UKAB 2020 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

ACCEPTED PARTIALI		LY ACCEPTED	REJECTED		
Airprox	ox Recommendation		Comments		
2020083	The CAA includes glider site ICFs, as supplied by the BGA, in the UK AIP ENR 5.5.		Partially Accepted		
2020086	The CAA reviews the Southend ATC Safety Case activity to ensure that it includes robust mitigations for the known incompatibility between the SSR processor and Garrecht-type transponders.		The CAA has liaised with Southend ATC unit and confirmed that the known incompatibility issue with the Garrecht transponder has been risk assessed and ATC procedures issued to provide visibility to ATC Staff of the issue. The risk assessments appeared to suitably identify available mitigations and were accepted by the allocated Air Traffic Operations Inspector. The mitigations were initially notified to ATCOs via ATC Supplementary Instructions. These have subsequently been incorporated into the Southend Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 2 Issue 4 v1.1 (01/10/2020). The Southend ATC Engineers have advised that they will discuss the matter with Leonardo during their weekly calls with the Vice President of Sales at Leonardo. The incident has also been highlighted to the SARG Surveillance Specialist for further investigation and follow up action, if deemed necessary.		
2020167	The CAA conducts a review to establish the reasons behind why many training airfields chose not to maintain their ATZ when the requirement to hold an aerodrome licence to conduct training activity was removed. Where those reasons fall within the competency of the CAA – take appropriate action to mitigate against any increase in risk associated with the removal of the protection previously afforded to them (by an ATZ).		The CAA provided a detailed response outlining the background behind the removal of the requirement for training establishments to hold a license and (where there was no provision of an air traffic service) the consequent removal of the associated ATZ. The response also included a precis of the extent of their authority over unlicensed aerodromes and highlighted the limited regulatory levers available to them. They noted that recent work on the UK approach to recreational GA, commissioned and funded by the DfT in 2020 and published in CAP1886, stated that 'Additional regulation is not justified and is unlikely to significantly improve safety'. Nevertheless, they undertook to review the position regarding what they would consider to be an acceptable level of regulatory oversight for the purposes of airspace management and committed to report back to the UKAB once the work was complete.		

UKAB 2019 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

	ACCEPTED PART		ALLY ACCEPTED	REJECTED
Airprox	Recommendation		Comments	
2019002	Wellesbourne Mountford update their AIP entry to reflect the BRUNO approach.		Whilst we see the values and benefits in formalising the BRUNO procedures as an instrument training aid for use in VMC conditions, our CAA ATS Inspector has stated that the use of this approach is likely to introduce significant risk to the operation of the airfield, as well as the safety management system and has informed us that the practice of using this procedure even in VMC conditions must cease with immediate effect. Subsequently we have met with stakeholders and have communicated that the BRUNO procedure must not be used.	
2019004	CAA and MAA provide advice and guidance on the interpretation and use of electronic conspicuity equipment.		electronic conspicuity equipment, this evidence and held a multi-stakeholder into the phase in which the strategy fo CAA but inclusive of ALL affected stake be held before mandated deployment In support of that strategy there are a creation of and/or alignment to suitable integrated trial to 'prove the concept';	programme is well underway, having made a call for conference on the issue. The programme is now moving r deployment will be crafted; that phase will be led by the holders. A full consultation on the draft final strategy will is initiated. number of key issues that will be addressed, such as: the le standards for use and fitting of such equipment; a fully consideration of the integration of other users, such as with the introduction of new equipment into the cockpit,
2019008	CAA and MAA provide advice and guidance on the interpre- electronic conspicuity equipment.	tation and use of	As above	
2019028	The P68 operating company consider the incorporation of a	a TAS.	These units were evaluated over 3 more unit integrated with and overlaid onto that this form of electronic conspicuity Commercial airliners were all detectab target' mode for Mode C detection had 'FLARM' licence for the Sky Demon sof	portable ADSB receiver units to trial on their P68 aircraft. In this and pilot feedback was canvassed. The SkyEcho2 In the same of the second on-board iPads running Sky Demon software. They found or did add some value, however the effect was limited. In the same GA aircraft were detectable. The 'bearing-less of been disabled by the manufacturer. The addition of a stware led to some suitably equipped gliders being to one of their rotary survey helicopters for further

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Airprox Recommendation		Comments	Comments	
The CAA review R/T procedures at non-ATS aerodromes.		not believe there is a case for intripositions in the aerodrome traffic some structural changes to Chapte Page 1 subtitle 'Aerodrome Core Paras 4.6 and 4.7 to be moved to 'Designated Positions in the Trafollow the Introduction and be applicated Positions in the Chapter of New header to indicate applicate Requirement in both cases for a ATS provider or aerodrome operations.	We have reviewed CAP 413 (Radiotelephony Manual) Chapter 4 Aerodrome Phraseology but do not believe there is a case for introducing a requirement for pilots to report at all designated positions in the aerodrome traffic circuit. However, the review has highlighted the need for some structural changes to Chapter 4, and the following will be considered: • Page 1 subtitle 'Aerodrome Control Service Phraseology' to move to page 5. • Paras 4.6 and 4.7 to be moved to Chapter 4 Introduction. • 'Designated Positions in the Traffic Circuit' and 'Standard Overhead Join Procedure' content to follow the Introduction and be applicable to ATC, AFIS and AGCS alike. • New header to indicate applicability. • Requirement in both cases for aircraft to report base leg to be enhanced to read 'if required by ATS provider or aerodrome operator'. It may not be universally applicable - the decision can be made at local level to satisfy local requirements.	
2019101	SkyDemon review the selection and depiction of sites used recreational activities		selection and depiction of sites used for aerial sporting and v to enhancing map conspicuity and preventing inappropriate ap depiction.	
2019110	SkyDemon review the selection and depiction of sites used recreational activities	recreational activities with a view	SkyDemon agreed to review the selection and depiction of sites used for aerial sporting and recreational activities with a view to enhancing map conspicuity and preventing inappropriate deselection of such sites from map depiction.	
2019151	Westonzoyland and Middlezoy airfield managers develop a regarding integration of their operations.		land stating that once the latest COVID restrictions are lifted a en the interested parties at both WestonZoyland and Middlezoy greed.	
2019192	Gloucester considers reviewing fixed-wing and rotary-wing	north-side of the airfield. A final of place sometime in the new year.	procedures with a potential change due to development on the decision has been delayed until a new Head of Operations is in In the meantime, an Airport Advisory Notice has been issued, rtance of height keeping in the visual circuit.	
2019201	The P68 operating company considers further mitigation operations.	s to MAC for survey Letter sent Company1 October 20	020 closing as 'partially accepted'.	
2019201	2. The CAA considers mandating additional cockpit crew to for single-pilot survey operations.	therefore, in response to the reco recommendation and will conduc	gnise the unique hazard of the operations in question and ommendation, confirm that the CAA Partially Accepts this ct a review of the risk assessments of survey operators, to nts of AMC SPO.OP.230(b) and are robust in addressing this	

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Airprox Recommendation		Comments		
2019208	19208 1. The P68 operating company considers further mitigations to MAC for survey operations.		This subject is both a safety matter and a commercial matter. The P68 is certified as a Single Pilot Aeroplane. EASA (CAT and Part SPO) and ANO regulation does not deal with any requirement for two pilots for this type of work. We operate in a commercial market with other UK entities, EU operators and Non-EEA operators. The many SPO-type flights that operate are both Commercial and Non-Commercial SPO and vary greatly in aircraft type/class/rotary/flight conditions, heights, altitudes and flight levels, in and outside of controlled airspace. We see the benefits of two crew in certain areas of airspace and we do what we can to encourage the end user to take the additional cost burden and reduction in other payload or fuel and therefore endurance. In the past we have also refused to operate in areas unless the clients accept the position of two crew. This has been to their cost and also as a cost neutral in some cases so that we can operate and complete the work. Mitigations that we routinely consider or that are currently in progress are: Scheduling of survey tasks to take advantage of surveillance-based Air Traffic Services where available. Fitting ACAS to the fleet where possible – this is an ongoing programme. Where commercial considerations permit, carriage of an extra crewmember to supplement the lookout task. We remain engaged with the UK CAA in trying to influence a change to the regulation such that all operators conducting survey tasks in UK airspace would be required to show enhanced MAC mitigation measures over and above the minimum requirements of EASA Part SPO. We also have further discussions to have with the CAA over Single Crew V Multi Crew operation of larger NCO aircraft that can also be used as CAT.	
2019208	2. The CAA considers mandating additional cockpit crew to for single-pilot survey operations.	enable enhanced lookout	therefore, in response to the recomme recommendation and will conduct a re	the unique hazard of the operations in question and endation, confirm that the CAA Partially Accepts this eview of the risk assessments of survey operators, to AMC SPO.OP.230(b) and are robust in addressing this

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Airprox Recommendation		Comments		
2019210	Gloucestershire Airport to clarify their AIP entry regarding of	departure procedures.	An AIP change has been submitted and	should be in place in the October AIRAC.
2019221	Old Sarum to review their AIP entry to ensure coherence with the Old Sarum website and proprietary flight guide information.		The state of the s	their Aerodrome License and has now closed. This action dation being implemented by the Airport Manager.
2019226	The P68 operating company considers further mitigation operations.	s to MAC for survey		
2019226	2. The CAA considers mandating additional cockpit crew to for single-pilot survey operations.	enable enhanced lookout	therefore, in response to the recomme recommendation and will conduct a re	the unique hazard of the operations in question and endation, confirm that the CAA Partially Accepts this view of the risk assessments of survey operators, to AMC SPO.OP.230(b) and are robust in addressing this
2019227	The C404 operating company considers further mitigations to MAC for survey operations.		in their fleet, is reviewing supplementi	ment, is considering TAS for the lighter (<5700kg) aircraft ng lookout (through use of the task specialist, rather than ewing task locations and scheduling and has re-issued a of operating ivo glider sites.
2019227	The CAA considers mandating additional cockpit crew to enable enhanced lookout for single-pilot survey operations.		therefore, in response to the recomme recommendation and will conduct a re	the unique hazard of the operations in question and endation, confirm that the CAA Partially Accepts this view of the risk assessments of survey operators, to AMC SPO.OP.230(b) and are robust in addressing this
2019238	The MAA ensures that military operators fully understand tapplication of the term 'MARSA'.	he definition and	RA amended with a reference for indiv	iduals to refer to MARSA.
2019257	Gloucester to consider applying for an SSR transponder cor	nspicuity code.	Recommendation rejected due to worl	kload and a backlog of training requirements.
2019264	Goodwood to review fixed-wing and rotary-wing circuit dec	confliction.	RECCOMMENDATION REMAINS OPEN	
2019282	Kent Gliding Club and Lydd Airport establish a Letter of Agresisk of concurrent activities in the same volume of airspace		Recommendation rejected.	

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Airprox	Recommendation		Comments	
2019287	Nottingham/Tollerton airfield to consider publishing procedures for the integration of faster jet aircraft with other circuit traffic.		The airport safety committee re-visited the incident with the possibility of a fast jet circuit being implemented at Nottingham. Of the committee members present at the meeting, there was a unanimous decision against a fast jet circuit. Following on from a previous meeting the Jet Provost crews have agreed to re-join the circuit via an overhead join. The Nottingham AIP entry will be amended to warn users that a fast-jet operates from the airfield and posters have been displayed for increased awareness of local pilots.	
2019294	The BGA reiterate guidance to gliding clubs regarding the significant mitigation to mid-air collision afforded by fitment of SSR transponders to tug aircraft.		The BGA has subsequently reminded their clubs that transponders in tug aircraft may help to reduce MAC risk under certain circumstances. In addition, they worked with a major club to establish a towing transponder code, which is now in use and was promulgated to clubs earlier this year.	
2019298	Dunkeswell airfield and the Devon And Somerset Gliding Club reach agreement to include parachuting operations within their Letter of Agreement.		Cooperation Agreement signed between	en Dunkeswell Airfield (inc Skydiving ops) and DSGC.
2019300	MoD considers the introduction of a flow arrow for the Hor	nister Pass.	Recommendation rejected after comp	rehensive safety review.
2019323	The CAA considers reviewing the UK AIP, ENR 1.6, paragrap point at which the 'lifting' call is to be made.	h 4.5.5, to define the	industry, the outcome of which is that the current operating environment. There was a consensus that the UKAB's	lation internally, and has also consulted with the offshore the current AIP entry is deemed to remain appropriate for s observations about the Forties Field communications all offshore platforms and, as such, the 'not above 1000ft ourpose.