

**AIRPROX REPORT No 2025248**

Date: 07 Dec 2025 Time: 1747Z Position: 5353N 00144W Location: IVO Leeds/Bradford Airport

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	B737	ATR72
Operator	CAT	CAT
Airspace	Leeds/Bradford CTR	Leeds/Bradford CTR
Class	D	D
Rules	IFR	IFR
Service	Radar Control	Radar Control
Provider	Leeds/Bradford	Scottish Control
Altitude/FL	FL041	FL044
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	Company	Company
Lighting	NK	Wing, Logo, Strobes, Nav
Conditions	NK	IMC
Visibility	NR	NR
Altitude/FL	NR	NK
Altimeter	NK	SPS
Heading	NK	NK
Speed	NK	170kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	TCAS II
Alert	None	None
<b>Separation at CPA</b>		
Reported	NR	Not Seen
Recorded	300ft V/3.1NM H	



**THE B737 PILOT** reports that they conducted two go-arounds because of weather conditions at Leeds/Bradford making approaches unstable at a late stage. An Airprox occurred in first go-around due to the controller launching a slower ATR in front of them and amending their missed-approach brief to “Climb straight ahead to 4000ft” (standard practice for Leeds ATC and part of the issue to discuss as this default non-standard instruction contributed to the Airprox). They diverted to [alternate] and landed having declared “Minimum Fuel”.

The wind conditions at Leeds were much worse than reported by Leeds. It was not possible to maintain approach stability, not least through the very large thrust adjustments required (high and low) at very low altitude. The Airprox was unfortunate and the assumed instruction of ‘climb ahead 4000ft’ contributed to this, as it was passed without thinking about the slower ATR that the controller launched in front of them while they were on approach. The standard missed-approach procedure (MAP) of ahead to 2000ft then orbit to 3000ft to the LBA is more challenging to fly, especially in bad weather, but perhaps [in this] case a revised instruction of “turn right 340° climb 4000ft” would have alleviated the Airprox. As this developed, they were in the early stages of the go-around and, whilst the FO was fully occupied flying the aircraft, the Capt was at capacity as well monitoring the FO and moving the flaps and gear. Coincident with this was a large gust which turned out to overspeed the flaps by 3kt: the FO momentarily reduced thrust to counter before increasing again. They [the Capt] were fully engaged monitoring speed and flight vector trends at this moment. It was at this point ATC instructed them to “turn right 360” to which the Capt immediately responded “standby”. They could see the traffic on TCAS at about 2.5NM in their 10:30 and had to make a split-second decision about the immediacy of that, versus the very dynamic weather affecting the speed and profile of the aircraft. They chose ‘aviate’ over ‘navigate’ but this was more instinctive than cognitive. It was more important to monitor the profile of the aircraft in that instant, but it added some unwanted extra input to the equation! They did respond to the second instruction from ATC to turn right 360, which was accompanied by some explanation from them: [the

Capt] could tell they [the controller] were exercised as their separation criterion was compromised. They admit to filtering out the amplifying comment as waffle they didn't need. Their cognitive process at this point was working on FD, PFD, automation and vector and, on reflection, they knew that should the Airprox have been more pressing they would have received a TA, which they did not. They opined that there would be benefit in a [company] team speaking with LBA ATC management to discuss the standard MAP and assumptions about amendments, especially with other slower traffic in the vicinity.

They were ok for fuel for the two approaches and diversion to [alternate destination], but it took some minutes for Scottish to finally confirm that they would accept the aircraft. They opined that, on a dark and unpleasant night (unpleasant at alternate too) the last thing the crews needed was uncertainty about diversion destination. Task workload was already high enough, running the diversion checklist, programming the kit, briefing each other and the passengers, with low fuel, without being concerned about acceptance at a starred alternate. They were vectored as No5 to RW23R and declared 'minimum fuel' on base leg as any go-around would have put them into their final reserve.

**THE ATR72 PILOT** reports that they departed from RW32 on the N4W SID. On climb-out they are usually given a frequency change, so they suspect that they had left the Tower frequency and were therefore unaware of the jet behind them carrying out a go-around. They were not aware of any issues at the time.

**THE NATS SCOTTISH CONTROLLER** reports that they were operating as North and East combined Tac and Planner. The ATR72 [pilot] called them, climbing FL70 from Leeds/Bradford on a NEL4W, and they gave the pilot initial climb to FL90. Shortly afterwards, the Leeds Approach controller phoned and pointed out [B737 C/S] which had gone around, the controller advised that they were turning it right. [The ATR72] was turning westerly passing FL42 and the [B737 C/S] was climbing up to FL40. They were operating on a large range as North and East were combined and subsequently put on the static range and bearing to measure the approximate distances between the aircraft. At that point they had more than 5NM, however, it looked like they might have had less than 5NM when the [B737] was turning away and reaching FL40. The controller subsequently called in a planner and was relieved from the sector and asked for a radar replay to check whether separation was lost.

**THE LEEDS/BRADFORD TOWER CONTROLLER** reports that the ATR72 departing to [redacted] was given conditional line-up clearance behind a landing B737 on final, with [another aircraft] positioning on right base for the ILS RW32 approximately 15NM out. The initial spacing was then eroded by the differences in speed between the aircraft on final and the second on base leg. APS was requested to delay the second aircraft if possible. On landing, [the aircraft] was instructed to vacate at the end and hold at E2. [The ATR72 pilot] was subsequently given take-off clearance. After [the ATR72] was airborne and established in the climb, landing clearance was given to [the B737]. Once observed on the ATM as established on a westerly track and passing approximately altitude 2.3A, [the ATR72] was transferred to Scottish Control. [The B737 C/S] initiated a go-around on short final. On informing APS of the go-around, the APS controller confirmed that the revised MAP of climbing straight ahead to altitude 4A had been passed to [the B737 pilot], then shortly afterwards added an instruction to turn the aircraft onto heading 360°. This instruction was passed to the pilot, but not acknowledged and passed again, to which an acknowledgement was made. Traffic Information on the departing ATR72 was also passed.

**THE LEEDS/BRADFORD RADAR CONTROLLER** reports that they had taken the Radar position when the B737 had been transferred to the Tower controller on final approach RW32. The ATR72 was airborne on NELSA4W and transferred to Scottish Control before [the B737] went around on RW32 flying a revised missed approach, straight ahead climbing 4000ft. They instructed the Tower controller to turn the [B737 C/S] right, heading 360° to turn away from the [ATR72]. Scottish North Sector controller was informed the B737 was being turned right. The B737 was vectored round for another attempt [at landing on] RW32 but was unsuccessful and subsequently diverted.

## Factual Background

The weather at Leeds/Bradford was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNM 071720Z 24016KT 210V270 4000 -RADZ BR SCT002 BKN004 11/11 Q0988=

## Analysis and Investigation

### Leeds/Bradford Investigation

RAD1 was handed over at 1745. Revised missed approach procedure was passed to both inbounds due to the cross-wind.

[Uninvolved aircraft] on final RW32 was cleared to land, [the ATR72] was at D1 ready for departure, [B737 C/S] was wide left-base RW32.

[The ATR72 pilot] was given a conditional backtrack for RW32 subject to [uninvolved aircraft] at 4D. [The Tower controller asked Radar] for a gap against [the B737] who had about 21D from touchdown (but with a groundspeed of approximately 320kt).

By the time [the B737] reached 10D the [uninvolved aircraft] was still on final at 1D. The gap had reduced dramatically due to the strong tailwind on base.

[The ATR72] was airborne at 1745 with [the B737] at 3D. [The ATR72 pilot] was transferred to Scottish when passing 2300ft.

As [the ATR72] was passing 2.5D at 2400ft [the B737] commenced the go-around.

The missed approach instruction was revised by Radar to 'right heading 360° 4A' and passed to [the B737 pilot]. The Radar controller (now in position) advised Scottish of the go-around and action taken to avoid [the ATR72].

Lowest separation appears to have been 500ft and 3.5miles.

The Tower controller passed standard Traffic Information to [the B737 pilot] regarding [the ATR72].

Analysis.

The requested gap between inbounds reduced dramatically due [to a] strong tailwind on base. Consideration should have been given to cancelling the conditional backtrack.

Traffic departing RW32 with landing traffic on short final was transferred too early to Scottish. There [would have been] no loss of separation if both aircraft had remained with Leeds.

Earlier 'avoiding action...' phraseology may have alerted [the B737 pilot] to the requirement for an earlier turn onto 360°.

### NATS Investigation

The North and East (NE) controller was operating the North and East sectors in a band-boxed configuration in a combined Tactical and Planner role. Note: All times UTC.

Leeds ATC provided the following initial background information in the lead-up to the event:

Revised missed approach passed to both inbounds due cross-wind. [An aircraft] on final RW32 cleared to land, [ATR72 C/S] at D1 ready for departure, [unrelated aircraft] wide left base 32. [ATR72 C/S] was given a conditional backtrack for 32 subject to [another aircraft] at 4D. [ADC position] asked for a gap against [B737 C/S] who had about 21D from touchdown (but with a groundspeed of approximately 320kt). By the time [B737 C/S] reached 10D the [unrelated aircraft] was still on final at 1D. The gap had reduced

dramatically due to the strong tailwind on base. [ATR72 C/S] was airborne at 1745 with [B737] at 3D. [ATR72 C/S] was transferred to Scottish when passing 2300ft. As [ATR72 C/S] was passing 2.5D at 2400ft, [B737 C/S] commenced the go-around.

[ATR72 C/S] departed RW32 and the pilot contacted Scottish Control at 1745:52, reporting on a NELSA 4W SID passing 2800ft climbing to FL70. The NE controller instructed the pilot to standby as they were on a telephone call coordinating another aircraft with an adjacent sector.

[B737 C/S], on final approach RW32, reached approximately 800ft at 1745:55 before commencing a climb as a result of the pilot initiating a go-around.

Immediately following the telephone call being ended, the NE controller contacted the pilot of [ATR72 C/S] at 1746:22 and instructed the aircraft to climb now to FL90 with a request for the pilot to report their passing altitude.



Figure 1

Separation minima was eroded at 1746:27 (Figure 1). Note: Both aircraft were within the Leeds CTR (SFC-FL85). The pilot of [the ATR72] reported passing 3600ft and read back their climb instruction correctly at 1746:36.



Figure 2

Minimum Separation occurred at 1746:39 and was recorded on Multi-Track Radar as 3.1NM and 300ft where 5.0NM or 1000ft were required (Figure 2).

The NE controller answered a telephone call from Leeds Radar at 1746:43. The Leeds controller informed the NE controller that [the B737] was going around and would be turning right heading 360°. The NE controller approved the coordination.

Leeds ATC stated, *'The missed approach instruction was revised by radar to 'Right HDG360 4A' and passed to [the B737 pilot]. [RAD1] advised Scottish of the go-around and action taken to avoid [the ATR72]. [ADC] passed standard traffic info to [the B737 pilot] regarding [the ATR72].'*

Leeds ATC was unable to apply reduced separation due to the cloud ceiling. Separation was restored at 1747:23 when 5.0NM lateral separation was achieved.

The NE controller stated in their CA4114, *'I was on a large range as North and East were combined and subsequently put on the Static R&B to measure the approximate distances between the aircraft. At that point they had more than 5nm, however, it looked like they might have had less than 5nm when the [B737] was turning away and reaching FL40. I subsequently called in a planner and was relieved from the sector.'*

The NATS4118 detailed, *'The TAC [NE controller] advised they were moderately busy working as combined TAC and Planner when Leeds phoned to advise the [B737] was going around and they were turning on to 360°. The TAC [NE controller] had replied 'coordinated' and continued with a couple of other tasks. The TAC [NE controller] advised that they were working on quite a big range but questioned the separation achieved between the go-around traffic and the [ATR72] they were working. The TAC [NE controller] had dialled in the range and used the ERBM to take a rough measurement. This was historic but the TAC [NE controller] felt it was potentially less than the required 5NM so immediately called a Planner and explained the situation before being relieved from sector. When asked about the use of avoiding action or Traffic Information the TAC [NE controller] advised they didn't realise it was a LOS until after the event and at the time of the rough measurement the two aircraft were already 5NM apart tracking in opposite directions.'*

Leeds ATC initial analysis – *'The requested gap between inbounds reduced dramatically due strong tailwind on base. Consideration should have been given to cancelling the conditional backtrack. Traffic departing RW32 with landing traffic on short final was transferred too early to Scottish. There was no loss of separation if both aircraft had remained with Leeds. Earlier 'avoiding action...' phraseology may have alerted [the B737 pilot] to the requirement for an earlier turn onto 360°.'*

*The main debrief/learning points seems to be a lack of awareness/appreciation of the slow climbing aircraft, followed by an early transfer to PC. Had it remained on the Leeds Tower frequency, it would have been close, but separation would have remained.'*

## Conclusions

The Airprox occurred when the pilot of [B737 C/S] initiated a go-around at Leeds with a revised missed approach instruction by Leeds ATC of climbing to 4000ft on heading 360°. Departing [ATR72 C/S] was transferred to the PC North sector frequency too early by Leeds, and the relative trajectories between the two aircraft were such that the increased separation minima were eroded. Closest Point of Approach occurred at 1746:39 and was recorded on Multi-Track Radar as 3.1NM and 300ft where 5NM or 1000ft were required. The incident was resolved by Leeds ATC amending the missed approach instruction for [B737 C/S] to ensure the lateral distance against [ATR72 C/S] improved. Leeds ATC passed Traffic Information to [the B737 pilot] regarding [the ATR72].

## UKAB Secretariat

The B737 and ATR72 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a B737 and an ATR72 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Leeds/Bradford Airport at 1747Z on Sunday 7<sup>th</sup> December 2025. The B737 pilot was operating under IFR in unreported met conditions, in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Leeds/Bradford. The ATR72 pilot was operating under IFR in IMC, in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Scottish Control.

### **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the actions of the Leeds/Bradford controllers. Members were told that the B737 had been inbound in poor and blustery weather conditions, in receipt of an ATS from the Radar controller. The Tower controller had asked the Radar controller for some extra separation in order to allow the ATR72 to get airborne, which they had duly actioned, although the tailwind had degraded this slightly. The Radar controller had given the B737 pilot amended MAP instructions (to climb ahead to 4000ft) in case of a go-around. Members then discussed the MAP at Leeds/Bradford, with a member with local knowledge noting that pilots were frequently given an amended MAP, because it was known that the published MAP (climb to 2000ft and turn on track for the beacon) could be difficult for pilots to follow, a point which was echoed by members with CAT experience who noted that a turn at 2000ft in gusty conditions could be difficult to fly accurately. Other controller members also told the Board that many airfields frequently dynamically amend their MAP to deconflict from departing aircraft, with some pilots even requesting an amendment prior to making an approach, so they assured the Board that providing MAP amendments was standard practice. Members were also told that to permanently change a MAP would involve conducting a formal Airspace Change Proposal (ACP) which could be a lengthy and expensive process.

Members were reminded that the standard separation required between two aircraft at the same level under the control of Leeds/Bradford was 3NM, but that once the ATR72 pilot had left the Leeds frequency, 5NM had been required. Once the ATR72 had been established in the climb and had passed 2000ft, the Tower controller had sent the pilot over to the Scottish controller's frequency in accordance with the prebriefed clearance. The weather at Leeds/Bradford had been blustery and further stormy weather had been forecast, and so members wondered whether the Tower controller could have predicted that go-arounds had been likely and could have kept the ATR72 pilot on their frequency for longer. They were told that passing through 3000ft would have been the usual point for transfer and, had the controller done so, the loss of separation would not have occurred (**CF4**). Members discussed whether the Tower controller had been correct in allowing the ATR72 to get airborne ahead of approaching traffic, but agreed that, had the ATR72 pilot remained on the Tower frequency, then standard separation would have been maintained, justifying the sequencing. However, once the ATR72 pilot had left the Tower frequency, the Radar controller had been required to achieve 5NM lateral separation with the following B737 because the two aircraft were both climbing. Members noted that the controller could have stopped the climb of the B737 at 3000ft but instead chose to achieve lateral separation. The Radar controller had therefore issued the B737 pilot with a turn onto 360°, which the B737 pilot had reported not responding to initially, but which they had eventually taken. The delay in the pilot taking up the heading had been unfortunate, and members thought that, had the controller prefixed the request for the turn with the phrase 'avoiding action', the wording would have alerted the pilot to the urgency of the requirement to turn (**CF2**). A brief discussion followed about anecdotal evidence from controllers that pilots conducting a MAP would prefer not to receive additional, urgent instructions, but members quickly agreed that the use of avoiding action was an important tool available to controllers, to ensure that pilots understood the gravity of a situation and took the instruction with the minimum of delay, and that controllers should not be discouraged from using it. In the event, the delay in the turn meant that, although 3NM separation had been achieved, 5NM had been required, resulting in a loss of separation (**CF1**, **CF3**).

Members briefly discussed the actions of the Scottish controller but quickly agreed that there had been very little that the controller could have done in the circumstances; they had initially been unaware that the B737 had been climbing out behind the ATR72. When they had been informed about the B737, they had been told that the Leeds/Bradford controller would turn the B737 right to remain clear, therefore they could have justifiably expected that the Leeds/Bradford controller would have achieved the required separation.

Turning to the actions of the B737 pilot, members with CAT experience acknowledged that it could be a high cockpit workload when executing a MAP in windy weather conditions. The pilot reported that they had been aware of, and concerned by, the position of the aircraft on the climb-out ahead of them (**CF5**), but that cockpit workload had dictated that they prioritize other tasks. Nevertheless, they noted that in not following the controller's request to turn, the pilot had exacerbated the situation with lateral separation reducing further. Noting the comments by the pilot regarding the weather reported at Leeds/Bradford being worse than expected, members highlighted that the TAF timed at 1720 reported the wind speed as 16kt, and they wished to remind pilots that reporting gusts need to be above 10kt from the mean, therefore within this meteorological report pilots should expect that the wind could be gusting up to 25kt.

Although outwith the Airprox, controlling members wished to address the concerns of the B737 pilot with regard to the subsequent diversion. They noted that the pilot reported that the Scottish controller had taken 'some minutes' to confirm the diversion and highlighted that the time taken would have been used by the controller to confirm with the diverting airfield that they had been willing to take the aircraft, furthermore, that it can take some time to receive that confirmation. Members opined that many airports were reluctant to take on diversions, with some having an outright position of refusing diversions, in part due to lack of facilities and handling availability, leaving controllers 'stuck in the middle' and frequently left with no option but to encourage pilots to declare a fuel emergency in order to be accepted.

Finally, the Board briefly considered the actions of the ATR72 pilot and quickly agreed that there had been nothing more that the pilot could have done; they had followed ATC instructions and had switched to the Scottish controller's frequency when instructed. They had not been aware of the situation unfolding behind them.

When determining the risk of collision, members considered the reports from both pilots and the controllers, together with the radar replay screenshots. Members quickly agreed that actions by the Leeds/Bradford Radar controller had ensured that there had been no risk of collision, but they unanimously agreed that, at 3NM instead of 5NM, the loss of standard separation meant that safety had been degraded; Risk Category C.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### Contributory Factors:

	2025248			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Ground Elements</b>				
<b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b>				
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
<b>• Situational Awareness and Action</b>				
2	Human Factors	• Conflict Resolution-Inadequate	An event involving the inadequate provision of conflict resolution	
3	Human Factors	• Separation Provision	An event involving Air Navigation Services separation provision.	
4	Human Factors	• Traffic Management Information Provision	An event involving traffic management information provision	The ANS instructions contributed to the Airprox
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>				

5	Human Factors	• Unnecessary Action	Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
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**Degree of Risk:** C.

**Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>2</sup>**

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:


**Ground Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because 5NM separation had been required between the two aircraft, but only 3.1NM had been achieved.

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **partially effective** because by sending the ATR72 to Scottish, ATC had set the conditions where 5NM separation had been required, when, by keeping it on frequency, 3NM would have been sufficient.

**Flight Elements:**

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **not used** because the Leeds/Bradford controller was required to maintain separation between the aircraft and the pilots were responding to controller instructions.



<sup>2</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).