AIRPROX REPORT No 2010058

Date/Time:	30 May 2010 1521Z (Sunday)	
Position:	5111N 00102W (O/H Lasham - elev 618ft)	
Airspace:	LFIR	(*Class: G*)
	Reporting Ac	*Reported Ac*
Type:	ASK13	PA28
Operator:	Civ Club	Civ Pte
Alt/FL:	1500ft↑ (QFE)	2500ft (N/K)
Weather:	VMC CLBC	VMC CLBC
Visibility:	50km	20km
Reported Separation:	200-300ft V/Nil H	Not seen
Recorded Separation:	NR	



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE ASK13 PILOT reports that during the final phase of a winch launch in a strong crosswind with a pupil under instruction, the winch power was cut. Heading 270° at 60kt the pupil reacted slowly so he took control to lower the nose and ensure normal flying attitude and speed; he estimated his height as passing 1300-1400ft agl. At the same time he saw an ac, a single-engine type, coloured white/blue, pass directly O/H flying to the S with 200-300ft vertical separation. At the time the visibility was 50km flying 2000ft below cloud in VMC and his ac was coloured red/white. He assessed the risk as very high had the winch launch not been terminated.

THE LASHAM WINCH OPERATOR reports launching was taking place to the W alongside RW27 with a surface wind about 290° at 15kt and excellent visibility and about 5000ft cloudbase. He launched the ASK13 but when it was towards the top of its launch he noticed a single-engine low-wing ac approaching from the N (his LHS) apparently on a collision course. He immediately terminated the launch and the light ac, a single-engine low-wing type coloured white/blue, passed just over the ASK13 by about 200ft with no horizontal separation. He believed that there was a good chance of a collision if he hadn't chopped the winch power.

THE PA28 PILOT reports en-route to France VFR and in receipt of a BS from Farnborough on 125·25MHz squawking an assigned code with Modes S and C. The visibility was 20km in VMC and the ac was coloured white/maroon with nav, anti-collision and strobe lights all switched on. En-route to KATHY (IOW) he passed through the Odiham MATZ having received clearance from Farnborough, tracking W of the Odiham ATZ but through the Lasham O/H. He was informed that gliding was taking place at Lasham and he informed Farnborough that he would keep a good lookout. Heading 205° at 110kt and 2500ft QNH he saw 3-4 gliders about 5km distant all circling and climbing although none were in his flightpath so he judged the situation to be safe. The gliders passed to his L and R with 300ft vertical separation and 1000m lateral separation. He also saw a glider tug ac take-off on a W'ly direction but about 2000ft below. Later he heard the tug pilot call Farnborough stating that a light ac had passed through the Lasham O/H. In future, he will route around gliding sites, which he did on the return trip.

THE FARNBOROUGH LARS W CONTROLLER reports operating bandboxed with Approach with high traffic loading although there was no Approach traffic on frequency. The PA28 flight called and was given a BS and, at his request, Odiham MATZ penetration was given; he thought he informed

the pilot of gliding at Odiham and Lasham. The ac continued en-route and he thought he may have further re-iterated caution regarding gliding at Odiham and Lasham. Some time later a glider tug pilot called on frequency requesting details of an ac that may have flown close to Lasham but at the time he was unable to confirm or provide any further details on the frequency.

ATSI comments that the Airprox is reported to have occurred overhead Lasham Airfield at approximately 1521 (UTC). The PA28 was on a VFR flight from White Waltham to Cherbourg and the glider was in the process of being cable launched from Lasham airfield. The Farnborough LARS(W) controller was operating combined Approach and LARS(W) positions and reports that there was no approach traffic on frequency, but assessed that the traffic loading on LARS(W) was high. ATSI had access to written reports and radar recordings. Transcription of the RT was not possible due to tape damage caused by a faulty recorder, which has since been replaced. Farnborough had access to the RT recording prior to this damage occurring and in the absence of RT transcription, the timings and speech from the Farnborough unit report have been used.

METAR EGLF 301520Z 30014G26KT CAVOK 18/03 Q1012=

The Farnborough Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) Part 2 (17/11/09), Memorandum of Understanding, between RAF Odiham and Farnborough ATC, Page ANX-31, paragraph 3.9, MATZ Crossing Aircraft, states: 'All military aircraft require clearance to transit Odiham MATZ, even when under the control of Farnborough. Civilian aircraft are to be instructed by Farnborough to avoid the Odiham ATZ (2nm and 2000ft Odiham QFE/2500ft Farnborough QNH) unless otherwise cleared by Odiham ATC.'

At 1511:10 the PA28 pilot called 2nm W of WOD requesting a BS and penetration of the Odiham MATZ. The controller responded and cleared the PA28 flight to transit Odiham MATZ. The PA28 flight was issued with a squawk of 0430 and provided with the QNH. The PA28 pilot was also issued with a caution regarding gliding activity at both Odiham and Lasham airfields, which the PA28 pilot acknowledged. At 1517:29 the controller again issued a caution regarding gliders at Odiham and Lasham airfields and the pilot again acknowledged this. The radar recording shows a number of intermittent contacts in the area and at 1521:09 shows the PA28 on a SW'ly track, passing close to Lasham airfield, displaying a squawk 0430 and Mode C reporting altitude 2600ft.

The PA28 was informed about the gliding activity at Lasham in accordance with the Farnborough MATS Part 2 (17/11/09), Page APR-19, paragraph 6, which states: 'Aircraft on a LARS track that is on own navigation may continue over Lasham at the pilot's own risk. Best practice would be to warn the pilot'.

The PA28 was in receipt of a BS from Farnborough LARS(W). CAP493, MATS Part 1 (11/03/10), Section 1, Chapter 11, Page 4, Para 3.1.1 states: 'A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. This may include weather information, changes of serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, general airspace activity information, and any other information likely to affect safety. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility.'

UKAB Note (1): The Odiham MATZ was not active.

UKAB Note (2): The UK AIP at ENR 5-5-1-3 promulgates Lasham as a Glider Launching Site centred on 511112N 0010155W where aerotow launches take place and winch launches may be encountered up to 3000ft agl during daylight hours, site elevation 618ft amsl.

UKAB Note (3): The radar recording does not capture the Airprox. The PA28 is seen at 1519:38 3nm NNE of Lasham tracking 200° and indicating altitude 2700ft London QNH 1012mb. The PA28 continues on a steady track towards Lasham passing close to intermittent primary returns, believed to be gliders, 1·5nm to the N and NE of the glider site. At 1520:38, as the PA28 reaches a position 1nm N of Lasham, its Mode C indicates the ac level at 2500ft QNH and a slight L turn onto a more S'ly heading is then observed. Twenty four seconds later at 1521:02 the PA28 is again tracking 200° and

is just about to pass O/H RW27 at altitude 2500ft. The next sweep 6sec later at 1521:08 shows the PA28 just S of the RW having commenced a climb, passing 2600ft QNH, before leveling at 2700ft QNH on the next sweep. Six seconds later a single primary only return appears, which might possibly be the ASK13, just N of RW27 close to the PA28's radar track history.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

Members were disappointed that the PA28 pilot had chosen to fly through the Lasham O/H; the ac's passage at 2500ft QNH (approximately 1900ft aal) is clearly shown on the recorded radar. This had placed the ac well below the promulgated winch cable release height (3000ft agl) thereby exposing the transiting ac to the attendant risk of a rapidly climbing glider, whose pilot has a poor field view, and the launch cable. Lasham is clearly marked on UK 1:500000 and 1:250000 charts as a glider launching site with a maximum altitude of 3700ft amsl. Also, there is a promulgated frequency shown for Lasham where information about gliding activity can be obtained. An experienced gliding Member opined that Lasham can, and does, have multiple launches taking place at times which added extra potential risks to transiting traffic. Best practice is to plan a route to avoid glider sites by a wide margin. The PA28 pilot's flightpath had placed his ac into conflict with the subject ASK13 glider, which he did not see, which the Board agreed had caused the Airprox.

It was noted that the PA28 pilot was 'cleared' by Farnborough to transit the Odiham MATZ whilst under a BS, which one Member thought might have given its pilot the impression that he was getting a better level of service than he actually was. That said, LARS(W) had twice issued a warning to the PA28 pilot with respect to Lasham and Odiham gliding activity, although it appeared the pilot was content to continue on his planned track through the Lasham O/H. Under a BS in Class G airspace the pilot is responsible for maintaining his own separation from all other traffic through see and avoid.

Fortunately, the winch operator saw the approaching PA28 and, having assessed the potential confliction, terminated the launch by cutting power to the winch. Although this aborted take-off (simulated cable break) is practiced, it can still come as quite a shock to the pilot involved. The ASK13 instructor took control to establish the glider into a safe flight profile and then saw the PA28 as it passed O/H from R to L with separation estimated as 200-300ft vertically. These actions were enough to remove the actual collision risk but, with the glider passing unnoticed to the PA28 pilot, the Board believed that safety of both ac had not been assured during this encounter.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The PA28 pilot flew O/H a notified and active glider launching site below the promulgated winch cable release height and into conflict with the ASK13 glider, which he did not see.

Degree of Risk: B.