AIRPROX REPORT No 2025175

Date: 02 Aug 2025 Time: 1200Z Position: 5350N 00111W Location: Leeds East ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152(A)	C152(B)
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Leeds East ATZ	Leeds East ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Fenton Radio	Fenton Radio
Altitude/FL	A001	A001
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Strobes, nav, landing	Strobes, nav, landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	200ft	500ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH (1018hPa)
Heading	240°	NK
Speed	65kt	70kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/100ft H	"*not seen*"
Recorded	0ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE C152(A) PILOT reports that they were conducting instructional general-handling to the north of York. The conditions were excellent with very good visibility. They made a visual recovery back to Leeds East via the Naburn VRP. They called for the airfield details approaching Naburn, called for a long finals approach at 1500ft at Naburn and proceeded towards the airfield. They had been aware that there was another aircraft in the circuit as they had maintained a listening watch on Fenton Radio throughout. A straight-in approach from their position seemed most appropriate as traffic was light (there is no dead side at Leeds East, and no overhead joins [that day] due to a competition). On proceeding towards the airfield, they looked hard for the other traffic but could not see it. The background lighting did not help as it was white and they were looking for a white aircraft. They were not sure if it was even still in the circuit as there seemed to be an absence of RT from the pilot. About three miles out, [the pilot of C152(A)] called 'long finals' to land and did not hear any calls from the other pilot as they left Naburn. Approaching 400ft, they called 'short finals' and then heard the other pilot also call 'finals'. Clearly, the other aircraft was still in the circuit, and they then assumed that it was behind them. However, the other aircraft was obscured by the right-hand cockpit door until they suddenly saw it below them. The other pilot did not seem to be aware of [C152(A)] at all. The [pilot of C152(A)] immediately commenced a go-around, keeping the other aircraft in sight at all times. The other pilot completed a touch-and-go and then turned downwind at the normal point. [The pilot of C152(A)] waited until [C152(B)] was well ahead before following.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE C152(B) PILOT reports that they were flying solo-circuits and had made all the calls and checks for a circuit e.g. a downwind call and final calls. They had heard someone call final but, as they were on base leg turning onto final, and had called final on the radio, they looked to their left and right and [continued to] turn onto final. When they turned in, and about to touch down (100-200ft above the

ground) they heard the go-around call from [the pilot of C152(A)]. At that time, they did not see where [C152(A)] was as they had been pitching downwards with flaps set to 3, and they did not see [C152(A)] above them.

[The pilot of C152(B) commented that] they had a feeling that their engine was losing power and, upon checking after landing, they found out that the right magneto was faulty.

THE LEEDS EAST AGO reports that [C152(B)] was being flown by a solo student in the circuit who had flown around five circuits at 1000ft. [The pilot of C152(A)] called to join and stated that they would join on a long final. The [pilot of C152(B)] called downwind followed by base leg. The next thing heard was the [pilot of C152(A)] on long finals calling going around. The aircraft appeared to be quite close but it was difficult to tell exactly how close from their position.

Factual Background

The website for Leeds East airport provides the following procedures:

> General Procedures
>
> All fixed-wing circuits are to the north of the runway at 1000ft.
>
> All approaches to Church Fenton to be via reporting Visual Reference Points (VRP's) at 1500ft.
>
> Aircraft joining on a straight in approach from outside the ATZ are to give way to traffic already established in the visual circuit. Please be prepared to give way to traffic on base leg in the visual circuit.

A NOTAM for the restriction of overhead joins at Leeds East:

> H5831/25
> Q) EGTT/QWBLW/IV/M/AW/000/041/5350N00112W003
> A) EGCM B) FROM: 25/08/02 08:00 TO: 25/08/03 16:00
> E) AEROBATICS WI 2NM RADIUS OF 535004N 0011144W (TADCASTER). NO OVERHEAD JOINS. FOR INFO 01937 534194. AR-2025-5882/01.
> LOWER: SFC
> UPPER: 4100FT AMSL
> SCHEDULE: 0800-1600

The weather at Leeds Bradford Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNM 021150Z 27009KT 9999 FEW035 SCT045 18/08 Q1018
METAR EGNM 021220Z 26010KT 240V330 9999 FEW035 SCT045 18/08 Q1018
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 1). The C152(B), but not C152(A), was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.



Figure 1

The aircraft were depicted on the radar replay as having flown at Flight Levels. A suitable correction was applied to determine their respective altitudes. The diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined from the radar data.



Figure 2 – CPA at 1200:06 (radar data)



Figure 3 – Aircraft positions at the approximate time of CPA (ADS-B and MLAT data)

The C152(A) and C152(B) pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

aircraft in operation.[2] When two or more heavier-than-air aircraft are approaching an aerodrome or an operating site for the purpose of landing, aircraft at the higher level shall give way to aircraft at the lower level, but the latter shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is in the final stages of an approach to land, or to overtake that aircraft.[3]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when C152(A) and C152(B) flew into proximity in the Leeds East ATZ at 1200Z on Saturday 2nd August 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, and in receipt of an AGCS from Fenton Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, a report from the AGO involved and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of C152(A), and members noted that they had elected to recover to Leeds East airfield with a 'straight-in' approach. As such, it was agreed that it had been of paramount importance for them to have been certain of the presence and position of any circuit traffic. Indeed, members noted that the pilot of C152(A) had maintained a listening-watch on the Fenton Radio frequency and had gathered generic situational awareness of an aircraft in the circuit (**CF5**). However, members noted that the pilot of C152(A) had recalled a lack of position calls made by the other pilot and had not been certain of their position. Members were in agreement that it may have been advantageous to the C152(A) pilot to have requested the position of the other aircraft before continuing their straight-in approach to the airfield (**CF3**).

Members agreed that the EC device fitted to C152(A) would have been expected to have detected the presence of C152(B) and alerted to its proximity, however, no alert was reported (**CF7**).

The pilot of C152(A) had known of the presence of C152(B) but had not sighted it converging from their right as they had joined the final approach. It was clear to members that the pilot of C152(A) had not complied with the procedure to give way to aircraft already established in the circuit (**CF1**) and had therefore not conformed with (or avoided) the existing pattern of traffic (**CF2**). Indeed, it was noted that it had only been after they had heard the pilot of C152(B) make a call of 'final' that they had been certain that C152(B) had still been in the circuit. Members concurred that, as the pilot of C152(A) recalled that they had called 'final' first that they had made an assumption that C152(B) had been behind them. However, that had not been the case and they had not been aware that the pilot of C152(B) had been ahead (and above) and had descended through the glideslope of C152(A), albeit with some lateral offset, unsighted. It was agreed that C152(B) had been obscured from the view of the pilot of C152(A) (**CF9**) and it had not been sighted until it had been below them. Consequently, it was agreed that C152(B) had been sighted after CPA and, therefore, it had effectively been a non-sighting (**CF8**). Members appreciated that the pilot of C152(A) had initiated a go-around to increase separation once C152(B) had been visually acquired.

Turning their attention to the actions of the pilot of C152(B), members pondered the situational awareness that they had held. It was appreciated that the pilot of C152(B) had limited flight experience, and the introduction of another aircraft into their mental model of the circuit had required careful consideration. It was noted that the pilot of C152(B) had heard the call of 'final' made by the pilot of C152(A) and members agreed that they had therefore gained generic situational awareness (**CF5**). However, as they had already turned (or had been turning) onto final themselves, but had not visually acquired C152(A), it was agreed that they had not assimilated that a conflict had been likely (**CF6**). It

[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.
[3] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (4)(i).

was noted that the pilot of C152(B) had attempted to visually acquire C152(A) by "looking left and right" as they had turned onto final but had not sighted C152(A) at any stage (**CF8**).

Members suggested that, had a compatible EC device been fitted to C152(B), then the pilot of C152(B) may have received an early warning that may have assisted with their awareness and subsequent management of the unfolding situation. Members strongly encouraged all flying schools to equip their aircraft with additional EC devices.

In consideration of the actions of the Leeds East AGO, members agreed that they had not been permitted to have sequenced the traffic, or to have suggested a sequence to land. However, some members wondered whether they had had an opportunity to have passed Traffic Information to each pilot about the other aircraft, or to have asked each pilot to verify if they had been in visual contact with the other aircraft.

Concluding their discussion, members summarised their thoughts. It was noted that the narrative reports from both pilots, and from the AGO, were somewhat incongruent with respect to the timing of the making and hearing of certain position calls. After pondering the three accounts, members agreed that, on balance, the pilot of C152(B) had not heard the joining call made by the pilot of C152(A) that they had been (or had intended to join) on 'long-final' (**CF4**). It was also agreed that the pilot of C152(A) had not heard the call of 'final' made by the pilot of C152(B) (**CF4**). However, it was noted that both pilots had gleaned generic situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft but that both pilots had subsequently made an assumption about the position of other aircraft without confirmation through visual acquisition or by requesting further information. Members felt that, for both pilots, this encounter had highlighted that 'just looking harder' had not been sufficient to have resolved the situation and that early positive action had been required to have ensured that they had known exactly where the other aircraft had been and to have been certain that it had been safe to continue.

Members agreed that the separation between the aircraft had reduced to the bare minimum and had only stopped short of an actual collision due to marginal, and entirely providential, lateral separation (**CF10**). The Board assigned Risk Category A to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025175			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Human Factors	• Lack of Communication	Events involving flight crew that did not communicate enough - not enough communication	Pilot did not request additional information
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Communications	Events involving flight crew that did not appropriately monitor communications	
5	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
6	Human Factors	• Understanding/ Comprehension	Events involving flight crew that did not understand or comprehend a situation or instruction	Pilot did not assimilate conflict information
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			

7	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
8	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
9	Contextual	• Visual Impairment	Events involving impairment due to an inability to see properly	One or both aircraft were obscured from the other
	• Outcome Events			
10	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: A.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Leeds East AGO had not been permitted to have sequenced the traffic.

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of C152(A) had not complied with the published procedure to give way to traffic already established in the visual circuit.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of C152(A) had not conformed with, nor avoided, the pattern of traffic formed by the pilot of C152(B).

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of C152(B) had not assimilated information pertaining to a potential conflict with C152(A), and the pilot of C152(A) had not requested additional information as to the position of C152(B) within the circuit.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC device fitted to C152(A) would have been expected to have alerted to the proximity of C152(B) but no alert was reported.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of C152(B) had not sighted C152(A) during the encounter, and C152(B) had been obscured from the view of the pilot of C152(A) until after the moment of CPA.

[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025175
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness