AIRPROX REPORT No 2025196

Date: 04 Sep 2025 Time: 1228Z Position: 5114N 00133W Location: ivo of Thruxton Airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	FA200
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Thruxton ATZ	Thruxton ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Thruxton Radio	Thruxton Radio
Altitude	NR	~880ft
Transponder	None[1]	None[2]
Reported		
Colours	Red	Red/white stripes
Lighting	Bcn, nav, landing	Nav and landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude	550ft AGL	~600ft AGL
Altimeter	QFE (993hPa)	QFE
Heading	160°	251°
Speed	80kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	50ft V/100m H	Not seen
Recorded	NK V/ 0.25NM H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were flying as the instructor for a club checkout, doing circuits at Thruxton using runway 25RH. There was one other aircraft in the same circuit, a student, and they had a good half a circuit separation from each other. Whilst they were in the climbout, [the pilot of] another aircraft called for a join from [waypoint]. They were told, by the ATC,[3] that there were 2 aircraft in the circuit. The [pilot of the] joining aircraft asked for a straight in approach and [the PA28 pilot believed that] ATC told them they must give way to circuit traffic.[4] After they turned base leg, ATC asked if they could see the other aircraft. They replied they could see them and, as they were on a fixed bearing in their 10 to 11 o'clock and on a collision course, they asked if [the pilot of the other aircraft] was going to climb for an overhead join. The other aircraft [pilot] carried on with their approach, not giving way. Whilst ATC told the [pilot of the] conflicting aircraft about [the PA28] on base leg, [the PA28 instructor] took control and descended their aircraft beyond the normal glidepath and also turned left to avoid a collision. They passed the other aircraft below and behind it. At closest approach they estimated 100m, their student estimated 120m. They completed the turn onto final and handed control back to their student. The other aircraft was now in front, by approximately 200m, and climbing slowly. They spoke to the pilot on the ground and they were apologetic saying they did not see them at all. They only started climbing when ATC told them that [the PA28] was on base leg. They said they were aware of the correct Thruxton modified overhead join [they recalled] and should have used it instead of a straight in approach. Usually a straight in approach at Thruxton is only possible with no circuit traffic and practically impossible to do with 2 aircraft in the circuit.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

[1] The PA28 pilot reported operating Modes A, C and S, but these were not observed on radar.
[2] The FA200 pilot reported operating Modes A and C, but these were not observed on radar.
[3] The PA28 pilot's references to ATC are intended to reference the Thruxton Radio Air/Ground Operator (not ATC).
[4] The Thruxton Air/Ground operator provided advice only, in accordance with CAP 452, Chapter 4, Limitations.

THE FA200 PILOT reports that the planned flight was from [departure] to Thruxton. Boscombe Down was contacted and they were given a Basic Service. As they neared Thruxton they were advised to contact Thruxton once visual. This they did. As their track was in line with the RW25 [centreline] they advised Thruxton that they would make a direct approach. Thruxton Radio advised that they had two aircraft in the circuit and that they should give way to circuit traffic. They heard [the pilot of] an aircraft announce that they were downwind. They continued the approach and requested that their pilot passenger alert them when they were 2NM final. This [the passenger] did, and [the PIC] announced that *"*[C/S] *was 2 miles final."* Shortly after, [a pilot] announced that they were base. As they had not detected any aircraft visually and on hearing that an aircraft was on base they immediately initiated a climb and go-around, having assessed that a conflict was likely. Very soon after, [a pilot] announced to Thruxton Radio that they were filing an Airprox as an aircraft had passed within 100m of them. There was no indication in the call, or subsequently, as to the relative aspects of the aircraft during the Airprox. At no time did the other [pilot] state that they had contact with [the FA200].

Having elected to go-around they made a circuit, announcing that they were downwind and final at the prescribed circuit heights. They landed on RW25 and taxied to the fuel bowser. The pilot of the other aircraft approached them to say that they were filing an official Airprox. [The FA200 pilot] accepted that they could have, and perhaps should have, elected to make an overhead join rather than a direct approach.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE THRUXTON AIR/GROUND RADIO OPERATOR reports that they were the Duty Aerodrome Operations manager at the time of the incident. They had one aircraft in the circuit doing touch-and-goes, instructor and student on board. The pilot of [the FA200] called on the RT inbound and requested airfield information. They passed [the FA200 pilot] RW25 right-hand circuit and the QFE. They asked if they could join straight in for RW25. They informed [the FA200 pilot] that there was one aircraft downwind in the circuit. As they got closer [the FA200 pilot] announced their intention to join straight in. The aircraft in the circuit was now on [base-leg] and the instructor called on the RT that *"Assume the joining traffic is going around?"* The pilot of the straight-in traffic did not respond so they advised [them] they should join through the overhead. This [the FA200 pilot] acknowledged, added power and began to climb to join in the overhead. At the time, from their view, the joining traffic was above and in front of the [base-leg] traffic.

Factual Background

The weather at Boscombe Down was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGDM 041120Z 25013KT 9999 FEW025 17/10 Q1005 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU
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The relevant AIP entry for RW25 recommended joining instructions at Thruxton are as follows:

3 CIRCUITS

d. The following are recommended circuit joining procedures:

ii. Runway 25 in use

1. Joining from the east, fly along the runway centreline, at the Runway 07 threshold turn crosswind, descend to circuit height when crosswind.
2. Joining from the west, notify A/G of intent to join downwind, descend to circuit height at the ATZ boundary, enter the circuit via the downwind leg.

e. The following circuit directions apply for fixed wing aircraft when the specified runways are in use:

- Runway 07 - LH
- Runway 25 - RH
- Runway 12 - RH
- Runway 30 – LH

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of aircraft tracking sources was undertaken and both the PA28 and the FA200 were detected using ADS-B data sources (Figure 1). Given that neither the PA28 pilot nor the FA200 pilot reported having additional electronic conspicuity equipment fitted to their aircraft, it was assessed that the ADS-B data for both was likely emitted from a working transponder, even though there were no transponder Modes A,C, or S detected at the time of this Airprox. It was acknowledged that, due to poor radar coverage, particularly at low level, neither aircraft was detected on the NATS radar replay at the time of the CPA, but the PA28 had been observed operating Mode S on an earlier flight.



Figure 1 – Time ~1227:45

Unfortunately, the altitude readouts for the PA28 were unreliable, mostly reading 0ft during the circuit prior to CPA, which was assessed to have occurred at 1227:58 by interpolation of positions viewed on ADS-B data sources. The lateral separation between the aircraft was recorded as 0.25NM but the vertical separation could not be established.

The PA28 and FA200 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[5] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[6]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and an FA200 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Thruxton Airfield at 1228Z on Thursday 4th September 2025. Both the PA28 and FA200 pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an Air/Ground Communication Service from Thruxton Radio.

[5] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[6] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, ADS-B data for both aircraft, the FA200 GPS track data, and a report from the AGCS operator involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the PA28 pilot, and noted that the pilot had been aware of the approaching FA200, and had responded via RT that they had been visual with the FA200 during its approach to Thruxton. The Board noted that the PA28 pilot had decided to manoeuvre their aircraft below and behind the FA200 *'to avoid a collision'* after not having received a response to their question regarding the FA200 pilot's intentions to join via the overhead, and members agreed that the PA28 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the FA200 (**CF7**).

The Board then considered the actions of the FA200 pilot, and noted that the pilot had been informed that there had been 2 aircraft in the circuit, and that they were to give way to circuit traffic. The Board wondered why the FA200 pilot, on noting that the circuit had been active, had not entered the circuit pattern via the overhead, and members agreed that the FA200 pilot had executed an ineffective join onto a long final approach instead of following the recommended procedure to join via the overhead (**CF1**). The Board felt that the FA200 pilot had planned to fly a direct track to the final approach and had not considered making an early adjustment to that plan prior to having heard the PA28 pilot call from a base leg position, and members agreed that the FA200 pilot had neither adequately adapted their plan to have prevented conflicting with aircraft in the circuit (**CF2**) nor had they conformed with the pattern of traffic already formed (**CF3**). Members further agreed that, regardless of the circuit traffic details provided by the AGCS operator, the FA200 pilot had not assimilated that their approach may have conflicted with established circuit traffic (**CF4**), and had continued their approach. The Board was satisfied that the FA200 pilot had made the decision to go around after having heard the pilot of the PA28 and members agreed that the pilot of the FA200 had not sighted the PA28 (**CF6**). [UKAB Secretariat note: Subsequent to the Board assessing this Airprox, the FA200 pilot provided information that they had been equipped with an EC device (as defined in the data-block at page 1 of this report). The FA200 pilot reported that they had not received any alert from this device when it might have been expected that it would have done so (**CF5**), so this had not contributed to the FA200 pilot's situational awareness and therefore does not materially affect the Board's discussions.]

Turning their attention to the actions of the Thruxton AGCS Operator, the Board noted that the Operator had been very helpful with the provision of circuit traffic information, checking that the PA28 pilot had been visual with the FA200 and finally advising the FA200 pilot to join via the overhead.

In bringing their discussion to a close and assigning a risk category, the Board noted that the PA28 pilot had reacted to a potential conflict by manoeuvring to a position where they could continue to monitor the FA200, and the FA200 pilot had decided to climb to execute an overhead join and remove themselves from the conflict. Members agreed that, while safety had been degraded, effective avoiding action had been taken by both pilots to prevent the aircraft from coming into close proximity, and there had been no risk of collision. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025196			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption

3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Human Factors	• Understanding/Comprehension	Events involving flight crew that did not understand or comprehend a situation or instruction	Pilot did not assimilate conflict information
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[7]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the FA200 pilot had not conformed with the pattern of traffic already formed and had not adequately adapted their plan to align with the circuit traffic.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the FA200 pilot had not assimilated the conflict with the PA28 in the circuit.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity device in the FA200 did not alert as expected.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the FA200 pilot had not seen the PA28, and the PA28 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the FA200.

[7] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025196 Outside Controlled Airspace