AIRPROX REPORT No 2025252

Date: 13 Dec 2025 Time: 1157Z Position: 5241N 00104E Location: 7NM west of Norwich Airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	EC145	Unknown
Operator	HEMS	Unknown
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	Unknown
Service	Basic	Unknown
Provider	Norwich Radar	Unknown
Altitude/FL	980ft	Unknown
Transponder	A, C, S	None
Reported		
Colours	Yellow	Unknown
Lighting	Strobes, nav, ldg	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	1300ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1027hPa)	
Heading	276°	
Speed	120kt	
ACAS/TAS	TCAS I, SkyEcho	
Alert	None	
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	100ft V/0.25NM H	NK
Recorded	NK V/~0.1NM H	



THE EC145 PILOT reports that they had been in receipt of a Basic Service with Norwich Radar. Norwich Radar reported two primary contacts at the 11 o'clock position, moving left-to-right, with no height information. Both pilots visually identified one yellow aircraft approximately 2NM ahead and assessed no immediate conflict. A second aircraft was subsequently identified by one of the pilots. Shortly after, the pilot flying visually acquired this traffic at approximately 45° to the left, at a similar level, assessed as less than 100ft above and within 1NM, on a converging track. The pilot flying initiated an immediate avoiding action, descending at approximately 1500fpm to increase vertical separation. Following deconfliction, the aircraft was stabilised and continued en-route. The conflicting aircraft appeared to be a microlight or motor glider and was not believed to be in communication with Norwich Radar while operating slightly below their controlled airspace and only a few miles outside.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

Unfortunately, the **PILOT OF THE SECOND AIRCRAFT** could not be traced.

THE NORWICH RADAR CONTROLLER reports that, at approximately 1155, [EC145 c/s] departed Norwich tracking westbound under a Radar Control Service inside CAS and was given a Basic Service once outside CAS. The controller observed 2 primary contacts in the EC145's left, 11 o'clock at approximately 5NM, crossing left-to-right with no height information and called the traffic to the EC145 pilot, stating that they believed them to be outside CAS and below the CTA (1500ft). They once again called the traffic, with one in the EC145's left 11 o'clock and the second [by then] at their right 1 o'clock, within approximately 1NM. The EC145 pilot called visual with the closest primary contact and was descending as they were at a similar level to them (indicated at 1300ft). No Airprox was declared on frequency.

Norwich safety review

At approximately 1155 [EC145 c/s] departed […] tracking westbound under a Radar Control Service inside CAS and was given a Basic Service outside CAS. Two primary radar contacts were observed tracking north and were called to [EC145 c/s] whilst the helicopter was inside the Norwich CTA. The Traffic Information was updated as [EC145 c/s] left CAS with the pilot immediately calling visual and '*descending to avoid one of the contacts which appears to be at our level'*. No Airprox was declared on frequency by [EC145 c/s]. […].

The incident took place in good weather with all services available. Traffic levels were high and the ATCO concerned had already opened RAD2. Both non-SSR aircraft were painting clearly on the radar screen and the ATCO passed Traffic Information to [EC145 c/s] when they were approximately 5NM away. The Traffic Information was updated as [EC145 c/s] left CAS, with the pilot calling visual and descending to avoid one of the contacts. No further mention of the incident was made and no Airprox was declared.

Neither of the conflicting aircraft pilots attempted to call Norwich as they transited close to the western edge of the CTA (and beneath the CTR). Additionally, EC information was not observed from either conflicting aircraft at any stage.

Whilst the updated Traffic Information could have been more succinct, the pilot immediately saw and avoided the conflicting traffic with the information that was passed.

Whilst the conflicting aircraft may have been norad (no radio), [it is] alarming that 2 x non-SSR aircraft passed so close to the Norwich CTA without some form of communication with ATC (a telephone call if norad) as to their intentions. Norwich intended to contact GASCo, citing this example, to ask them to pass on information to airspace users to request that, wherever possible, aviators should inform ATC units that they are passing close to CAS.

The Norwich ATCO's actions were correct in recalling the traffic to [EC145 c/s], fulfilling the duty of care.

Factual Background

The weather at Norwich airfield was recorded as follows:

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METAR COR EGSH 131150Z 22008KT CAVOK 08/06 Q1027 NOSIG=
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Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

ATSI has nothing to add to the Norwich investigation.

UKAB Secretariat

The EC145 was tracked by radar and identified via Mode S data. The untraced aircraft was tracked via primary radar, did not appear on any of the other aircraft tracking tools available to the UKAB Secretariat, and could not be identified.

The EC145 and untraced pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the untraced pilot was required to give way to the EC145.[2]

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an EC145 and an untraced aircraft flew into proximity 7NM west of Norwich airfield at 1157Z on Saturday 13th December 2025. The EC145 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Norwich Radar. It was not possible to determine the flight rules or FIS utilised by the untraced pilot.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the EC145 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly discussed the role of the EC145 pilot, noting that they had departed Norwich under a Radar Control Service which had reduced to a Basic Service as the aircraft had egressed controlled airspace. The pilot reports having received Traffic Information regarding two unidentified contacts to the left of their track. That information had included lateral reference but no vertical element because the contacts had not displayed any height information to the controller, thus granting the EC145 pilot only generic situational awareness of the crossing aircraft (**CF2**). The EC145 pilots had identified a yellow aircraft crossing through their 12 o'clock at approximately 2NM, deeming it not to be a conflict and had then seen the second contact (the Airprox aircraft) much closer to their track and, having been concerned by its proximity, had initiated an avoidance manoeuvre (**CF4**). Although the EC145 had been equipped with a number of electronic conspicuity capabilities, it had not registered any electronic emissions from the conflicting untraced aircraft (**CF3**).

Members next considered the actions of the untraced aircraft pilot, noting that the aircraft had apparently carried no transponder or electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment. The Board wished to recommend to all operators that situational awareness can be gained through either EC means or RT. In this case, if the aircraft had been unequipped with EC, but had carried a radio, then a call to the relevant air traffic units as they pass greatly helps operators build that situational awareness. As the departing aircraft had been HEMS traffic, the crew's attention is often split between tasking and tracking and therefore all additional inputs help to maintain their situational awareness. Barring EC and RT contact, Board members re-stated the advice to 'Take 2' as a sensible additional safety net for those passing close to controlled airspace.

In reviewing the contribution by Norwich Radar, members noted that they had passed all available information to the EC145 pilot, acknowledging that, without a Mode C readout available to them, the information is considered generic (**CF1**) but, in this case had enabled the crew to visually acquire the untraced aircraft.

Concluding their discussion, members turned their attention to the determination of the risk of collision. They noted that the EC145 pilot had been given situational awareness of the presence of the untraced aircraft by Norwich Radar, had acquired it visually at relatively close range and had initiated avoiding action. Members consequently agreed that safety margins had been reduced much below the norm and were in agreement that there had been a risk of collision (**CF5**), assigning a Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025252			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			

1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
	• Outcome Events			
5	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the EC145 pilot had gained only generic situational awareness of the presence of the unknown aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the EC145 had been unable to register any electronic emissions from the unknown aircraft.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025252
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness