

**UKAB AIRPROX FINDINGS ON CAUSE AND RISK OUTSIDE CAS - GUIDELINES**

1. The purpose of these simple UKAB guidelines is to promote consistency when arguments are being marshalled to determine 'cause' and 'risk'. Many circumstances can and do surround Airprox incidents, but there are two broad situations which cover most cases which occur **outside controlled airspace**:

a. **Two aircraft A and B on conflicting flightpaths**

- A sees B as early as prevailing circumstances permit and avoids
- B sees A (perhaps later) and files

**Cause: Confliction of flightpaths resolved by A**

or

- Both see the other as early as prevailing circumstances permit and avoid

**Cause: Confliction of flightpaths resolved by both pilots**

or

- One or both pilots do not see the other (when an earlier sighting could reasonably have been expected) until late, not at all, or too late to increase separation at CPA.

**Cause: Late, or non-sighting, or effectively a non-sighting, by A or B or by both**

Note that "Confliction of flightpaths resolved by..." and "Late or non-sighting" should be seen as mutually exclusive; in other words they are either/or choices on cause where, in the first case, the pilot 'saw and avoided' - while in the second he 'did not see' (so did not take any action to avoid).

b. **Two aircraft A and B not on conflicting flightpaths**

- A sees B and considers safety was not compromised
- B sees A, thinks otherwise and files

**Cause: Sighting report** (if we think that the situation was entirely benign)

or

**Cause: B was concerned by the proximity of A** (if we think that A was conducting himself with due care and regard)

or

**Cause: A flew close enough to cause concern to B** (if we think that A should have done more to avoid B)

2. Although the nature of the assessment process requires you to bring to bear your own judgement, the determination of *cause* must be as objective as possible. To this end, analysis must adhere to the facts of the case i.e. what actually took place. Contributory factors should be identified where appropriate but, in isolating the core reason for an Airprox, **the final *cause* statement must be unambiguous and stand alone as the final direct link to the result.**

3. Similar treatment should be applied to the determination of *risk*. When doing so, there is no room for speculation on what might have happened if such-and-such had also happened. **Stick rigidly to what did happen** and don't speculate on the potential for something worse or better to transpire from a situation - although you will often be encouraged to do so by those involved in an incident. **The assessment is purely *risk of collision*, not what the consequences might have been had the aircraft collided.**

As a guide:

ICAO 4444 PANS-ATM AIRPROX risk classification	UKAB Collision Risk descriptor and guideline word picture
<b>Category A</b> Risk of Collision: ...aircraft proximity in which serious risk of collision has existed.	<b>Providence – serious risk of collision.</b> Situations where <u>separation was reduced to the bare minimum</u> and/or which only stopped short of an actual collision because chance played a major part in events: the pilots were either unaware of the other aircraft or did not/could not make any inputs in time to materially improve matters.
<b>Category B</b> Safety not assured: ...aircraft proximity in which the safety of the aircraft may have been compromised.	<b>Safety much reduced/not assured.</b> Situations where <u>aircraft proximity resulted in safety margins being much reduced below the norm</u> either due to serendipity, misjudgement, inaction, or where emergency avoiding action was taken at the last minute that materially increased separation and averted a likely collision.
<b>Category C</b> No risk of collision: ...aircraft proximity in which no risk of collision has existed or risk was averted.	<b>Safety degraded – no risk of collision.</b> Situations where <u>safety was degraded</u> but either fortuitous circumstances or early enough sighting, information or action allowed one or both of the pilots to either simply monitor the situation or take <u>timely and effective avoiding action</u> to prevent the aircraft from coming into close proximity.
<b>Category D</b> Risk not determined: aircraft proximity in which insufficient information was available to determine the risk involved, or inconclusive or conflicting evidence precluded such determination.	<b>Non-assessable – insufficient, inconclusive or irresolvable information.</b> Situations where <u>insufficient information was available to determine the risk involved, or inconclusive/conflicting evidence precluded such determination</u> .
<b>Category E</b> Not an ICAO risk classification	<b>Non-proximate - benign.</b> Situations that met the criteria for reporting but where the occurrence was in fact benign and <u>normal procedures, safety standards and parameters were considered to have pertained</u> .