solent visual circuit. Although the pilot of the PA28 did not observe the C42 until it was passing his aircraft, the pilot of the latter aircraft did sight the PA28 in time to take avoiding action and, consequently, removed any risk of collision.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: The PA28 pilot flew into conflict with the C42 in the Lee-on-Solent visual circuit.

Degree of Risk: C.

Contributory Factor: Lack of planning preparation by the PA28 pilot.

ERC Score: 4<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC.