


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026102

Date: 05 Jun 2026 Time: 1422Z Position: 5146N 00054W Location: 4NM SW Aylesbury

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	A400M	C42
Operator	HQ Air (Ops)	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Traffic	Listening Out ¹
Provider	Brize Director	Wycombe Radio
Altitude/FL	3000ft	2500ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Observed
Reported		
Colours	Grey	White, blue
Lighting	Strobes, nav.	Strobes, nav.
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	2500ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH
Heading	270°	150°
Speed	250kt	70kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	Not fitted
Alert	RA	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	400ft V/1NM H	500ft V/5NM H
Recorded	500ft V/0.5NM H	



THE A400M PILOT reports that, on recovery to [destination], whilst under a radar-vector'd Tower-to-Tower transit at 3000ft AMSL, pop-up traffic triggered a TCAS RA. It was an intermittent TCAS pop-up inside 2.5NM and 400ft below. The traffic was sighted low in the 1 o'clock position prior to the RA event. The TCAS RA direction (monitor vertical speed) was followed and actions were conducted as per SOP. A radio call was made to inform Brize ATC of the incident. The crew was visual with the other aircraft throughout. The aircraft landed at [destination] without further incident.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE C42 PILOT reports that they had conducted a short navigation exercise from [...] to [...] via Princes Risborough with a standard rejoin [to their destination]. The flight was in uncontrolled airspace, VFR conditions, good visibility and at approximately 2500ft on QNH. At approximately 1420, they headed back towards Princes Risborough on a heading of 150°. They saw, in the far distance [at a reported range of 10NM], and in an easterly direction (relative bearing 10 o'clock), a 4-engined military transport aircraft, subsequently identified as an A400M. As it came closer, its relative bearing drew steadily right and its relative angle of height increased. At no point did they believe that there was a risk of collision or undue proximity.

The aircraft passed from their left-to-right directly ahead of them and with probably 500 to 1000ft vertical separation. They were, at all times, on the A400M's starboard side. For the duration of the short flight they had remained on the Wycombe Radio frequency 126.555MHz. They reported overhead Princes Risborough and recovered to [their destination], landing at 1432Z.

¹ The pilot of the C42 reported that they had been in receipt of an AGCS from Wycombe Radio.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE BRIZE DIRECTOR reports that they were the controller working a busy band-boxed session with multiple inbounds, outbounds and approving zone transits from the Zone controller. [The pilot of the A400M] had opted to recover from [...] at 3000ft through Class G airspace under a Traffic Service. [The controller at the takeoff airfield] called to handover the aircraft, called relevant traffic and told them that the [pilot of the A400M] was visual with the traffic. Shortly after coming onto frequency, [the pilot of the A400M] stated that they had a TCAS RA. [The Brize Director] acknowledged and told them to report when they were ready for turns. The [pilot] was then directed into RAF Brize Norton with no further issue. There was no mention of an Airprox on frequency at the time

The controller perceived the severity of the incident as 'Low'.

THE BRIZE SUPERVISOR reports that the work level in the control room was higher than normal and they were assisting in administrative tasks for several controllers. They heard [the pilot of the A400M] check in with Radar/Director and declare that they had a TCAS RA. The rest of the recovery was completed without further incident.

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WYCOMBE AERODROME reports that the Air/Ground Operator on the day did not have [the pilot of the C42] on frequency overhead Thame [approximately 3NM southwest of the Airprox location]. The usual position for inbound traffic to switch to Wycombe Radio is overhead Princes Risborough or Stokenchurch depending on circuit position. [The pilot of the C42] was not on frequency at the time of the incident.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Benson was recorded as follows:

METAR EGUB 051420Z 21007KT 9999 FEW042 BKN060 17/07 Q1012 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU

Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

Background

The controller was working a busy bandboxed session as Approach and Director. The A400M was recovering from [...] to RAF Brize Norton under a Traffic Service.

Sequence of Events

At 1421:01, [...] the A400M [was handed over] to the Brize Norton controller. During the handover, [the controller at the takeoff airfield] pointed out the C42 and confirmed that the A400M pilot was visual.

At 1422:17, the A400M pilot made initial contact with the Brize Norton controller and reported that they had just received a TCAS RA.

CPA occurred at 1422:10 with 0.5NM horizontal separation and 500ft vertical separation.

2 Gp BM Analysis

Whilst the occurrence took place during the transfer of the A400M between ATS agencies, visual contact with the C42 had already been established and reported, with this information passed during the handover.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. Both aircraft were observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 1 – CPA at 1422:10

The A400M and C42 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.³ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the A400M pilot was required to give way to the C42.⁴

Comments

HQ Air Command

The Airprox occurred in Class G airspace as the A400M crew was transferring between agencies. The A400M crew was operating under a Traffic Service and the controller at the departure aerodrome passed Traffic Information (TI) regarding the C42 to the A400M crew before they changed frequency. The combination of TI and TCAS information allowed the A400M crew to visually acquire the C42 and monitor its progress as it passed to the right and below them. No evasive manoeuvring was required, and the A400M crew complied with the TCAS RA to monitor their vertical speed. On completion of the handover, the A400M crew reported the TCAS RA to the controller at their destination aerodrome and conducted an approach without further incident.

AOPA

For the TCAS to operate, the distances involved would have been closer than those described. This is not unusual in the VFR environment. In this case, both pilots were visual with each other from some distance and were happy that their tactical planning had ensured adequate separation. The risk algorithm within the TCAS had a different perspective. However, AOPA agrees with the pilots' perception of risk: 'none' and 'low'.

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 13.

⁴ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 12.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an A400M and a C42 flew into proximity 4NM southwest of Aylesbury at 1422Z on Friday 5th June 2026. The A400M pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of a Traffic Service from Brize Director. The C42 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, listening out on the Wycombe Radio frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the A400M, and members noted that they had been passed Traffic Information on the C42 by the controller at their takeoff airfield. Although the exact phrasing of that information had not been available to members, nor the distance at which it had been called, it was noted that the pilot of the A400M had subsequently transmitted that they had visually acquired the traffic. Indeed, members noted that the A400M pilot's narrative specified that the C42 had been sighted "*low in the 1 o'clock position*". Members agreed that the TCAS fitted to the A400M had subsequently provided a Resolution Advisory (**CF4**). It was appreciated that the pilot of the A400M had been concerned by the TCAS contact, and that an RA had been triggered (**CF3**), but noted that the correct actions had been carried out in response.

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the C42. It was noted that their aircraft had not been fitted with an additional EC device, and members agreed that they had not had situational awareness of the presence of the A400M until it had been sighted (**CF2**). Members wished to emphasise that, had a compatible EC device been fitted, it may have provided a significant benefit to their situational awareness, particularly during their flight in busy airspace. Nevertheless, members noted that they had visually acquired the A400M at distance and, as it had drawn nearer, noted that they had assessed that the geometry had been such that there had not been a risk of collision or "*undue proximity*". It was noted that no avoiding action had been necessary.

Members next focussed on the actions of the Brize controller, and noted that they had been telephoned by the controller at the airfield from where the A400M pilot had departed. The handover had included notification that Traffic Information had been passed to the A400M pilot on the C42 and that the pilot had reported that it had been sighted. Members noted that, shortly after the A400M pilot had established two-way contact with the Brize controller, they had reported the TCAS RA. An advisor to the Board explained to members that the STCA in use at the Brize position had triggered an alert to the proximity of the A400M and C42 (**CF1**). Members agreed that there had been little else that the controller could have done to have assisted matters.

The discussion was concluded and members considered the risk of collision. Noting that neither pilot had been required to have taken any action to have altered the geometry of the encounter, and that the separation at CPA had been significant, members were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. Members appreciated that the pilot of the A400M had been concerned by the proximity of the C42 (**CF5**) but agreed that normal safety parameters had pertained. The Board assigned Risk Category E to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026102			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			

1	Technical	• STCA Warning	An event involving the triggering of a Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Warning	
Flight Elements				
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
3	Human Factors	• Unnecessary Action	~~Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
4	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS RA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered	
• See and Avoid				
5	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the C42 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the A400M until it had been visually acquired.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026102			Outside Controlled Airspace					
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness Barrier Weighting				
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓					
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✓	✓					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✓	✓					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✓					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⚠	✓					
	See & Avoid	✓	✓					
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable		Not Used	
Provision		✓	⚠	✗	●			
Application		✓	⚠	✗	●		○	
Effectiveness		■	■	■	■		□	

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).