AIRPROX REPORT No 2026007

Date: 17 Jan 2026 Time: ~1351Z Position: 5423N 00737W Location: ivo Enniskillen Airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	X'Air
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Enniskillen ATZ	Scottish FIR[1]
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Enniskillen Radio	Enniskillen Radio
Altitude	~860ft	NK
Transponder	None[2]	None[3]
Reported		
Colours	White with red/blue	White
Lighting	Bcn, strb, nav, ldg	Strobe
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	5-10km
Altitude/FL	700ft	~1150ft
Altimeter	QFE (1006hPa)	QNH (~1021hPa)[4]
Heading	320°	270°
Speed	75-80kt	70kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	SafeSky
Alert	None	None
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	100ft V/300m H	1500ft V/1NM H
Recorded	NK V/NK H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that, on [arriving at Enniskillen] at around 1350, [they and their] PPL student descended to circuit height (1000ft AGL) and positioned on the deadside (east of the airfield) to join crosswind for RW32 left-hand. Whilst continuing downwind, they heard a non-standard RT [call] from an unidentified aircraft stating that they were *"Taking a flight over the lakes".* A few seconds later, they then heard the Air/Ground Operator in the control Tower requesting the aircraft callsign, POB, and aircraft type. The non-standard communications from this aircraft continued and, after a few more requests from the Air/Ground Operator, the following callsign, [X'Air C/S], and that the aircraft was a microlight was transmitted. No information was provided relating to present position, level, heading and what area of the Fermanagh Lakes they were actually intending to fly over. At this stage, [their PA28] was now positioned on left base and configured for landing on RW32. Having turned from base leg onto final, and just prior to wings level, their student alerted them to the presence of a fixed-wing aircraft which they now know to be an X'Air Hawk microlight. Their altitude at this time was approximately 700ft AGL. The aircraft was passing from right-to-left (east to west) across their approach path to landing. They would estimate separation was approximately 300m away from them at its closest point and at [a height] of 600ft AGL. Continuing on the approach, the Pilot Flying (PF) student had been distracted by this occurrence and, as a consequence, landed long on RW32, a go-around was considered but ultimately was not required. Whilst continuing the approach to land, they observed the microlight travelling on a northerly heading remaining inside the ATZ and in the opposite circuit direction to the

[1] The exact track, and therefore position, of the X'Air could not be determined.
[2] The pilot of the PA28 reported that the transponder was transmitting on Modes A, C, and S; this was not detected on radar at the time of the Airprox.
[3] The pilot of the X'Air reported that their transponder was switched to 'OFF' due to a damaged aerial making the transponder not available for use.
[4] The pilot of the X'Air reported their altimeter was set to the QNH of approximately 1021hPa (not 1012hPa as expected).

landing RW32. They also heard the A/G Operator request the pilot of [the X'Air] to contact Enniskillen Tower on landing. They did not hear any acknowledgment of this transmission.

They further noted that their student had taken no avoiding action.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE X'AIR PILOT reports that they were enroute to Enniskillen Airport, and had called ATC [Enniskillen Radio] 6NM from the airport with their intentions. They passed their information on to ATC [sic] but [they thought that] someone was transmitting along with ATC [the Enniskillen Air/Ground Radio Operator]. All they got was a squealing in their headset. They tried two times with the same result, and on a third occasion the [Air/Ground Radio Operator] asked them *'how many POB?'* to which they answered *'2 POB'.* They did not hear any other information, or traffic calls, or clearance to enter the ATZ. As they were travelling at 80mph at approximately 1150ft and were approaching the boundary of the airfield[5] [ATZ], they chose to manoeuvre away from and around the ATZ. They checked for traffic and were visual with an aircraft way out in their 10 o'clock [position], which was miles from them, heading in the direction of Omagh. They told [the Air/Ground Radio Operator] that they were not landing at this time as they were heading up the Lough to Ederney[6] area.

The pilot further noted that, before they left their departure airfield, they had set their altimeter to the airfield elevation, as no-one was there to provide a QNH. After departure and on reaching 2000ft, their planned altitude, they had selected the Aldergrove ATIS and made a small adjustment to the altimeter setting. From memory, they thought that the QNH was approximately 1021hPa. They further noted that they had planned the trip for 2000ft, but because of low cloud they believe that they may have descended as low as 1150ft, to remain clear of cloud, in the vicinity of Enniskillen. The pilot confirmed that they had been to Enniskillen Airport many times and were very familiar with the area and procedures. They mentioned that after they had passed Enniskillen ATZ, further down the Lough, they thought that they heard someone calling, something like, '*1 mile and a half downwind',* and they had, therefore, considered that there had likely been no fault with their radio. They had been unable to check the radio back at base as there had been no-one on frequency to check with.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE ENNISKILLEN AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that, at 1348, [the PA28] was [inbound] with an instructor and student on board. They were given the runway in use (RW32 left-hand), the QNH and QFE. [The pilot] advised they were positioning deadside to join overhead for a landing on RW32 left-hand.

At 1349 [a C208] departed RW32; the pilot was given the runway for departure (RW32) and QNH. At 1350 the pilot of [the X'Air] called Enniskillen Radio to advise they were in the area *"over the lakes"*. The Air/Ground Operator repeatedly requested the aircraft type and POB. The [X'Air] pilot eventually advised there were 2 POB and the type was a microlight. At 1352 the microlight was observed flying east-to-west, south of [the airfield] inside the ATZ. It passed in front of the PA28 [on the final approach to RW32]. The microlight continued in a northerly direction inside the ATZ, in an opposite direction to the circuit direction. At 1353 [the PA28] landed long on RW32. At 1353 the pilot of the microlight was requested to telephone the [airfield] on landing.

They further noted that the lake referred to is Lower Lough Erne; this is situated west and northwest of the [airfield]. The X'Air was not over the lake but approached from the east. No phone call was received.

The Air/Ground Operator perceived the severity of the incident as 'Medium'.

[5] The pilot's initial report did not make clear that they had meant the ATZ boundary.
[6] Ederney is 7.75NM north of Enniskillen Airport, and Lower Lough Erne is to the northwest.

Factual Background

The weather at Belfast Aldergrove Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGAA 171350Z AUTO 10004KT 9999 SCT024/// //////TCU 07/06 Q1012 RERA
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

Neither aircraft was detected on radar, however, the PA28 was detected on third-party aircraft tracking software utilising ADS-B sources. The pilot of the PA28 provided the aircraft's GPS-derived track data which was coincident with the ADS-B track data and the pilot of the X'Air provided screenshots of their track from their passenger's SafeSky App from which no data download was available.

Due to the absence of track, time, and altitude data for the X'Air, the CPA could not be assessed, other than to note that the reported Airprox position was at approximately 1350:52.

The PA28 and X'Air pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[7] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[8]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and an X'Air flew into proximity in the vicinity of Enniskillen Airport at approximately 1351Z on Saturday 17th January 2026. Both the PA28 and X'Air pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an AGCS from Enniskillen Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar video recordings, GPS track data for the flight of the PA28, and a report from the Enniskillen Air/Ground Operator. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first looked at the actions of the PA28 pilot, and noted that the pilot had been instructing a student as they had made a standard overhead join into Enniskillen. The Board further noted that the pilot had been listening to another aircraft pilot's intermittent R/T calls and had become aware that this pilot had wanted to fly down the nearby lakes but had not heard any position report from that pilot. Additionally, the PA28's electronic conspicuity device had not detected the other aircraft (the X'Air) due to there being no detectable electronic emissions from the X'Air (**CF4**), and members agreed that this combination had led to the PA28 pilot only having had generic situational awareness of the presence of a microlight, but not the position of it (**CF3**). The Board noted that the student had continued with the circuit and the instructor had reported that the X'Air microlight had passed directly in front of them as they had reached the final approach to RW32. Although the student had not reacted, members recognised that the PA28 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the X'Air (**CF7**) and the effect of the event had likely contributed to the student landing long.

Turning their attention to the action of the X'Air pilot, the Board noted that the pilot had been having problems listening to Enniskillen's response to their own R/T calls, and possibly making intelligible calls themselves. The Board noted that the pilot reported that, once they had realised there had been an R/T issue, they had chosen to route around the Enniskillen ATZ and not through it. Members agreed that, due in part to the RT issues the X'Air pilot had apparently been experiencing, they had not effectively communicated their intentions to route around the zone to the Enniskillen AGO and other pilots on the

[7] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[8] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

frequency (**CF1**). The Board then discussed the actual routeing of the X'Air, but was unable to determine where the X'Air pilot had flown their aircraft due to the differing reports between the X'Air pilot and those of the PA28 pilot and AGO. [UKAB note: hence the two tracks depicted on the diagram at the top of this report.] The Board felt that it had been a pity that the X'Air pilot had been unable to provide a GPS track from their EC device to help clarify the situation, but was satisfied that the X'Air had remained sufficiently close to the circuit for members to conclude that the pilot had not sufficiently avoided the circuit pattern formed by the PA28 (**CF2**), which members also found surprising, given that the pilot had had generic situational awareness of circuit activity based on their reported familiarity with the Enniskillen circuit (**CF3**). The Board noted that the X'Air pilot's passenger had been carrying an EC device that had been capable of detecting the PA28, but that no alert had been reported as having been received (**CF5**), and that this had contributed to the pilot's reduced situational awareness. The Board further noted that the pilot had reported that they *'were visual with an aircraft way out in their 10 o'clock [position], which was miles from them, heading in the direction of Omagh'.* The Board surmised that the PA28 may have been pointing towards Omagh during the turn onto the final approach, but did not qualify as being *'miles from them'* and members agreed, therefore, that the X'Air pilot had seen a distant aircraft and not the PA28 in the Enniskillen circuit (**CF6**).

The Board briefly looked at the actions of the Enniskillen Air/Ground Operator, and wondered if they had been able to assist the PA28 pilot by locating the position of the X'Air. Ultimately, members agreed that the AGO would likely have been uncertain of the X'Air's position or pilot's intentions and had remained uninvolved.

In concluding their discussion and turning to the assessment of risk, the Board noted that the PA28 pilot had not needed to take avoiding action on seeing the X'Air pass from right-to-left ahead of them. Members agreed, therefore, that although safety had been degraded, there had been no risk of collision. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026007			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
2	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
4	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[9]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Enniskillen Air Ground Operator was not required to monitor the position of aircraft.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the X'Air neither avoided the pattern of traffic already formed in the circuit at Enniskillen, nor effectively communicated their intended routeing.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because both the PA28 and X'Air pilots had only generic situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28's EC equipment was incompatible with that of the X'Air, and the EC device carried in the X'Air did not alert as might have been expected.



[9] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.