AIRPROX REPORT No 2025250

Date: 13 Dec 2025 Time: 1614Z Position: 5120N 00049W Location: Blackbushe ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Europa	S200
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Blackbushe ATZ	Blackbushe ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AFIS	AFIS
Provider	Blackbushe Info.	Blackbushe Info.
Altitude/FL	600ft	700ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	Silver
Lighting	Strobes	Strobes, taxy, landing, nav
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5-10km	5-10km
Altitude/FL	600ft	800ft
Altimeter	QFE	QFE (1014hPa)
Heading	340°	250°
Speed	100kt	65kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM, SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	0ft V/500m H	"*Not seen*"
Recorded	100ft V/0.1NM H	



THE EUROPA PILOT reports that they joined the Blackbushe circuit from a Farnborough CTR zone transit. They joined at 1500ft QFE, between mid-downwind and the base turn. Their understanding was that the circuit was clear. They reported base and Blackbushe Information informed them that there was one aircraft [whose pilot had] reported final. They were visual with an aircraft on short final and so reported them in sight. However, that was not the aircraft they were talking about. They looked forward to see another aircraft directly in front at the same altitude. They took up a right-hand orbit for spacing [UKAB Secretariat note: a left-hand orbit was conducted], reported the orbit and made two turns. After levelling out, they opted for a go-around as the approach was not stable at that point.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE S200 PILOT reports that they received a call from their training school stating that an Airprox was raised involving a Europa and their S200. On the day, they were conducting their first solo Navex and were returning to land at Blackbushe on RW25. As they remember it, there were three aircraft in the circuit around the time stated. They followed the standard deadside join, reporting a downwind call. The first aircraft was on base and turning final when they had visual with it (they were downwind at that point). They then proceeded to turn onto base with a delayed and extended turn to give enough space and time for the [pilot of the] first aircraft to land and vacate the runway so that they could report final. At that time, there was an aircraft behind them but they were not visual with it or aware of their separation from them.

Once reported final, they landed with slightly faster speed than their usual landing and proceeded to vacate the runway right at the end, taxiway Echo. The aircraft behind them had gone around. They only knew that as they had heard it on the radio.

Their instructor, and two fellow individuals from their flying school, had seen [the event] and made a casual comment that the pilot of the aircraft behind them [seemed to have been] flying low and fast and had to initiate a go-around.

THE BLACKBUSHE AFISO reports that they received a notification from the UK Airprox Board of an Airprox at the base leg stage of the circuit in use. The AFISO and ATSU were not informed, nor aware of this occurrence.

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGLF 131620Z 18005KT CAVOK 07/05 Q1026
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Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

ATSI has nothing further to add to the comprehensive Blackbushe Unit investigation.

Blackbushe Unit Investigation

The AFISO initially reported that they do not remember anything unusual about the incident. It was a busy Saturday, and it was not long before official night so it was getting dark. There were no comments about the incident made on the frequency post-flight or any telephone calls received to indicate there was an incident.

The first notification received by the AFISO of such an incident was the Airprox notification via email on the 16th December. An MOR was subsequently submitted.

On reviewing the recordings to refresh their memory, the AFISO had the following points:

> When [the Europa pilot] made their initial call to join from Farnborough, they believed them to be coming from the direction of M3 Junction 4 VRP (SE of Blackbushe). As Farnborough and Blackbushe have a Letter of Agreement which encourages [Blackbushe] to maintain complementary runway directions, they know from experience that aircraft usually are routed through the Farnborough CTR1 to the west of the aerodrome following the A331 to the M3 Junction 4 VRP. They had not anticipated the aircraft coming from the Fleet Pond VRP direction (which is south of Blackbushe, mid-downwind). Because of this assumption, they suggested a base leg join to expedite the arrival into Blackbushe without having to go through the overhead and reporting deadside.
>
> When [the Europa pilot] reported base leg as requested, they informed them of one aircraft ahead, referring to [the S200] which was in their 12 o'clock. [An uninvolved C152] was also on very short final to land (just crossing the aerodrome boundary fence at 20-30ft) which is why they did not provide information on that aircraft. They understand from [the Europa] pilot's report that they may have confused this Traffic Information, believing it to have referred to [the C152].

Radio sequence of the occurrence:

1612:31

[Europa pilot]	*Blackbushe Information* [Europa C/S] *joining from Farnborough request joining information*
Blackbushe AFISO	[Europa C/S] *Blackbushe Information using runway 25 left hand circuit QFE 1014*
[Europa pilot]	*25 LHC QFE 1014* [Europa C/S]

Blackbushe AFISO	[Europa C/S] *I have no traffic to affect, would you like to report for a base leg?*
[Europa pilot]	*Yes, roger, will report base leg* [Europa C/S]
Blackbushe AFISO	*Report base leg runway 25*
[Europa pilot]	*Report left base runway 25* [Europa C/S]

[C152 pilot]	[C152 C/S] *Final to land*
Blackbushe AFISO	[C152 C/S] *Runway 25 surface wind 180/05 kts land at your discretion*
[C152 pilot]	[C152 C/S]

1613:56

[Europa pilot]	[Europa C/S] *Left base runway 25*
Blackbushe AFISO	[Europa C/S] *Thank you, report final*
Blackbushe AFISO	*One aircraft reported ahead, are you visual?*
[Europa pilot]	*Affirm* [Europa C/S]

1614:20

[Europa pilot]	[Europa C/S] *Making an orbit of final leg*
Blackbushe AFISO	[Europa C/S] *No reported traffic to affect*
[Europa pilot]	*Roger* [Europa C/S]

1614:36

[S200 pilot]	[S200 C/S] *Final to land*
Blackbushe AFISO	[S200 C/S] *Runway 25 surface wind 200/05 kts land at your discretion*
[S200 pilot]	[S200 C/S]

Aerodrome rules and procedures: [As published on the website for Blackbushe Airport, VFR Flying procedures].

5.7 Unless in an emergency, aircraft must observe the Rules of the Air for aerodromes at all times.

10.1.2. From within controlled airspace (south and east). Aircraft coming from within the Farnborough CTR shall join overhead at 1600ft AAL to ensure they are within the LFA. They shall descend on the dead side and integrate with the visual circuit

10.2 Downwind, base leg, and long finals joins may be possible depending on circuit traffic, but pilots are advised to plan for a standard join to avoid circuit conflicts if the circuit is busy

Review of immediate corrective actions:

Blackbushe Airport will undertake to provide a copy of this Airprox to AFISOs and Air/Ground Operators to increase awareness of potential Airprox risks within the Blackbushe ATZ. The Blackbushe Safety Action Group (next meeting in March 2026) provides an opportunity to disseminate safety information to resident flying schools and operators. The use of 'no reported traffic' is also to be discussed in the next AFISO meeting.

Root cause analysis:

Whilst analysis by the UK Airprox Board will consider any contributory factors relating to pilot action and the operation of aircraft, this Unit investigation is focussed on any causal factors within the control of Blackbushe ATSU. Accordingly, the following were identified:

1. [The Europa] was arriving from Farnborough via Fleet Pond. On speaking with the AFISO, they anticipated the aircraft arriving via M3 J4, hence the offer of a base join.

2. The use of the phrase "*no reported traffic*" was, in the opinion of the AFISO, because there was no traffic to affect the aircraft at the time, based on the position that the AFISO believed the aircraft to be in. However, it was clear in hindsight how this terminology would be received by the pilot of [the Europa] and would be confusing.

3. There was no downwind call from [the Europa pilot] as they had been asked to report base leg.

4. [Europa C/S] reported base at 1613:56, at which point, CCTV from the tower shows [the C152] over the fence for RW25 and of no factor. The AFISO gave "*one ahead*", referring to [the S200] but, from the report obtained, it appears that the pilot of [Europa C/S] had identified [the landing C152] as the traffic ahead and not [the S200] which now appeared on a wide base-leg and flying much slower. Traffic Information could have included the type or location to aid situational awareness.

5. [The S200 pilot] had not made any calls since [the Europa pilot] had joined the frequency and therefore there was a lost opportunity for [the Europa pilot] to build up situational awareness from radio calls.

6. Whilst analysing the Airprox during a recent Operations and Safety meeting, the speed differential in the circuit between [the Europa] and [the S200] was discussed. The differing speeds, and integration of differing types, remains one of the biggest risks at a mixed-use airport such as Blackbushe. A contributing factor was the speed (~140kt) of [the Europa], flying a circuit close to the published pattern, whilst [the S200 pilot] was ~100kt and flew a very wide base leg, close to the ATZ boundary. This allowed [the Europa pilot] to catch [the S200], and also placed [the S200] to the right of [the Europa pilot's] field of view, when the left-hand circuit would naturally lead the pilot to be looking left for circuit traffic.

Root cause correction (new procedures):

Reminders to be issued to based pilots:

When joining, please include a location/direction, and a distance to run to ATZ boundary. If arriving via Farnborough, then Fleet Pond VRP or M3 J4 VRP are useful position reports that enable an AFISO to provide accurate and timely Traffic Information.

Reminders issued to Blackbushe AFISOs:

Ask for precise location if not provided by aircraft on initial call. "*Inbound from Farnborough*" could indicate M3 J4 VRP, overhead EGLF airport or via Fleet Pond VRP and lead to ambiguity without clarification.

Exercise caution when suggesting non-standard joins, particularly when a precise location for the joining aircraft has not been established.

Continue to provide traffic information to all airborne aircraft even if that includes aircraft that are in the final stages of an approach and deemed no factor. If a joining aircraft is flying particularly fast, they may catch up a preceding aircraft. Similarly, should an aircraft in the final stages of an approach perform a go-around, the traffic information would have already been passed.

Consider the use of aircraft type/number ahead to aid situational awareness. E.g. 1 Cessna final, 1 Piper base leg.

Conclusion:

[The Europa pilot] called for join when positioned south of Blackbushe and was suggested to join base leg. At the time of initial call, the use of "*no reported traffic*" by the Blackbushe AFISO was confusing to the pilot of [the Europa] as the circuit was active with one fixed-wing on short final and one fixed-wing late downwind. Without specific location information from [the Europa pilot], the pilot was asked to report base leg when, in this instance, a downwind call would have been beneficial

and may have allowed the AFISO to pass timely and specific Traffic Information on aircraft ahead. [The Europa pilot] reported base leg and was provided with Traffic Information on an aircraft (the [S200]) positioned ahead, and [the Europa pilot] reported visual. When analysing the radio calls, it was not clear if [the Europa pilot] had reported visual with [the S200] on base turning final or [the C152] that was likely touching down at the time (and the only aircraft they had heard on frequency until that point). The incident may have been further mitigated by not suggesting the base-leg join, allowing the pilot to perform a standard overhead join, and giving additional time to pass specific Traffic Information. Additionally, advising [the pilots that there had been] two aircraft active in the circuit at the time of initial call, and asking [the Europa pilot] to report visual before offering a downwind/base join, may have prevented the occurrence.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 1). The Europa, but not the S200, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources. The pilot of the S200 kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight.



Figure 1 – 1612:31



Figure 2 – 1613:55



Figure 3 – CPA at 1614:23

The Europa and S200 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Europa and an S200 flew into proximity in the Blackbushe ATZ at 1614Z on Saturday 13th December 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, and in receipt of an AFIS from Blackbushe Information.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data from the flight of the S200, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the AFISO involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the S200, and members noted that they had been positioned along the downwind leg of the circuit when the pilot of the Europa had first called the Blackbushe AFISO. Members suggested that there had been an opportunity for the S200 pilot to have assimilated that the Europa pilot's intention had been to join the circuit on the base leg, and that there might exist a potential conflict with their own position. However, from the S200 pilot's narrative report of the event, members agreed that, although they had been aware of an aircraft "*behind them*" in the circuit, they had not had situational awareness of the Europa as it had been converging from their left (**CF4**). It was agreed that the Europa had not been sighted by the S200 pilot during the encounter (**CF7**), and members were keen to emphasise the importance of maintaining an effective lookout in the visual circuit.

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the Europa. It was noted that, when they had first called the Blackbushe AFISO, they had transmitted that they were "*joining from Farnborough*". Given that they had tracked directly overhead the Fleet Pond VRP, members suggested that it may have been prudent to have cited that VRP in their call to have assisted the AFISO. It was noted that the AFISO had subsequently transmitted "*I have no traffic to affect, would you like to report for a base leg?*" to which the Europa pilot had responded: "*Yes, roger, will report base leg*". Members surmised that the intention of the AFISO's transmission had been to have offered a base-leg join, whereas the Europa pilot had actually joined the circuit on the downwind leg and had only confirmed that they would provide a position report when on the base leg. Members noted that, after the Europa pilot had reported on left base, the AFISO had informed them of "*one aircraft reported ahead*". Members had sympathy with the view that the Europa pilot had visually acquired the uninvolved C152 and had assumed that that had been the 'one aircraft ahead'. Members noted that the Europa had been fitted with additional EC devices, however, it was agreed that, in this instance, they would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the S200 (**CF5**). It was suggested that the absence of an alert from their devices may have reinforced the notion that there had been no conflicting aircraft nearby. Again, members wished to remind all pilots of the imperative to maintain a very thorough lookout in the visual circuit. It was agreed that the pilot of the Europa had had an inaccurate mental model of the traffic in the circuit (**CF4**). However, members noted that the pilot of the Europa had visually acquired the S200 in time to have taken avoiding action and had turned their aircraft away to increase the separation. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the S200 had been sighted late (**CF6**) and, ultimately, the pilot of the Europa had not conformed with, nor avoided, the pattern of traffic in the circuit (**CF3**).

Members next considered the actions of the Blackbushe AFISO. It was surmised that, having received the initial position call from the Europa pilot that they had been "*joining from Farnborough*", the AFISO had assumed that they had been further east than their actual position, and had offered a base-leg join for their convenience. However, as there had been some ambiguity as to their actual location, members suggested that it may have been beneficial to have requested a more accurate position report.

The transmitted phrases "*no traffic to affect*" and "*one aircraft reported ahead*" were pondered, and it occurred to members that both had involved an element of assumption on the part of the AFISO. Perhaps if the Europa pilot had been further east (as they had assumed), and had intended to join the circuit directly on the base leg, the phrase "*no traffic to affect*" may have been valid. Additionally, members felt that there had also been an assumption that the Europa pilot would not consider the C152 as 'circuit traffic', given that its pilot had been on the final stages of approach to the runway. In consideration of those factors, members agreed that the Blackbushe AFISO had introduced confusion by having passed inaccurate Traffic Information (**CF2**). Recalling the wording provided in CAP 797 (Flight Information Service Officer Manual), members agreed that they had not fully complied with the procedure to 'expedite and maintain an orderly flow of air traffic' (1.9 (c)) and to 'provide advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights' (1.9(d)) (**CF1**).

Members commended the extensive investigation conducted by the Blackbushe Unit, and were heartened that lessons had been identified and that corrective action had been taken. The Board concluded their discussion and considered the risk of collision. Some members proffered that the safety of the pilots involved had not been assured and that there had been a risk of collision. Other members

suggested that the Europa pilot had sighted the S200 in time to have taken effective avoiding action and had increased the separation. A vote was conducted and the latter view prevailed. Members were in agreement that safety margins had been reduced, but were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025250			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Human Factors	• ANS Traffic Information Provision	Provision of ANS traffic information	TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the transmissions made by the Blackbushe AFISO had inadvertently misled the pilot of the Europa.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Blackbushe AFISO had provided the Europa pilot inaccurate Traffic Information.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the Europa had inaccurate situational awareness of the aircraft present in the circuit. The pilot of the S200 had no situational awareness of their proximity to the Europa.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity devices fitted to the Europa would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the S200.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the Europa had not conformed with, nor avoided, the existing pattern of traffic.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the S200 had not sighted the Europa during the encounter, and the Europa pilot had sighted the S200 late.