

AIRPROX REPORT No 2010080

Date/Time: 30 Jun 2010 1332Z

Position: 5109N 00105W (2.5nm
SW Lasham - elev 618ft)

Airspace: LFIR (Class: G)
Reporting Ac Reported Ac

Type: DR400+K13 PA28
combination

Operator: Civ Club Civ Pte

Alt/FL: 2600ft↑ 2500ft
(QNH) (QNH)

Weather: VMC CLBC VMC CLBC


Visibility: 20km >20km

Reported Separation:

100-200ft V Not seen

Recorded Separation:

NR



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE DR400 PILOT reports towing a K13 glider from Lasham and in communication with Lasham Ground on 131.025MHz; no transponder was fitted. The visibility was 20km flying 1000ft below cloud in VMC and the ac was coloured black/yellow; no lighting was mentioned. About 2-3nm SW of Lasham heading 240° climbing through 2600ft QNH, he thought, at 60kt the K13 instructor pilot pointed out traffic, simultaneously with him noticing, a PA28 about 0.5nm away to his L on a converging course. He waited to see what avoiding action the PA28 flight would take but when he saw it was maintaining course he reduced power to reduce his ROC – he needed to maintain 60kt with the glider under tow – and passed 100-200ft beneath the PA28. He was aware that abrupt avoidance was to be avoided if possible whilst aero towing. He attempted to contact Farnborough to report the Airprox but was told to standby and he then had to change back to Lasham frequency during his approach back into Lasham. He assessed the risk as high.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that he was unaware of being involved in an Airprox until contacted by UKAB. He was flying en-route from the Channel Islands to Beverley VFR and in receipt of a BS from Farnborough on 125.25MHz, squawking an assigned code with Mode C. The visibility was >20km flying 1000ft below cloud in VMC and the ac was coloured blue/silver/grey; no lighting was mentioned. He had routed initially to Bembridge and then E of Portsmouth to avoid a restricted area. He rejoined his planned track (Bembridge to O/H Sywell) about 14nm S of Lasham and then changed from Solent Radar to Farnborough. At the time he was heading 010° cruising at 2500ft QNH at 95kt. It was always his intention to avoid the immediate area of Lasham and track to the W to avoid any gliding activity. Farnborough advised him of gliding activity around Lasham, which he acknowledged informing ATC that he was routing to the W to avoid the area; he believed this course change occurred about 5nm S of Lasham. He was visual with several gliders in the area that did not pose any risk. He routed to the W edge of the Odiham MATZ stub and rejoined his original planned track 12nm N of Lasham. He did not see the glider tug with a glider under tow.

THE FARNBOROUGH LARS W CONTROLLER reports that he was acting as an OJTI to a trainee at the time of the incident. It was only much later on that a Lasham tug pilot telephoned ATC stating that he was filing an Airprox against an ac that LARS W had worked during the period. He had no particular memory of any outstanding relevant event during that period.

ATSI reports that the PA28 flight contacted Farnborough LARS (West) at 1328, requesting a BS. After initially being requested to standby, at 1329:58 the pilot was asked to pass his message. He reported at 2500ft, approximately 5nm S of Odiham, again requesting a BS. This service was agreed and the flight was issued with a Farnborough squawk 0436. At 1331:00, after the pilot reported squawking 0436, the controller transmitted, "*caution intensive gliding around Lasham*". The pilot commented, "*we're going to detour round to the west er we are visual with some of the gliders*". Approximately 3min later, the pilot of the subject DR400 contacted the frequency and was requested to standby and told he would be called back shortly. However, not receiving a further response, the pilot reported, about 2min later, returning to the Lasham frequency.

In the meantime, the pilot of the PA28 had requested to cross the Odiham MATZ stub and this was approved, avoiding the ATZ. No further comments were made to or from the PA28 pilot, about the vicinity of any gliding activity, until it left the frequency at 1351. The radar at 1330:53, at the time the PA28 was establishing contact with Farnborough, shows the aircraft, tracking NNW, 3.2nm SSW of Lasham. Thereafter, it makes a L turn and remains at least 2.5nm from the airfield.

[UKAB Note (1): The Airprox is not captured on recorded radar as the DR400 and K13 glider combination does not show at all.]

The Farnborough MATS Part 2, Page APR 4.3, states, with reference to Lasham, 'Aircraft on a LARS track that is on own navigation may continue over Lasham at the pilot's own risk. Best practice would be to warn the pilot'. On this occasion, the controller did warn the pilot of activity at Lasham and the pilot advised routeing to its W. The controller also complied with the procedures for the provision of a Basic Service: 'A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers. It is essential that a pilot receiving this service remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight. Pilots should not expect any form of traffic information from a controller, as there is no such obligation placed on the controller under a Basic Service outside an ATZ, and the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance at all times. A controller with access to surveillance derived information shall avoid the routine provision of traffic information on specific aircraft, and a pilot who considers that he requires such a regular flow of specific traffic information shall request a Traffic Service'.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC authorities.

Both pilots had equal responsibility for collision avoidance within this Class G airspace by maintaining a thorough lookout scan and taking appropriate action if necessary. It was clear that the PA28 pilot had avoided the Lasham O/H and had received a warning from LARS W of the gliding activity, and although he saw gliders in the immediate area he did not see the DR400 combination, which was a part cause of the Airprox. The DR400 tug pilot reported seeing the approaching PA28 0.5nm away, which Members thought was a late sighting and another part cause. The opportunity for both pilots to see each other's ac was there for some time prior to the Airprox. The DR400 would have been approaching from below but within the PA28 pilot's field of view, although the dark coloured DR400 may have blended into the dark background of the surrounding countryside. Conversely the PA28 would have been sky-lined throughout the DR400 combination's climb-out. The Board understood the dilemma facing the DR400 pilot and agreed that his sighting and subsequent action of reducing his ROC whilst maintaining visual contact with the PA28 had been most effective in removing any risk of collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Non-sighting by the PA28 pilot and a late sighting by the DR400 pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.