## AIRPROX REPORT No 2010088

*Date/Time:* 14 Jul 2010 (Wednesday) 0953Z

*Position:* 5250N 00028W (12nm SSE Cranwell)

*Airspace:* Lincolnshire AIAA (*Class: G*)

| | *Reporting Ac* | *Reported Ac* |
|---|---|---|
| *Type:* | Tutor | Tutor |
| *Operator:* | HQ AIR (TRG) | HQ AIR (TRG) |
| *Alt/FL:* | 6000ft (RPS 994mb) | NR |
| *Weather:* | VMC CLOC | NR |
| *Visibility:* | 30km | NR |
| *Reported Separation:* | 100ft V/ 100m H | NR |
| *Recorded Separation:* | 100ft V/0.1nm H | |




## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

**TUTOR (A) PILOT** reports flying an instructional flight from Cranwell in a white ac, not in contact with any unit but squawking a Cranwell conspicuity code. During the climb, heading 180° at 80kt and passing 6000ft, the student pilot flew a gentle pitch up and right turn to avoid another Tutor ac, and subsequently reported the sighting to the instructor. The opposing Tutor was first seen in the 2 o'clock low position, at a distance of 100M and about 100ft below. The instructor only saw the ac as it passed below departing towards their 8 o'clock. In retrospect, having not seen the other ac until after it passed, the instructor considered the risk of collision as medium.

**TUTOR (B) PILOT** reports that 2 months after the incident he was informed that he had been involved in an Airprox. Given that it has been 2 months since the incident, he was unable to recollect the flight and could not recall feeling that ac separation and thus safety was compromised at any time.

UKAB Note (1): The time of the Airprox given by the reporting pilot (Tutor (A)) was 1 hour in error and the incident could not be correlated with the radar recording. Immediately after the event the pilot was on leave and only after he returned to duty could the amended time be reconciled with the radar data. When this was completed the pilot of Tutor (B) was contacted and an ASIMS report requested.

UKAB Note (2): The recording of the Claxby radar shows the incident clearly. In the lead up to the CPA at 0952:30, Tutor (A) can be seen climbing through FL062 in a Southerly direction and Tutor (B) is in its 2 o'clock, tracking 040° and level at FL065 (i.e. Tutor (A) is in Tutor (B)'s 1130, 1.6nm away and 300ft below it). The ac continue to close on unaltered headings until 0952:53 when Tutor (A) at FL064 commences a descending right to pass behind Tutor (B), which has descended by 200ft. The CPA with the separation of 100ft V/0.1nm H is at 0952:59, with Tutor (A) passing above and behind Tutor (B).

**HQ AIR (TRG)** comments that out of the 4 crew members involved in this Airprox it is disappointing that only one saw the other ac before the CPA. However, even though the sighting was late it was in time to allow a gentle avoiding action to be flown removing any risk of collision. The Tutor fleet is

about to fitted with a CWS that will assist with SA thereby reducing the risk of repeating this type of Airprox.

## PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, radar recordings and a report from the Tutor operating authority.

The Board noted that both ac had been operating legitimately and independently in the busy airspace of the Lincolnshire AIAA where the principal means of collision avoidance was the Rules of the Air - 'see and avoid' principle. Under these Rules Tutor (A) should have given way to Tutor (B) and, albeit perhaps later than optimum, the pilot did so. Although the pilot of Tutor (B) did not see Tutor (A), since its (student) pilot had the other ac in sight throughout and deemed that only a gentle avoidance manoeuvre was required, Members agreed that there had been no risk of collision.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A non-sighting by the crew of Tutor (B) and a late sighting by the crew of Tutor (A) .

Degree of Risk: C.